United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division
LOUISIANA CLEANING SYSTEMS, INC.
CITY OF SHREVEPORT, ET AL.
HORNSBY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
MAURICE HICKS, JR., CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
the Court are pending motions filed by the parties pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56: (1) Defendants City of
Shreveport, Ollie S. Tyler, David Duncan, Brian Crawford,
Dale Sibley, and Jeff Landry’s (collectively
“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Record
Document 101); and (2) Plaintiff Louisiana Cleaning Systems,
Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Record Document 83). Defendants seek
dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims. For the reasons
set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
is a Louisiana corporation licensed to do business in the
state and domiciled in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.
See Record Document 46 at 1. Its sole business is to
sell Kirby vacuum cleaners exclusively through door-to-door
sales to residents by knocking on doors or ringing doorbells.
See id. at 2.
January 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant suit pursuant to
Section 1983 alleging that the version of Shreveport
Ordinance Section 42-277 in effect at that time, which
prohibited uninvited, door-to-door commercial solicitation,
was a violation of its First Amendment right to freedom of
speech and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. See Record Document 1 at 1–2. The
version of Section 42-277 in effect at that time provided as
It shall be unlawful for any solicitor, peddler, hawker,
itinerant merchant or transient vendor of merchandise to go
in and upon any private residence in the city, not having
been requested or invited to do so by the owner or occupant
of such residence, for the purpose of soliciting orders for
the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, or for the purpose
of disposing of or peddling or hawking such goods, wares and
merchandise. Such practice is hereby declared to be a
nuisance and punishable as a misdemeanor; provided, however,
that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the
vending or sale of ice, or soliciting orders for the sale of
ice, milk and dairy products, truck vegetables, poultry and
eggs, and other farm and garden produce, so far as the sale
of the named commodities is authorized by law.
Document 110-1 at 5. On June 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which this Court denied on
November 17, 2016, in light of its previous ruling in
Vivint La. v. City of Shreveport, 213 F.Supp.3d 821
(W.D. La. 2016), upholding the constitutionality of the
ordinance. See Record Document 28 at 1, 4.
on September 23, 2017, the Shreveport City Council voted to
amend the ordinance, which now allows individuals to partake
in door-to-door commercial soliciting if certain requirements
are met, such as applying for and obtaining a permit from
City officials, as well submitting background check
information. See Record Document 46 at 5–6. On
October 26, 2017, one of Plaintiff’s employees mailed
an application to the City of Shreveport to obtain a permit.
See Record Document 36-8.
December 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend
its complaint, arguing that the alleged “delay”
following its mailing of its permit application also
constituted a deprivation of its constitutional rights, and
further adding additional claims. Record Document 36-1 at 6,
8. Defendants responded by filing an opposition to the
motion, arguing that Plaintiff had not followed up with the
City and taken the steps required to complete the permitting
process. See Record Document 42 at 2. However, on
January 22, 2018, a representative of Plaintiff completed
said process and received a permit to partake in door-to-door
commercial solicitation, after paying City officials a
deposit fee for an “identifying vest.” Record
Document 57-4; Record Document 110-1 at 11. On January 31,
2018, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend was
granted, after which Plaintiff filed its “First
Supplemental Petition for Damages.” Record Documents 45
and 46. Plaintiff asserts several claims against Defendants
due to alleged deprivations of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights resulting from both the pre-amendment
version, as well as the current version, of Section 42-277.
See Record Document 46 at 10–14. These claims
request various forms of relief, including, inter
alia, declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory
damages in the form of lost profits, and punitive damages
against Defendant David Duncan in his individual capacity.
14, 2018, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss,
seeking the dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims
except for Plaintiff’s facial challenge to the
pre-amendment version of the ordinance. See Record
Document 57 at 1–2. Thereafter, Defendants filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment in which they incorporate their
previously filed Partial Motion to Dismiss, and further seek
summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s action in its
entirety. See Record Document 101-1 at 9–10.
Accordingly, the Court, for efficiency purposes, subsequently
denied Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss, noting
that it would consider Defendants’ arguments asserted
in the Motion when ruling on their Motion for Summary
Judgment. See Record Document 119 at 2.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure when “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v.
Health Care Serv. Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir.
2010). A genuine dispute of material fact exists
if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the non-moving party. See Geoscan,
Inc. of Texas v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 387,
390 (5th Cir. 2000). During this stage, courts must look to
the substantive law ...