United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division
MAGNOLIA ISLAND PLANTATION, LLC, ET AL.
LUCKY FAMILY, LLC, ET AL.
HAYES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MAURICE HICKS, JR., CHIEF JUDGE
the Court is a “Motion to Suspend Payments Due Under
Promissory Note or, in the Alternative, to Deposit with the
Court” (hereinafter referred to as
“Motion”) filed by Plaintiffs - Magnolia Island
Plantation, LLC (“Magnolia”) and Barbara Marie
Carey Lollar (“Mrs. Lollar”). Record Document 57.
Defendant, Lucky Family, LLC, opposes the Motion.
See Record Document 61. For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiffs' motion is hereby
facts of this matter are detailed and complex, thus for
purposes of the instant motion, the Court will only provide a
brief summation of the pertinent facts. The current matter is
centered around the seizure and sheriff's sale of a
promissory note (“Note”) owned by Mrs. Lollar.
Record Document 51 at 3. The Note was executed November 2,
2017 by Ronald Lollar (“Mr. Lollar”) in favor of
Mrs. Lollar for $1, 730, 000.00 at the rate of 4% per annum,
to be paid in four consecutive installments of $100, 046.00
and a fifth and final balloon payment equal to remaining the
principal and interest due. See id. at 5. The Note
was secured by immovable property conveyed from Mrs. Lollar
to Mr. Lollar. See id. The same day the Note was
executed Mr. Lollar conveyed the property to Magnolia, who
thereby assumed the obligations under the Note and the
Mortgage. See id. at 6.
allege that the sheriff's sale of the Note is a nullity,
and that the return of the Note to Mrs. Lollar is
“proper under the law in the current
circumstances.” Record Document 57-1 at 1. Defendant,
Lucky Family LLC, contends it purchased the Note at a valid
sheriff's sale and is therefore the rightful owner of the
Note. See Record Document 61-1 at 9.
Motion, Plaintiffs seek to suspend payment of the Note, of
which the next installment is due November 1,
2019. See Record Document 57. In the
alternative, Plaintiffs seek to deposit the installment into
the Court's registry pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 67. See id. Defendant contends the Motion
is a preliminary injunction because Plaintiffs seek to
prohibit Lucky Family LLC from taking any action to collect
the Note. See Record Document 61-1 at 12. Defendant
argues Plaintiffs cannot meet the preliminary injunction
standard, and, therefore, a preliminary injunction should be
denied. See id. In addition, Defendant contends
deposit of the installment of the Note into the Court's
registry is an impermissible use of depositing funds pursuant
to Rule 67. See Id. at 14.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
outset the Court notes that Plaintiffs cite to no legal
authority or authorization from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for their Motion to Suspend Payments. Thus, the
Court agrees with Defendant that this request is a
preliminary injunction as it seeks to suspend the
enforceability of the Note. Therefore, the Court will analyze
the motion under the rules governing preliminary injunctions.
seeking a preliminary injunction must prove four things:
(1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the
merits, (2) a substantial threat that he will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his
threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party
whom he seeks to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary
injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445, 457
(5th Cir. 2017). “A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy which courts grant only if the movant
has clearly carried the burden as to all four
elements.” Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc. v.
Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2003); see
also House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall, 94 F.3d 176,
180 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We have frequently cautioned that
‘[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy,' and ‘[t]he decision to grant a preliminary
injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the
fail to establish any of the four elements required to grant
a preliminary injunction. Although Plaintiffs mention
“there is a potential for harm if the installment
payment due on November 1, 2019 is required to be made,
” the Plaintiffs fail to identify what that potential
harm is. Record Document 57-1 at 2. Furthermore,
“irreparable injury” as required for a
preliminary injunction is only found “where there ...