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Santhuff v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana

September 19, 2019




         This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24) filed by Defendants United Parcel Service, Inc., (“UPS”) and Paul Witt (“Witt”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff Steve Santhuff (“Plaintiff” or “Santhuff”) opposes the motion. (Doc. 38.) Defendants have filed a reply. (Doc. 40.) Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

         I. Introduction and Summary

         The basic facts are not disputed. Plaintiff is employed by UPS as an On Road Supervisor. He suffers from Pigmentary Glaucoma that necessitated a leave of absence from March to July of 2016. When he was ready to return, he requested an accommodation for his disability. While there is some disagreement on what exactly UPS and Plaintiff agreed to, it’s undisputed that, upon his return on July 11, 2016, he was assigned to perform supervisory rides with drivers five days a week (as opposed to before his leave, when he only had to conduct these rides two or three days per week). There’s a dispute as to how long Plaintiff did this (somewhere between one to three months), but it is undisputed that Plaintiff unilaterally chose to discontinue riding five days a week. UPS accepted his decision, and he remains an employee today doing the same duties he previously performed.

         In the instant motion, Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. However, Plaintiff only opposes the dismissal of three: UPS’s alleged failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:301 et seq. (“LEDL”), and UPS’s alleged failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”).

         Having carefully considered the arguments, law, and evidence, the Court will deny the motion as to the ADA and LEDL claims. Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing reasonable inferences in his favor, a reasonable jury could conclude that UPS knew of the limitations Plaintiff had with riding a car five days a week (as it related to his eye), was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process, and failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. In short, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.

         However, the Court will grant summary judgment on the FLSA claim because of the Executive exemption. The central question here is whether Plaintiff’s “suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a). The Court finds that they are. That is, all reasonable jurors would conclude-from Plaintiff’s own testimony-that his involvement in the disciplinary process was such that his input on firing was given particular weight.

         Plaintiff’s other claims also warrant dismissal-all because of waiver, and some for other reasons. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), fails due to causation. Plaintiff’s claim under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 also fails, as it is foreclosed by Story v. Our Lady of the Lake Physician Grp., No. 17-651, 2018 WL 1902687 (M.D. La. Apr. 20, 2018) (deGravelles, J.). Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages fails because of the good faith defense.

         Consequently, all of Plaintiff’s claims-except those made under the ADA and LEDL for UPS’s alleged failure to provide a reasonable accommodation-will be dismissed with prejudice.

         II. Relevant Factual Background

         A. Plaintiff’s Background with UPS and UPS’s Investigation into Plaintiff

         Plaintiff is currently a UPS employee, working as an On Road Supervisor in UPS’s Port Allen facility. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”) ¶ 1, Doc. 24-11; Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant[s’] Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts (“PRSUMF”) ¶ 1, Doc. 38-1.)[1] Plaintiff began his UPS employment in Georgia in 1998. (SUMF ¶ 1; PRSUMP ¶ 1.) He moved to Louisiana in 2014, where he began as an On Road Supervisor in UPS’s Gonzales facility. (SUMF ¶ 1; PRSUMP ¶ 1.)

         In fall of 2015, Plaintiff asked to transfer from Gonzales to Baker due to problems he experienced with a number of Gonzales employees. (SUMF ¶ 2; PRSUMP ¶ 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims he was the only supervisor issuing discipline, which caused the Gonzales employees to resent him. (SUMF ¶ 2; PRSUMP ¶ 2.)

         Plaintiff said his first year in Baker was smooth, but then his boss, Jeff Hill, asked Plaintiff and other supervisors to improve the drivers’ performance. (SUMF ¶ 3; PRSUMP ¶ 3.) In response, Plaintiff increased his disciplinary efforts, causing the Baker employees to resent him. (SUMF ¶ 3; PRSUMP ¶ 3.) Plaintiff said the Baker employees filed grievances against him because they, like the Gonzales employees, did not want to be supervised as closely as Plaintiff supervised them. (SUMF ¶ 3; PRSUMP ¶ 3.)

         In January 2017, Plaintiff learned of approximately eight complaints about his supervision made to the UPS 800 line. (SUMF ¶ 4; PRSUMP ¶ 4.) In May of 2017, employees submitted more than 800 line complaints and also submitted a memorandum, complaining of, among other things, unprofessional discipline and that Plaintiff pressured drivers by “soliciting deals and handouts.” (SUMF ¶ 5; PRSUMP ¶ 5.) The employees asked UPS to investigate Plaintiff. (SUMF ¶ 5; PRSUMP ¶ 5.)

         UPS interviewed Plaintiff and some of the employees involved. (SUMF ¶ 6; PRSUMP ¶ 6.) Plaintiff does not know who Wilfred Edwards in Human Resources (“HR”) spoke to as part of Edwards’s investigation. (SUMF ¶ 6; PRSUMP ¶ 6.) In the investigation, Plaintiff acknowledged that employees had complaints about him and even said one employee called him the “Discipline Monster.” (SUMF ¶ 7; PRSUMP ¶ 7.) Some employees viewed him as “sarcastic” and “arrogant.” (SUMF ¶ 7; PRSUMP ¶ 7.) Plaintiff had seen these complaints coming since January 2017. (SUMF ¶ 7; PRSUMP ¶ 7.)

         With respect to the allegations that Plaintiff solicited handouts, Plaintiff admitted to asking one employee, Kevin Shows, to deliver a key to someone along Shows’ route. (SUMF ¶ 8; PRSUMP ¶ 8.) Specifically, he told Shows to log out of the time system, perform this personal errand for Plaintiff, and then log back in to resume being paid. (SUMF ¶ 8; PRSUMP ¶ 8.)

         Similarly, Plaintiff asked another driver, Wayne Mitchell, to deliver a personal check for Plaintiff along Mitchell’s delivery route and to log out and take personal time to perform Plaintiff’s errand. (SUMF ¶ 9; PRSUMP ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also distributed flyers to his employees before a meeting, asking them to perform free manual labor on his personal property. (SUMF ¶ 10; PRSUMP ¶ 10.)

         B. Disciplinary Acknowledgements Issued to Plaintiff

         After the investigation, on June 26, 2017, Paul Witt (West Package Division Manager) sent to Plaintiff a document entitled “Disciplinary Acknowledgement.” (See SUMF ¶¶ 11, 12; PRSUMF ¶¶ 11, 12; Pl. Dep., Ex. 53, Doc. 24-5 at 18.) The document stated that the “investigation revealed that [Plaintiff] failed to adhere to some UPS polices and procedures” and then listed some examples. (Pl. Dep., Ex. 53, Doc. 24-5 at 18.) The Disciplinary Acknowledgment then said that Plaintiff’s actions were contrary to UPS principles and that he would not be recommended for a Management Incentive Program (MIP) bonus. (Pl. Dep., Ex. 53, Doc. 24-5 at 18; SUMF ¶ 11; PRSUMP ¶ 11.)

         Paul Witt and Wilfred Edwards, in HR, met with Plaintiff to administer the Disciplinary Acknowledgment. (SUMF ¶ 12; PRSUMP ¶ 12.) During the meeting, Witt realized the acknowledgment contained a typo in the spelling of Kevin Shows’ name. (SUMF ¶ 12; PRSUMP ¶ 12.) Witt asked Plaintiff to hand the document to Witt, but Plaintiff refused unless Witt agreed to give Plaintiff a copy right then. (SUMF ¶ 12; PRSUMP ¶ 12.) Rather than simply following instructions and letting his manager correct the document, Plaintiff refused to return the document, insisting he would not pass it back until he photographed the document containing the typo. (SUMF ¶ 12; PRSUMP ¶ 12.)

         Witt instructed Plaintiff not to photograph it and again told Plaintiff to return the document. (SUMF ¶ 13; PRSUMP ¶ 13.) Again ignoring Witt’s instructions, Plaintiff photographed the document and still did not hand it to Witt. (SUMF ¶ 13; PRSUMP ¶ 13.) After refusing several direct instructions, Witt told Plaintiff to leave the property. (SUMF ¶ 14; PRSUMP ¶ 14.) Plaintiff did so, but he took the document with him. (SUMF ¶ 14; PRSUMP ¶ 14.)

         A week or so later, UPS gave Plaintiff a corrected version of the document (with Shows’ name spelled correctly), but it also referenced Plaintiffs insubordination in refusing to return the document, and it increased Plaintiffs discipline to include removal of a salary increase. (SUMF ¶ 15; PRSUMP ¶ 15.)

         Shortly thereafter, UPS decided to transfer Plaintiff, this time to its Port Allen facility, where Plaintiff remains employed today, performing the same job duties he performed in Baker. (SUMF ¶ 16; PRSUMP ¶ 16.) Plaintiff said he was initially uncomfortable with the transfer to Port Allen, but he soon became “comfortable” in Port Allen. (SUMF ¶ 16; PRSUMP ¶ 16.) Per Plaintiff, his move to Port Allen was again the result of employee complaints about him. (SUMF ¶ 16; PRSUMP ¶ 16.)

         C. Plaintiffs Disability and Requested Accommodation

         1. Plaintiffs Condition and Initial Request for an Accommodation

         Plaintiff suffers from Pigmentary Glaucoma. (SUMF ¶ 17; PRSUMP ¶ 17.) In March 2016, Plaintiff said his Pigmentary Glaucoma worsened, which he said caused him to take a medical leave from March to July of 2016. (SUMF ¶ 17; PRSUMP ¶ 17.) Plaintiff worked for Jeff Hill, Business Manager, at the time. (SUMF ¶ 17; PRSUMP ¶ 17.) Witt supervised Hill. (SUMF ¶ 17; PRSUMP ¶ 17.)

         When Plaintiff was ready to return from his medical leave, he called UPS’s 800 line to request an accommodation, and he completed an Accommodation Checklist on June 1, 2016. (SUMF ¶ 18; PRSUMP ¶ 18.) Plaintiff stated in his accommodation paperwork, “If I can conduct the job of an [O]n [R]oad [Supervisor without a requirement to physically deliver routes myself or take over routes then I should not have an excessive physical activity or excessive pigment release/blockage.” (SUMF ¶ 18; PRSUMP ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also submitted his doctor's statement saying Plaintiff “should be restricted from exertional physical activity such as heavy lifting.” (SUMF ¶ 18; PRSUMP ¶ 18.) This letter will be discussed in greater detail below.

         Following Plaintiff’s submission of this accommodation paperwork, Wilfred Edwards in HR met with Plaintiff to discuss possible accommodations. (SUMF ¶ 19; PRSUMP ¶ 19.) Edwards “was polite, professional, and . . . made [Plaintiff] feel comfortable.” (SUMF ¶ 19; PRSUMP ¶ 19.)

         2. The Alleged Agreed-to Accommodation

         On July 6, 2016, Edwards wrote a letter to Plaintiff confirming his meeting with him. (Pl. Dep., Ex. 30, Doc. 24-5 at 9.) There, Edwards wrote: “To facilitate your continued employment, UPS has offered to implement the following modification to your current position: No. delivering packages more than 3 consecutive hours in any given day. You have stated that this is acceptable.” (Pl. Dep., Ex. 30, Doc. 24-5 at 9.)

         Plaintiff testified that he responded to the letter. (Pl. Dep. 174, Doc. 24-2 at 21.) He explained:

It would have been about the three consecutive hours. I told him that I understood it to be three hours per day, not just consecutive hours. And I didn’t get a response back to that response. But I’ve just been working with it as three hours a day instead of three consecutive hours, because three consecutive hours could be three hours, take a ten-minute break, three more hours, take a ten-minute break, three more hours.

(Pl. Dep. 174–75, Doc. 24-2 at 21–22.) Plaintiff also testified that he “attempted” to tell someone that he was “not going to do it because it’s outside of [his] work restrictions.” (Pl. Dep. 175, Doc. 24-2 at 22.) Thus, Plaintiff said that he agreed to the limitation of three hours, but that he had to clarify after Edwards’s letter that he “expect[ed] it to mean three hours per day but not consecutive.” (Pl. Dep. 179, Doc. 24-2 at 26.) Phrased another way, Plaintiff agreed to the wording of Edwards’s letter, except for Edwards’s use of the word “consecutive.” (Pl. Dep. 179–80, Doc. 24-2 at 26–27.) Plaintiff also said that he wrote a response about this within a few days of receiving Edwards’s letter but that Plaintiff did not receive a response one way or another. (Pl. Dep. 178, Doc. 24-2 at 25.)

         3. The “New” Job-Riding Five Days a Week

         According to Plaintiff, upon his return from months of leave, he was assigned to perform supervisory rides with drivers five days. (SUMF ¶ 22; PRSUMP ¶ 22.) Before his leave, Plaintiff said he rode with his drivers two to three days per week. (SUMF ¶ 22; PRSUMP ¶ 22.) Plaintiff complained to Hill and Edwards that he should not have to ride five days per week, but Edwards advised Plaintiff that riding five days per week was within the regular duties of his position. (SUMF ¶ 23; PRSUMP ¶ 23.) Plaintiff’s duties included these rides, and his job did not prescribe a maximum number of days an On Road Supervisor must perform these rides. (SUMF ¶ 24; PRSUMP ¶ 24.)

         In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that, when he returned from leave, he began having to make rides every day and every week. (Pl. Dep. 192, Doc. 24-2 at 36.) He complained to Hill and was told that “that was [his] new job”-“my new job was to ride five days a week.” (Pl. Dep. 192, Doc. 24-2 at 36.) Elsewhere, Plaintiff said he told Hill that this was outside his restrictions, and he was told to work within them, which he tried to do. (Pl. Dep. 176, Doc. 24-2 at 23.) Plaintiff testified:

I did do it in the sense that I minimized my physical impacts and potential damage. I took longer to do things, you know. If there was four or five hours[’] worth of work, I did things where I wouldn’t cause, you know, the stress level to go up and the increase in my eye pressure. I was presented with the work that needed to get done, but I haven’t made an issue of that. That’s not a complaint that I’m making.

(Pl. Dep. 176, Doc. 24-2 at 23.)

         4. Plaintiff Stops Riding Five Days a Week-His Own Account, Generally

         a. Plaintiff’s Explanation, from his Deposition

         Notably, Plaintiff alleges this period of riding five days a week only lasted for a brief period from July 11, 2016 to August or September 2016. (SUMF ¶ 24; PRSUMP ¶ 24.) Thereafter, Plaintiff returned to riding fewer days. (SUMF ¶ 24; PRSUMP ¶ 24.)

         More specifically, Plaintiff testified that, after two and half to three months, “there came a point in time when [he] was fed up with being on a car five days a week, and [he] was sore.” (Pl. Dep. 209, Doc. 38-2 at 16.) Plaintiff said: “My back was hurting. I didn’t have a specific injury that I needed to report, but my legs – the circulation in my legs were cut off. My back was hurting. You’re sore. You can’t – in one weekend, you can’t really recover.” (Pl. Dep. 209, Doc. 38-2 at 16.) Defendants emphasize that Plaintiff complained that riding two “extra” days per week hurt his back and legs but he admitted he had no disability related to his back or legs. (SUMF ¶ 25; PRSUMP ¶ 25.)

         Plaintiff testified that he told Hill “ ‘ I’m not going to keep riding on a car because I am physically in pain from riding on a car every day.’ ” (Pl. Dep. 210, Doc. 24-2 at 47.) After this, Plaintiff “went back to being in the office and doing [his] job like [he] always [did], or like [he] did before.” (Pl. Dep. 211, Doc. 24-2 at 48.) Plaintiff would ride some days, but he “went back to managing [his] job like it had been before the ADA request.” (Pl. Dep. 211, Doc. 24-2 at 48.) Plaintiff testified:

Q. And you had no evidence that riding in the car did anything to injure your eyes, correct?
A. I have no evidence. I’m not making the claim. I know that it’s potentially detrimental, but I don’t know that there’s any evidence that any expert witness can provide one way or the other.
Q. So was your problem with riding in the car that it was affecting the rest of your body, not your eyes?
A. Both. Both. I felt like it was affecting my eyes, but you had asked me if I had any evidence.
I don’t have any evidence other than my vision has deteriorated. But I don’t have specific evidence that riding in the car has caused me more trouble with my eyes, just the fact that it can or potentially could.
And then also, yes, on the physical pain, there’s really no time to recover from five days a week, every week. It causes a lot of strains, not just to me. Other people agree. It’s kind of – it’s a problem when you’re on the car too much with that seat.

(Pl. Dep. 211–12, Doc. 24-2 at 48–49.)

         Plaintiff also disputed that riding in the car five days was consistent with his job restrictions; he said that, when he agreed to the accommodation, he was “thinking about [his] former job where [he] didn’t have to do such a thing [as riding in the car five days]. [Plaintiff] wasn’t anticipating that [he] could be assigned to do that[] [because] [a]ny jarring or physical activity, getting in and out of the car, getting in and out of a car potentially can cause [him] a problem.” (Pl. Dep. 212, Doc. 24-2 at 49.)

         b. Plaintiff’s Letter to Witt and Edwards

         Plaintiff also testified about a letter to Witt and Edwards. (Pl. Dep., Ex. 38; Pl. Dep. 222, Doc. 24-3 at 2.) Plaintiff said the information in the letter was accurate. (Pl. Dep. 222, Doc. 24-3 at 2.) In the letter Plaintiff said:

Since returning from my disability there is a problem in that I have not returned to my old job as expected with an accommodation but I have entered into a newly created assignment that was not explained to me and that was not requested and not expected. I hope and believe this can easily be resolved reasonably as it should be of no trouble for us to agree on a beneficial resolution or trial attempt. It seems that after an ADA accommodation agreement and letter I have returned to work in a capacity of a newly created position that is more detrimental to my overall health and more detrimental to my specific medical condition then (sic) the position I held for most of the past 18 years, and prior to even making any such request for an accommodation. In other words, I am much worse off in this newly created position then (sic) I would have been in my former position without any accommodation request at all. Yet, I still need a minor accommodation to maintain my eyesight and not go blind. In this new position I am now verbally instructed or verbally assigned to ride in the passenger “jumpseat” (sic) of a UPS car for five days a week, week after week, conducting our full “Space and Visibility” Training Rides even when all such rides are caught up and no longer expired. My prior job averaged no more then (sic) 30-40 days annually on the car (driving or as a passenger which varied). Where as (sic) this newly created job requires most of the day (approximately 90% or more) in the jump[s]eat every day, day after day, Monday through Friday.
There is not a position such as this in UPS and although one on the outside might think that creating an accommodation position would be very beneficial and helpful to the employee, I find that perhaps the creation and assignment to ride everyday on a plywood seat with little to no cushion and vertical at 90 degrees and completely uncomfortable to be either malicious or retaliation or born out of a misunderstanding of my situation or some opinion that my request may be invalid or exaggerated.
Regarding the chain of command, I have spoken to my manager, Jeff Hill, about this matter. I sent an email without response earlier this week. I sent a text message Wednesday this week, without response. And I started a conversation on 7/21/2016 where the response was that he was not going to ask me to deliver more than 3 hours or lift more than 150 pounds and that UPS was meeting my accommodation request. I expressed that there was still a problem.
I am not sure who made the decision to assign me to ride in the jump seat for 5 straight work days each week but this is excessive. It’s not required of any supervisor anywhere basically for the reason that after a few days it becomes very difficult to recover from the strains it puts on the body. It is way more detrimental to my medical eye condition then (sic) my former job had I never even made any accommodation request. I am sure that anyone in UPS management that has worked in our “Package Operation” would agree that after a few days riding in a jumpseat (sic) you need a break for your health.
Separate from my medical condition with my eyes, the plywood jumpseats (sic), even when new and fully cushioned, tends to reduce circulation in the legs from the leading edge of the seat pressure on the back of the thighs. The seats in various cars strain the leg muscles from holding the legs wide and tense to maintain a vertical position of the body to avoid back injury. . . . The constant movement in this type of seat causes strain on the lower back. All of this that I describe has although been uncomfortable over the years, has never been in such an excess that my body could not recover following one, two, or three days riding. But now after 9 consecutive weekdays on the car I am very sore and feel many pains throughout my body. I do not believe I have sustained any injury at this point but all of the details I describe above are a concern for me in this newly created position, not only for my eye health but for the rest of my body. Any damage to my eyes must be evaluated by a pressure test in a doctor[’]s office as I cannot generally detect an elevation in pressure until it [ ] changes the shape of my eye which then changes the vision. On Wednesday this week . . . my pressures were tested and were above normal high on full medication, which leads to blindness.
. . . .My ADA request simply amounted to asking UPS to refrain from requiring excessive physical activity which is typically and often a violation of our union negotiated contract. I stated that I can conduct all of the essential functions of my job that are typical and normally encountered through out (sic) the day. My doctors[’] restrictions (from Ayla and Morgan) in the ADA request were “NO excessive physical activity.” I suggested in my ADA request that physical activity such as that of a UPS driver be limited to 2 hours per day. I want to work for UPS and I wanted to work in my former position. The letter came to me through email from Wildred Edwards (not by mail) and acknowledged that I would not be asked to perform physical work beyond 3 hours per day, though it’s worded no more than 3 consecutive hours, I construe it to mean no more than 3 total hours in a day as I expect UPS would also construe it to mean 3 hours total in a day.
. . . My eye condition is that of Pigmentary Glaucoma. I have severe uncontrolled Glaucoma on maximum medication and it is uncontrolled in the sense that the medication is not controlling the level of damaging pressure that leads to blindness. The curvature of my eyes inside result in the coloration (green and blue) pigment cells rubbing off and clogging the drainage. Fluid is constantly being produced in all eyes and in my eyes the drainage is blocked. The cells are removed and become free floating by action of my pupil and by physical activity and jolting or bumping. That is why excessive physical activity is detrimental to this condition “Pigmentary Glaucoma.” Riding on a package car in excessively bumpy roads contributes to the problem. Riding for 5 days a week, weekly, when it’s not even necessary for the business is very aggr[a]vating to my condition.
. . . I propose that now the center is caught up in the expired safety training rides that I be given either my old assignment with the accommodations already offered or the new assignment / the same assignment where I ride instead of day after day, to no more then (sic) 2-3 days per week as needed for business purposes and the remaining days I conduct training observation of the drivers as UPS already has an established observation procedure and requirement in our package center operations (or work as instructed in the daily operation of the center when off the car). I feel that limiting my exposure to the package jumpseat (sic) to just 2-3 days per week (or less) as needed for training would likely be a reasonable accommodate (sic) to my medical condition and meet the needs of the company. It would allow my body time to naturally recover and limit the amount of Pigment release and detriment to my eye condition. At this time however I am not absolutely certain that my suggestion will meet the needs of my eye health but I would like UPS to reduce their demand that I ride in a jumpseat (sic) daily everyday and I would like a trial period to determine if my eye health can sustain a reasonable amount of time in a jump seat as my eye health cannot handle the newly created position.
As a special note: I have inquired to my manager and suggested all of this to my manager and it was explained to me that my job entails daily riding for full days every day even beyond the point where training was no longer expired.
It is my sincerely hope (sic) that this request can be met and can be implemented immediately. I await a response as soon one can be made available. (sic).
Sincerely, Steve Santhuff.

(Pl. Dep., Ex. 38.)

         c. Plaintiff’s Medical Evidence?

         Of this letter, Plaintiff admitted that he did not “attach any medical opinions or new medical information.” (Pl. Dep. 222, Doc. 24-3 at 2.) Plaintiff said, “Correct, I did not. I was simply describing that what was happening wasn’t the agreed-upon ADA accommodation.” (Pl. Dep. 222, Doc. 24-3 at 2.) Plaintiff was asked whether riding five days a week was inconsistent with the agreed accommodation, and he explained that, when he evaluated the ADA accommodation, he did so “based on the job as [he’d] always known it and not a newly created job.” (Pl. Dep. 222, Doc. 24-3 at 2.) Plaintiff did not indicate in his paperwork that “there was any limitation to [his] riding in the vehicle and performing observations” because he “didn’t know that was a potential job that [he] would be facing.” (Pl. Dep. 222–23, Doc. 24-3 at 2–3.) Plaintiff did not have a problem riding in a car a couple of days a week; he had a problem with five. (Pl. Dep. 223, Doc. 24-3 at 3.) But Plaintiff did not note this limitation “because [his] job did not require more than [he] was evaluating.” (Id.)

         Defendants point to the fact that, after submitting Plaintiff’s initial information and accommodation checklist, he never submitted additional medical information to UPS. (Pl. Dep. 174, Doc. 24-2 at 21.) For example, Plaintiff testified that he did not “submit any medical information to UPS that would indicate that riding in the car five days a week was not allowed” because: “I didn’t want to keep causing problems.” (Pl. Dep. 213, Doc. 38-2 at 17.) Defendants also refer to the following testimony:

Q. And so at no point in time did you go back and start the accommodation process again and submit revised medical paperwork or anything, correct?
A. I have not.
Q. Why did you not do that?
A. Because I don’t know that there’s a reason to resubmit. I mean, I like the job. I want to work the job. I can work the job as we originally agreed. I think if I made any additional requests, it would be slightly beyond the expectations of the job. I think I can get the job done with these accommodations.
And the rare instances where I was asked to maybe exceed or presented with a larger workload that I thought could accommodate it was rare, and I made it known that I objected. And I think that by making it known that I objected, I wasn’t asked to do that much more.

(Pl. Dep. 180–81, Doc. 24-2 at 27–28.)

         Similarly, Plaintiff was also asked why he didn’t submit medical documentation showing that his condition was affected by movement or jarring, and he replied:

I didn’t have any – I didn’t try to obtain support from a doctor on that. I didn’t want to go through an ADA change because of the issues that came about afterwards. I mean, I felt what I experienced afterwards with this accommodation was a problem for me, and I just wanted to try to leave things alone and let things --- let things work themselves out.

(Pl. Dep. 184, Doc. 24-2 at 30.) Plaintiff was asked if he was talking about “a shift in [his] job duties, ” and he said: “Right, or the riding on the car five days a week, which ultimately was an excessive – additional workload, because I was also asked to acknowledge that I still had all of my old responsibilities as well.” (Pl. Dep. 184, Doc. 24-2 at 30.)

         However, Plaintiff emphasizes in his opposition that he did in fact have medical evidence. (Doc. 38 at 1 n.1.) Specifically, and as stated earlier, Plaintiff submitted a letter with his original request for an ADA accommodation from Dr. Morgan. (See Pl. Dep., Ex. 29, Doc. 24-4 at 41, Doc. 38-2 at 27.) In that letter, Dr. Morgan said that Plaintiff’s “type of glaucoma can be made worse by physical activity.” (Pl. Dep., Ex. 29, Doc. 38-2 at 27.) Further, Dr. Morgan stated that Plaintiff “should be restricted from exertional physical activity such as heavy lifting. This restriction should be considered life long.” (Pl. Dep., Ex. 29, Doc. 38-2 at 27.) Thus, while Plaintiff did not have any additional medical documentation to complement his own letter, Plaintiff did have this original doctor’s note.

         d. Plaintiff’s Other Evidence about this “Accommodation”

         Plaintiff also submits two declarations to support his arguments on the accommodation issue. Defendants object to most of these declarations, but the Court finds ...

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