United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division
T. TRIMBLE, JR JUDGE
H.L. PEREZ-MONTES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is a Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 19) filed
by pro se Plaintiff Alan Virgil Brumfield
(“Brumfield”) in a closed civil rights action
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brumfield seeks a
“retraction” of the undersigned's Order (Doc.
18). Brumfield also requests that the undersigned be
“removed” from the case. (Doc. 19)
there is no basis to vacate the Order (Doc. 18) or for the
undersigned to recuse, Brumfield's Motion (Doc. 19) is
named Defendants in this case were both state public
defenders. Brumfield alleged he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at his state criminal proceeding. Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court dismissed Brumfield's
initial § 1983 claim as frivolous. (Docs. 5, 6).
Brumfield filed several motions (Docs. 7, 9, 11, 13),
including one that was construed as a Motion to Amend and
granted in error. (Doc. 18). Because the Amended Complaint
(Doc. 17) was never properly pending before the Court, the
Memorandum Order (Doc. 16) granting Brumfield's
reconstrued Motion to Amend (Doc. 13) was subsequently
vacated and stricken from the record. (Doc. 18).
Law and Analysis
Motion (Doc. 19) seeks restoration of the vacated Order (Doc.
16). Therefore, Brumfield's Motion (Doc. 19) is construed
as a motion for reconsideration.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide
for motions for reconsideration. See Shepherd v.
Int'l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326, 328 n.1 (5th Cir.
2004); Cormier v. Turnkey Cleaning Servs., LLC, 295
F.Supp.3d 717, 719 (W.D. La. 2017). Nonetheless, motions for
reconsideration are generally analyzed under the standards
governing motions to alter or amend under Rule 59(e) or
motions for relief from judgment or order under Rule 60(b).
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Wheatley,
4:18-CV-2869, 2019 WL 5964524, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12,
2019) (citing Shepherd, 372 F.3d at 328 n.1 and
Hamilton v. Williams, 147 F.3d 367, 371 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1998)). Such motions are “‘not the proper
vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments
that could have been offered or raised before the entry of
judgment.'” Id. (quoting Templet v.
Hydro Chem., Inc., 367 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) and
In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th
Cir. 2002)). Instead, motions to reconsider serve the narrow
purpose of allowing “a party to correct manifest errors
of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Id. “‘Mere disagreement
with a district court's order does not warrant
reconsideration of that order.'” Blue Spike,
LLC v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 6:17-CV-16, 2018 WL
4261316, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2018) (quoting J2 Glob.
Comm'n., Inc. v. Protus IP Sols., Inc., No.
6:08-CV-211, 2009 WL 440525 at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 2009)).
has not identified any errors of law or fact or newly
discovered evidence to support his Motion (Doc. 19). As the
undersigned stated in the vacating Order (Doc. 18), the
Motion to Amend should have been mooted by the Court's
Judgment of dismissal. (Doc. 18, p. 3). Because the Motion to
Amend was mistakenly granted, the Amended Complaint was
docketed, but the closed lawsuit remained closed. Therefore,
the Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) was never properly pending
before the Court. (Doc. 18, p. 4).
the Court signed its Judgment (Doc. 14) dismissing
Brumfield's claims, it implicitly rejected
Brumfield's Objections and the reconstrued Motion to
Amend (Doc. 13). (Doc. 18, p. 4). In fact, the Amended
Complaint (Doc. 17) named the same Defendants as the original
Complaint (Doc. 1), which was dismissed as frivolous because
the named Defendants were not state actors. Therefore, the
Amended Complaint would have been subject to dismissal on the
also asks that the undersigned be “removed” from
the case, apparently because of his disagreement with the
Order (Doc. 18). Brumfield's request should be construed
as a motion to recuse.
magistrate judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts