United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
JAMES C. TATE, SR.
VALERO SERVICES, INC.
WELLS ROBY CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate (R.
Doc. 14) and a Motion for Extension
of Time (R. Doc. 15) filed by the Plaintiff,
James C. Tate, Sr. (“Tate”), seeking an order
from this Court vacating its judgment against Plaintiff
dismissing his Title VII claims with prejudice (R. Doc. 13).
These motions are opposed. R. Doc. 16. Plaintiff also filed
his Motion to Continue (R. Doc. 17), which
similarly requests the Court reconsider its initial verdict
in light of certain newly proffered evidence. That motion is
likewise opposed. R. Doc. 18.
February 20, 2019, this Court dismissed Plaintiff Tate's
claims for gender discrimination, hostile work environment,
and racial discrimination against his former employer
Defendant Valero Services, Inc. (“Valero”). R.
Doc. 12. Starting on September 10, 2019, more than six (6)
months after the Court's final judgment, Plaintiff Tate
filed a series of motions to include a Motion to Vacate (R.
Doc. 14), Motion for Extension of Time (R. Doc. 15), and a
Motion to Continue (R. Doc. 17). All of the motions seek the
Court reconsider its judgment in light of a National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) investigation instituted
at the behest of Tate and against the United Steel Workers
local 8363 (“Union”).
Tate contends the Union did not adhere to their bylaws, which
he believes would have required the Union to form a Civil
Rights Committee to investigate his claims of discrimination
against Defendant Valero. Id. Also, to rebuff the
Court's finding that he did not file a charge with the
EEOC until August 3, 2018, Plaintiff also attaches an EEOC
inquiry response email in an attempt to show the alleged
discrimination and his contact with the EEOC date back as
early September 2017. R. Doc. 15-3, p. 3.
the Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court vacating its
earlier judgment. R. Doc. 14. More specifically, Plaintiff
seeks this Court reconsider its earlier judgment in light of
this newly submitted evidence. Plaintiff seeks this Court
find (1) his hostile work environment discrimination claims
are not procedurally barred because the Union's failure
to proceed with certain administrative measures renders his
administrative remedies exhausted and (2) his racial
discrimination claims with the EEOC date back to September
Valero, in opposition, contends that Tate has neither
established that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Rule
60(b) nor has he established any other reason to justify
overturning the Court's previous judgment. R. Doc. 16, p.
5. Defendant also contends that Tate continues to complain
about alleged actions and inactions on the part of the Union,
who is not a party to this matter, and who should have no
bearing on the dismissal of his suit against Valero.
Id. Valero further contends the fact that Tate was
in contact with the EEOC before he filed his August 3, 2018
EEOC charge will not have the effect of producing a different
result. R. Doc. 16, p. 5. Ultimately, Defendant avers
Plaintiff's series of recent filings is an improper
vehicle for relief. See R. Doc. 18, p. 1. As such,
Defendant maintains dismissal of Tate's time-barred Title
VII discrimination claims remains proper. Id.
only party to this action is Valero, and not the NLRB or the
Union. Now receiving this additional information, the Court
will analyze its previous judgment in light of the newly
submitted documents and with consideration to these
non-parties' actions and/or inactions.
Standard of Review
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b) provides
the grounds for relief from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding. Specifically, it provides that the court may
relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for six reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously
called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(1)-(6). The purpose of Rule 60(b) is
to balance the principle of finality of a court judgment
“with the interest of the court in seeing that justice
is done in light of all the facts.” Hesling v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005).
of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that
should be used sparingly.” Templet v. HydroChem
Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). Still, the
“decision to grant or deny relief under Rule 60(b) lies
within the sound discretion ...