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Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit

August 30, 2019

Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc., Petitioner
v.
Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent Monroe Energy, LLC, et al., Intervenors Coffeyville Resources Refining & Marketing, LLC and Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC, Petitioners
v.
Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc., et al., Intervenors

          On Petitions for Review of Agency Action of the United States Environmental Protection Agency

          Samara L. Kline argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Evan A. Young, Megan H. Berge, Lisa M. Jaeger, Brittany M. Pemberton, Clara Poffenberger, Richard S. Moskowitz, Robert J. Meyers, Thomas A. Lorenzen, Elizabeth B. Dawson, Warren R. Neufeld, LeAnn M. Johnson, and Jonathan G. Hardin. Albert M. Ferlo Jr. and Krista Hughes entered appearances.

          MeghanE. Greenfield, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General. Daniel R. Dertke, Attorney, entered an appearance.

          Robert A. Long Jr. argued the cause for intervenors American Petroleum Institute and Growth Energy. With him on the brief were Kevin King, Seth P. Waxman, DavidM. Lehn, Saurabh Sanghvi, and Claire Chung. Stacy R. Linden entered an appearance.

          Shannen W. Coffin and Linda C Bailey were on the brief for amid curiae NACS, et al. in support of respondent EPA.

          Brian Killian argued the cause for petitioner The National Biodiesel Board. With him on the briefs was Douglas A. Hastings.

          Samara L. Kline and Thomas Allen Lorenzen, argued the causes for Obligated Party Petitioners. With them on the briefs were Evan A. Young, Lisa M. Jaeger, Brittany M. Pemberton, Clara Poffenberger, Richard S. Moskowtiz, Robert J. Meyers, Elizabeth B. Dawson, David W. DeBruin, Thomas J. Perrelli, Matthew E. Price, LeAnn M. Johnson, and Jonathan G. Hardin. David Y. Chung, Eric D. Miller, and Albert M. Ferlo Jr. entered appearances.

          PatrickR. Jacobi and SamaraM. Spence, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the causes for respondent. With them on the brief was Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General.

          Thomas Allen Lorenzen argued the cause for intervenors American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers and American Petroleum Institute in support of respondent regarding Biomass-Based Diesel Issues. With him on the brief were Robert J. Meyers, Elizabeth B. Dawson, Richard S. Moskowitz, Robert A. Long, Jr., and Kevin King. Stacy R Linden entered an appearance.

          Robert A. Long, Jr., Kevin King, Bryan M. Killian, Douglas A. Hastings, Seth P. Waxman, David M. Lehn, Saurabh Sanghvi, and Claire H Chung were on the brief for intervenors Growth Energy, et al. in support of respondent. Eric D. Miller entered an appearance.

          Before: Pillard and Katsas, Circuit Judges, and Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

          OPINION

          PER CURIAM.

         TABLE OF CONTENTS

         I. Introduction.....................................................................6

         II. Background.....................................................................7

         A. Legal Background........................................................7

         B. Procedural Background.............................................12

         1. 2007, 2010, and 2017 Point of Obligation Proceedings............................................................12

         2. 2017 Annual Volumetric Proceedings...................15

         III. Standard of Review....................................................17

         IV. 2010 Point of Obligation Rule...................................17

         A. Jurisdiction.................................................................17

         1. Final Agency Action Under Section 7607(b)(1).... 19

         2. After-Arising Grounds Under Section 7607(b)(1)..............................................................28

         3. Mandatory Reconsideration Under Section 7607(d)(7)(B).........................................................29

         B. Merits of Challenges to EPA's Refusal to Revise the 2010 Point of Obligation Rule.............................32

         V. 2017 Annual Volumetric Rule......................................41

         A. Point of Obligation....................................................42

         1. Jurisdiction.............................................................42

         2. Merits.....................................................................43

         B. Cellulosic Biofuel Projection.....................................53

         C. Cellulosic Waiver......................................................58

         VI. 2018 Volume for Biomass-Based Diesel...................62

         A. NBB's Standing.........................................................63

         B. Merits of NBB's Challenges......................................65

         VII. Conclusion.................................................................70

         I. Introduction

         The Clean Air Act requires EPA to publish "renewable fuel standards," ultimately expressed as "applicable percentages," each year to ensure that the total supply of transportation fuel sold or imported into the United States contains specified proportions of each of four categories of renewable fuels. Congress intended the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) program to "move the United States toward greater energy independence and security" and "increase the production of clean renewable fuels." See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110-140, preamble, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)).

         In these related cases, Alon Refining Krotz Springs, together with other petroleum refineries and their trade associations-the "Alon Petitioners"-seek review of EPA's decision not to revise its 2010 point of obligation regulation requiring refineries and importers, but not blenders, to bear the direct compliance obligation of ensuring that transportation fuels sold or introduced into the U.S. market include the requisite percentages of renewables. Coffeyville Resources Refining & Marketing and another group of refineries and trade associations-the "Coffeyville Petitioners"-challenge EPA's refusal to reassess the appropriateness of the point of obligation in the context of its 2017 annual volumetric rule, which set the 2017 applicable percentages for all four categories of renewable fuel and the 2018 applicable volume for one subset of such fuel, biomass-based diesel. See 81 Fed. Reg. 89, 746 (Dec. 12, 2016) (2017 Rule). The Coffeyville Petitioners also contend that EPA arbitrarily set the 2017 percentage standards too high. The National Biodiesel Board (NBB)-a biomass-based diesel industry trade association-separately contends that EPA set the 2018 applicable volume for biomass-based diesel too low. Various trade associations representing refineries and producers of renewable fuels have intervened in support of EPA. For the reasons that follow, we deny each of the petitions for review, many of which recycle arguments raised and rejected in prior challenges.

         II. Background

         A. Legal Background

         Congress established the RFS program in 2005 as part of the Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)). The statute mandates the gradual introduction of four nested categories of renewable fuels into the United States' supply of gasoline, diesel, and other transportation fuels. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B). These categories include: (1) total renewable fuel; (2) advanced biofuel; (3) cellulosic biofuel; and (4) biomass-based diesel. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i), (B). The umbrella category, total renewable fuel, covers the three other categories plus any conventional renewable fuels, such as corn-based ethanol. See id. § 7545(o)(1)(F), (J), (2)(A)(i). The advanced biofuel subset includes any renewable fuel (except ethanol from cornstarch) that has at least 50% lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels. Id. § 7545(o)(1)(B). The statute further specifies two nonexclusive subsets of advanced biofuels: cellulosic biofuel (a renewable fuel derived from cellulose materials such as corn stalks and husks) and biomass-based diesel (a diesel fuel substitute made from feedstocks such as animal fats). Id. § 7545(o)(1)(B), (D), (E); EPA Coffeyville Br. 4-5. The following figure depicts the nested nature of the four fuel categories.

         (Image Omitted)

         Source: Coffeyville Br. 11.

         Four tables in the statute set forth gradually increasing annual "applicable volume" requirements for each category of renewable fuel. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i). The statute sets applicable volumes for biomass-based diesel through 2012, id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(IV), and applicable volumes for the other three categories through 2022, id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I)-(III). Under those tables, as the total quantities of renewable fuel rise over time, the ratio of advanced biofuels relative to conventional renewable fuel gradually increases. Id. For compliance years (which match calendar years) after those specified in the tables, the statute requires EPA, in coordination with the Secretaries of Energy and Agriculture, to set the annual applicable volumes based on a review of the implementation of the program plus an analysis of six listed factors. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii). For years not specified in the table, EPA must publish the applicable volumes fourteen months before the year in which they will apply- volumes that, shortly before the start of the compliance year, EPA translates into percentage standards. Id.

         Various "waiver" provisions require or permit EPA to lower the annual applicable volumes. Two are relevant for the purposes of this case. First, under the "cellulosic waiver provision," EPA must make its own projection of the volume of cellulosic biofuel that will be produced in the following year. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(i). If that projection is less than the statutory figure, the agency must use its own projection as the applicable volume of cellulosic biofuel. Id.; see Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 477-80 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (API). The same cellulosic waiver provision authorizes (but does not require) EPA to also reduce the advanced biofuel and total renewable biofuel volume requirements "by the same or a lesser volume" as the cellulosic biofuel reduction, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(i), and EPA has "broad discretion" regarding whether and how to do that, Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA, 750 F.3d 909, 915 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Separately, under the "general waiver provision," EPA may reduce any of the statutory applicable volumes if it determines "that implementation . . . would severely harm the economy or environment," or "that there is an inadequate domestic supply." 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A); see Ams. for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691, 707-13 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (ACE).

         After EPA determines the waiver-adjusted applicable volumes, it must translate those volumes into "renewable volume obligation[s]" for each category of renewable fuel for the upcoming compliance year. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i). The volume obligation for each category of renewable fuel is expressed as an "applicable percentage," also known as a "percentage standard," calculated by dividing the adjusted applicable volume for that category of fuel by the total anticipated volume of non-renewable transportation fuel that will be introduced into commerce (which EPA derives based on an estimate provided by the Energy Information Administration) in the coming compliance year. Id. § 7545(o)(3)(A), (B)(ii)(II); 40 C.F.R. § 80.1405(c). The statute calls on EPA to publish the percentage standards not later than November 30-a month before the start of the compliance year. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i).

         EPA must place the renewable volume obligations on "refineries, blenders, and importers, as appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(I); see also id. § 7545(o)(2)(A) (requiring EPA to promulgate implementing regulations, including "compliance provisions applicable to refineries, blenders, distributors, and importers, as appropriate," designed to ensure that transportation fuel sold or introduced into the United States "contains at least" the required annual applicable volumes). The entities that EPA designates to meet the volume obligations are known as "obligated parties." Monroe Energy, 750 F.3d at 912. Each obligated party must ensure that the volume of non-renewable fuel it sells or introduces into U.S. commerce is matched by selling or introducing a corresponding volume of each category of renewable fuel at the level EPA's percentage standard requires for that category. See ACE, 864 F.3d at 699. The percentage standards are set in the anticipation that, if each obligated party meets them and EPA's projection regarding the country's total transportation fuel supply bears out, the amount of each category of renewable fuel introduced into the economy in the upcoming compliance year will equal the applicable volumes for that year. Id. Obligated parties bear no direct responsibility for any shortfalls in the applicable volumes so long as they comply with the percentage standards.

         EPA assigns a set of "renewable identification numbers" (RINs) to each batch of renewable fuel that is produced or imported for use in the United States. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1426; see 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5); Monroe Energy, 75OF.3d at 913. The number of RINs assigned to each batch corresponds to the amount of ethanol-equivalent energy per gallon in that batch. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.1415; Monroe Energy, 750 F.3d at 913. RINs remain attached to the renewable fuel until that fuel is purchased by an obligated party or blended into fossil fuels to be used for transportation fuel. See ACE, 864 F.3d at 699 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 80.1429(b)(1)-(2)). At that point the RINs become "separated," meaning they are, in effect, a form of compliance credit. Id. Obligated parties demonstrate their compliance with their renewable fuel obligations by "retiring" RINs in annual compliance demonstrations to EPA. 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1427(a), 80.1451(a)(1).

         Because the four categories of renewable fuel are nested, obligated parties can comply with their obligations for a type of fuel by retiring any combination of RINs corresponding to that category of fuels or any subset thereof. See 40 C.F.R. § 8O.l427(a)(3)(i). For instance, retiring a cellulosic biofuel or biomass-based diesel RIN counts not only toward the volume obligation for that fuel, but also toward both the advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel obligations. Thus, "if one million gallons of cellulosic biofuel are blended into the fuel supply, the statute allows those one million gallons to be credited toward the advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel obligations in addition to the cellulosic biofuel obligation." ACE, 864 F.3d at 698.

         Obligated parties who have more RINs than they need may sell or trade their excess, 40 C.F.R. § 80.1428(b), or they may "bank" those RINs for use to meet up to 20 percent of their obligations for the following compliance year, Monroe Energy, 750 F.3d at 913; see 40 C.F.R. § 80.1427(a)(1), (5); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 14, 670, 14, 734-35 (Mar. 26, 2010). Obligated parties without enough RINs to meet their compliance obligations may purchase RINs, use banked RINs from the prior year, or carry a deficit forward to the following year to be satisfied together with the following year's obligations. See ACE, 864 F.3d at 699-700; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)(D); 40 C.F.R. § 80.1427(b).

         B. Procedural Background

         The procedural history of these cases follows two paths: first, the proceedings relevant to the challenge that EPA arbitrarily declined to initiate a rulemaking to modify the 2010 regulation designating refineries and importers, but not blenders, as obligated parties; and second, the proceedings challenging the 2017 Rule.

         1. 2007, 2010, and 2017 Point of Obligation Proceedings

         In its 2007 regulations implementing the RFS program, EPA designated refiners and importers, but not blenders, as the "appropriate" parties to meet the renewable fuel obligation. 72 Fed. Reg. 23, 900, 23, 923-24 (May 1, 2007). At the time, those designations were not challenged in court. EPA reaffirmed its designations in a 2010 regulation now commonly known as the "point of obligation rule." 75 Fed. Reg. at 14, 721-22 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80.1406(a)(1)). During the 2010 rulemaking, several refiners-including petitioner Valero Energy Corporation-argued that failing to obligate blenders, who combine renewable fuel with fossil fuels, would make the RFS program unworkable. EPA concluded that the program was functioning adequately and that the burdens and disruption from changing the point of obligation would outweigh any benefits. See Summary and Analysis of Comments 3.9.2, Alon J.A. 287-90. Although other aspects of the 2010 regulations were challenged in court, see, e.g., Nat'l Chicken Council v. EPA, 687 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Nat'l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass 'n v. EPA, 630 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the point of obligation rule was not.

         On December 14, 2015, EPA promulgated the volume requirements for 2014, 2015, and 2016. Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 77, 420 (Dec. 14, 2015). In so doing, EPA exercised its general waiver authority to lower the total renewable fuel volumes based on a finding of inadequate domestic supply due to market factors "affecting the ability to distribute, blend, dispense, and consume . . . renewable fuels" at the levels required by statute. Mat 77, 43 5/2. Among those factors was "the slower than expected development of the cellulosic biofuel industry." Mat 77, 422. The agency thought an additional "real world constraint[]" was the "E10 blendwall"-the difficulty for most American vehicle engines to run on blends containing more than 10% ethanol. Id. at 77, 423. EPA explained that those factors made the statutory requirements "impossible to achieve." Id. at 77, 422/2. This Court later vacated the general waiver on the ground that EPA had misinterpreted the statutory term "inadequate domestic supply" to include demand-side constraints such as the E10 blendwall. See ACE, 864 F.3d at 704-13.

         On February 12, 2016, sixty days after EPA promulgated the volume requirements for 2014-16, the Alon Petitioners petitioned this Court for review of the 2010 point of obligation rule. These petitions contend that the rule was arbitrary and capricious insofar as it failed to impose the obligation on downstream blenders-the parties petitioners think are best able to comply with it. The petitions assert jurisdiction under the after-arising provision in 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which permits otherwise-untimely challenges to a rule if the challenges are "based solely on grounds arising after" the sixty-day deadline for seeking judicial review. The petitioners assert that EPA's exercise of its general waiver authority in the 2014-16 volume regulations, and its acknowledgment of the RFS program's shortcomings as of that time, provided such an after-arising ground.

         The Alon Petitioners simultaneously petitioned EPA to revise the point of obligation rule. Some of their requests were styled as petitions for a rulemaking. Others were styled as petitions for mandatory reconsideration under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B), which requires EPA to reconsider a rule if centrally important objections were impracticable to raise during the comment period or "arose after" that period "but within the time specified for judicial review." The petitions cited the waiver in the 2014-16 volume regulations and EPA's acknowledgment of program difficulties as grounds supporting mandatory reconsideration. This Court held in abeyance the petitions for review of the point of obligation rule pending resolution of the petitions to revise it.

         On November 10, 2016, EPA published a proposed denial of the petitions to revise the point of obligation rule. On November 22, 2017, after reviewing more than 18, 000 comments on the proposal, EPA denied the petitions. It concluded that the statutory requirements for mandatory reconsideration were not met, so it treated all the filings as petitions for a rulemaking. Denial of Petitions for Rulemaking to Change the RFS Point of Obligation, EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0544-0525, at 7 (Nov. 22, 2017) (EPA Denial), Alon J.A. 61. EPA then denied the petitions on the ground that "changing the point of obligation would . . . likely result in a decrease in the production, distribution, and use of [renewable] fuels" and would "do nothing to incentivize the research, development, and commercialization of cellulosic biofuel technologies critical for the growth of the RFS program in future years." EPA Denial at 8-9, Alon J. A. 62-63.

         Within sixty days (in December 2017 and January 2018), the Alon Petitioners sought judicial review of that denial, which it cast as a final agency action under section 7607(b)(1). The two sets of petitions-the February 2016 petitions for review of the 2010 point of obligation rule and the 2017-18 petitions for review of EPA's refusal to reconsider the rule- were consolidated and are now before us.

         2. 2017 Annual Volumetric Proceedings

         EPA issued its 2017 annual volumetric rule on December 12, 2016. The 2017 Rule establishes: (1) the applicable volume for biomass-based diesel for 2018, 81 Fed. Reg. at 89, 751/2; (2) the waiver-adjusted applicable volumes for cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel for 2017, id. at 89, 747 tbl. 1-1; and (3) percentage standards for all four fuel types for 2017, id. at 89, 751, tbl. LB.6-1.

         EPA exercised its mandatory cellulosic waiver authority to decrease the 2017 applicable volume for cellulosic biofuel by more than 94 percent, dropping 5.189 billion gallons from the statutory target of 5.5 billion gallons, to 311 million gallons. Id. at 89, 750/2; 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(III). EPA then had discretion under that same waiver authority to cut as much as 5.189 billion gallons off the statutory volumes for advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(i); 81 Fed. Reg. at 89, 762 & tbl. IV.A-1. EPA partially exercised that authority, reducing the 9-billion-gallon statutory target for advanced biofuel by 4.72 billion gallons, resulting in an adjusted applicable volume of 4.28 billion gallons-a greater than 50% decrease. 81 Fed. Reg. at 89, 750-51; 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(II). EPA reduced the total renewable fuel volume requirements by the same amount, lowering the statutory target of 24 billion gallons to 19.28 billion gallons. 81 Fed. Reg. at 89, 751/1; 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I). EPA considered but decided against also using its general waiver authority to further lower the applicable volume of total renewable fuel. 81 Fed. Reg. at 89, 751/1.

         Using the waiver-adjusted applicable volumes, EPA set the 2017 percentage standards for each of the four renewable fuel categories. See id. at 89, 751, 89, 799-801. Finally, EPA set the biomass-based diesel applicable volume for 2018 at 2.1 billion gallons. Id. at 89, 751/2. EPA received comments urging it to reassess the point of obligation in the 2017 Rule, but declined to address them on the grounds that the comments were "beyond the scope" of the 2017 rulemaking. Response to Comments at 542, Coffeyville J.A. 761.

         After EPA published the 2017 Rule, various parties petitioned for judicial review. The Coffeyville Petitioners contend that EPA erred by refusing to reconsider which types of parties would bear the direct compliance obligation under the 2017 Rule. They also argue that EPA arbitrarily calculated the 2017 production of cellulosic biofuel and arbitrarily exercised its discretionary cellulosic waiver authority, resulting in percentage standards that are too high. NBB argues that EPA set the 2018 applicable volume for biomass-based diesel too low by considering factors it should not have and omitting or incorrectly assessing others. Two trade associations representing refineries have intervened in defense of EPA's biomass-based diesel decision, and a coalition of trade associations representing renewable fuel producers and refineries have intervened to oppose the Coffeyville Petitioners' claims. None of the petitioners' challenges succeeds.

         III. Standard of Review

         "This court applies the familiar, deferential standard announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., to sustain any reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguity in the Clean Air Act." Nat 'l Ass'n for Surface Finishing v. EPA, 795 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2015). "We employ the deferential State Farm standard of review when reviewing arguments based on allegedly arbitrary or unreasoned agency action." ACE, 864 F.3d at 726 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). Under that rubric, EPA's actions are "presumptively valid provided [they] meet[] a minimum rationality standard." Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc. v. EPA, 194 F.3d 130, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We uphold EPA's actions so long as they are "reasonable and reasonably explained." Jackson v. Mabus, 808 F.3d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

         IV. 2010 Point of Obligation Rule

         We start with the Alon Petitioners and their challenges to the 2010 point of obligation rule.

         A. Jurisdiction

         We begin, as we must, with our jurisdiction. In general terms, the question presented involves our review of rules promulgated under the Clean Air Act, or EPA's failure to amend them, after the initial window for seeking judicial review has passed. Various statutory provisions frame this inquiry.

         Section 7607(b)(1) of Title 42 provides for judicial review of regulations promulgated by the Administrator of EPA under the Clean Air Act. The first sentence of section 7607(b)(1) vests this Court with exclusive jurisdiction to review "nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator" under the Act. The fourth sentence of section 7607(b)(1) specifies the time for seeking judicial review. It imposes a sixty-day time limit, but provides an exception for petitions based on grounds arising after the limit: "Any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise."

         Section 7607(d) of Title 42 sets forth provisions for various rulemakings under the Clean Air Act, including for the "promulgation or revision of any regulation" involving the RFS program. Id. ยง 7607(d)(1)(E). Section 7607(d)(7)(B) addresses various issues regarding exhaustion, agency reconsideration, and judicial review. The first sentence of that provision imposes a conventional exhaustion requirement, limiting judicial review to objections "raised with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment." The second sentence requires EPA to reconsider regulations in certain narrow circumstances: "If the person raising an objection can demonstrate to the Administrator that it was impracticable to raise such objection within such time or if the grounds for such objection arose after the period for public comment (but within the time specified for judicial review) and if such objection is of central relevance to the outcome of the rule, the Administrator shall convene a proceeding for reconsideration of the rule and provide the same ...


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