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McDuffy-Johnson v. Lane

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division

September 19, 2019

JULIA LOUISE MCDUFFY-JOHNSON
v.
DANIEL A. LANE, III, ET AL

          DOUGHTY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          Mark L. Hornsby U.S. Magistrate Judge

         Introduction

         Julia Louise McDuffy-Johnson (“Plaintiff”), who is self-represented, filed this civil action on a civil rights complaint form. She names as a defendant Daniel A. Lane, III.[1]Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has used “cyber technology” to sexually assault her. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed as frivolous.

         The Allegations

         Plaintiff's complaint states:

The defendant has both met with plaintiff in person and told her of his knowledge of a device housing data with her whole life on it, (2006) as well as been the primary participant in perpetrating crimes against her by the using thereof, anatomical and sex crime. Defendant sing the said means does hinder plaintiff's prayer times (he can hear and see when she prays). He rapes via “cyber technology” to hurt plaintiff's body for retaliation. He does raping when plaintiff meditates holy scriptures, uses the said to coerce plaintiff to have sex with telepathic “sensual” forged weapon(s).

Doc. 1, Part III. Plaintiff claims that she is damaged by the

installation of cyber weaponry installed to plaintiff's anatomical portals. The installation(s) of said damage is lifelong, malicious and “active”. It gives defendant the ability to repeat offend at his will twenty-four hours a day, 365 days per year since 2005…. The weapon (super imposed) causes plaintiff inability to protect herself…. It is a severe security breach leaving only certain spiritual uniquenesses without threat of vandalism and assault. The device has properties of espionage, destruction of evidence, audio/visual to name a few. The latter where defendant through noise pollution, videos sometimes pornography disturbs the peace nearly every day for past few months.

Id. at Part IV. Plaintiff requests the court to strip the defendant “of all weapons used to harm others maliciously or/and remove him from accessing them, ” to imprison defendant, to “bind him ‘hand and feet' and allow no more damage to any other, ” and to order him to pay restitution. Id.[2]

         Authority to Dismiss

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a district court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. “A district court may dismiss an action on its own motion under Rule 12(b)(6) as long as the procedure employed is fair.” Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). This procedure is fair, because this Report and Recommendation provides Plaintiff with sufficient notice of and opportunity to respond to the possible dismissal of his case. See Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998) (sua sponte invocation of defense in Report and Recommendation satisfied due process).

         Dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). The complaint must allege enough facts to move the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. Determining whether the plausibility standard has been met is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

         Rule 12(b)(6) does not ordinarily allow dismissal based on the mere fact that a judge does not believe a complainant's factual allegations. Dismissal has nonetheless been found appropriate when the well-pleaded facts were clearly baseless because they were fanciful, fantastic, or delusional. See, e.g., Gallop v. Chaney, 642 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2011) (dismissing a complaint that set forth a fantastical alternative history of the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks). Some courts have responded to such complaints by dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the allegations in a complaint are absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, obviously ...


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