United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division
ANTHONY C. BARRETT, Petitioner
CHRIS MCCONNELL, Respondent
H.L. PEREZ-MONTES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 filed by pro se Petitioner
Anthony C. Barrett (“Barrett”) (#69617-061).
Barrett is an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”), incarcerated at the United
States Penitentiary in Pollock, Louisiana. Barrett challenges
the legality of his sentence as well as the calculation of
his sentence and custody classification level by the BOP.
Barrett has not shown that he exhausted administrative
remedies, or that he is entitled to proceed under §
2241, he must AMEND his Petition (ECF No. 1).
alleges that was convicted of unlawful possession of a
firearm and armed bank robbery. ECF No. 1 at 1. Barrett
claims that he was sentenced “beyond the statutory
maximum.” ECF No. 1 at 1.
further alleges that he is entitled to a recalculation of his
sentence under the “First Step Act.” ECF No. 1 at
Barrett alleges that his custody classification level was
improperly changed from a 24 to a 27, resulting in his
placement at a United States Penitentiary rather than a
Federal Correctional Institution. ECF No. 1 at 7.
Instructions to Amend
may challenge the computation of his sentence under §
2241. However, a petitioner seeking relief under § 2241
“must first exhaust his administrative remedies through
the Bureau of Prisons.” Rourke v. Thompson, 11
F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1990)); United
States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
prerequisite to § 2241 relief). An exception to this
requirement may be made if the petitioner demonstrates
“extraordinary circumstances” such as the
unavailability of administrative remedies, the
inappropriateness of the remedies, or the futility of
pursuing such remedies. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61,
62 (5th Cir. 1994). The petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating the inappropriateness or futility of
administrative review. See Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62.
has not established that he fully exhausted administrative
remedies as to his sentence computation and custody
classification claims. Barrett must amend his Petition (ECF
No. 1) to state whether he filed an administrative remedy
regarding both of these claims, and whether he appealed the
denial of relief through the regional and national levels. If
so, Barrett shall provide copies of the responses received at
each level. If Barrett did not fully exhaust, he must explain
what, if any, extraordinary circumstances prevented him from
properly exhausting. See Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62.
also challenges the legality of the sentence imposed by
another federal court. A motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
should ordinarily be used to vacate, set aside, or correct a
sentence based on sentencing errors. See Cox v. Warden,
Federal Detention Ctr., 911 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir.
1990) (citing United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840,
842 (5th Cir. 1980)). The claims that are cognizable under
§ 2255 are broadly defined to include allegations that
“judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that
the sentence imposed was not authorized by law . . . or that
there has been such a denial or infringement of the
constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the
judgment vulnerable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Because
Barrett alleges that he was sentenced beyond what was legally
permissible, Barrett's claim must typically be raised in
a § 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court.
§ 2255 contains a “savings clause”
provision, which is a limited exception to the rule that a
§ 2241 petition may not be used to challenge the
validity of a federal sentence and conviction. See Pack
v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). The clause
allows a prisoner to rely on § 2241 if the remedy
available under § 2255 would be “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255(e). The petitioner bears the burden of
affirmatively proving the inadequacy of § 2255. See
McGhee v. Hanberry, 604 F.2d 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1979).
Fifth Circuit has identified the limited circumstances under
which the savings clause of § 2255 applies. To fall
under this provision, a petitioner must demonstrate that: (1)
his claim is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme
Court decision; (2) the Supreme Court decision establishes
that he was “actually innocent” of the charges
against him because the decision decriminalized the conduct
for which he was convicted; and (3) his claim would have been
foreclosed by existing circuit precedent had he raised it at
trial, on direct appeal, or in his original § 2255
petition. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243
F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). Therefore, ...