United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
BILL JONES, ET AL.
NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL PHYSICIAN HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION, INC.
M. DOUGLAS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. [Doc.
#102]. The motion is opposed. [Doc. #103]. Having reviewed
the pleadings and the case law, the Court rules as follows.
filed a putative collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§
201, et seq. and individually under the Louisiana Wage
Statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:631, seeking unpaid
minimum and overtime wages. Plaintiffs held various job
titles as current and former employees of defendant. Prior to
allegedly improper termination, Bill Jones worked as a
“Contracting Specialist.” Jennifer Branch has
held several positions over the years including
“Provider Relations Coordinator, ” “Project
Coordinator, ” “Project Manager, ”
“Operations Specialist, ” and currently
“Training Consultant.” Laura Romero was formerly
an administrative assistant and is presently a
“Pharmacy Part D Specialist.”
allege that defendant implemented record-keeping and
compensation policies and practices that intentionally
misclassified these employees and others similarly situated
as exempt from FLSA's overtime wage provisions. While
they were employed, defendant allegedly misclassified each of
their jobs because the job duties that plaintiffs performed
do not fall under any of the exceptions defined by the FLSA.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant instructed these and other
misclassified employees not to record any overtime hours even
if the employees worked hours in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek. Plaintiffs now sue to recover unpaid wages, both
minimum wages and overtime wages. In addition to unpaid
wages, plaintiffs also seek to recover liquidated damages,
attorney's fees, and costs associated with the
moved to conditionally certify the class. [Doc. #28]. The
District Court conditionally certified the class on October
18, 2018. [Doc. #37]. Defendant thus propounded discovery on
plaintiffs, seeking personal bank checking account and credit
card information from several plaintiffs for the months
during which those plaintiffs claim they worked overtime.
Plaintiffs objected to the discovery requests, and defendant
filed a motion to compel. [Doc. #66]. This Court set that
motion for oral hearing on July 17, 2019. [Doc. #68].
before that oral hearing, this Court noticed that it had not
received an opposition to the motion in accordance with the
local rules of this Court. E.D. Loc. R. 7.5. Accordingly,
after reviewing the motion, the Court found that the motion
had merit and was timely and ultimately granted the motion as
unopposed. [Doc. #74]. Plaintiffs now ask the Court to
reconsider that order.
motion to reconsider an interlocutory order is governed by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See McClendon v.
United States, 892 F.3d 775, 781 (5th Cir. 2018);
CIT Bank, N.A. v. Howard Transportation,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 17-10767, 2019 WL 3322725, at *1 (E.D.
La. July 24, 2019). Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure states, in pertinent part:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the
action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised
at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all
the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
this rule, the district court “possesses the inherent
procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an
interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be
sufficient.” Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659
F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981). However, the district court
must exercise this broad discretion sparingly to forestall
the perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting
burdens and delays. See Calpecto 1981 v. Marshall Expl.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (5th Cir. 1993); 18B
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4478.1 (2d ed.).
general practice in this district has been to evaluate
motions to reconsider interlocutory orders under the same
standards that apply to motions to alter or amend final
judgments made pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Rosemond v. AIG Ins., Civ. A.
No. 08-1145, 2009 WL 1211020, at *2 (E.D. La. May 4, 2009);
In re Katrina Canal Breaches, Civ. A. No. 05-4182,
2009 WL 1046016, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 16,
2009). A Rule 59(e) motion calls into question
the correctness of a judgment. In re Transtexas Gas
Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002). “Rule
59(e) is properly invoked to correct manifest errors of law
or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”
Id. at 581. “A Rule 59(e) motion should not be
used to relitigate prior matters that should have been urged
earlier or that simply have been resolved to the movant's
dissatisfaction.” Clark v. City of Thibodeaux,
No. CV 18-2364, 2019 WL 183851, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 14,
2019); In re Self, 172 F.Supp.2d 813, 816 (W.D. La.
their motion to reconsider, plaintiffs argue that the
discovery requests are overly broad, irrelevant, unduly
burdensome, and not proportionate to the needs of the case.
Plaintiffs also briefly mention in passing that no opposition
was filed to the motion to compel because there was a