United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
TRAVIS SEALS ET AL.
BRANDON MCBEE ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
TRICHE MILAZZO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.
121) of this Court's June 12, 2019 Order and Reasons
granting in part a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants.
For the following reasons, the Motion is
Travis Seals and Ali Bergeron allege that Defendants- members
of the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office-violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana law during an incident at
Seals's home in December 2015. On April 23, 2019,
Defendants moved for summary judgment. In granting the motion
in part, the Court held that Defendants were entitled to
summary judgment on Seals's excessive force and malicious
prosecution claims. Seals now seeks reconsideration of that
portion of the Court's June 12, 2019 Order and
Reasons. Defendants did not file an opposition to
Plaintiff Seals's Motion for Reconsideration.
Motion for Reconsideration of an interlocutory order is
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b). “Under Rule 54(b), ‘the trial
court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any
reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new
evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the
Seals's excessive force claim
Court previously held that Defendants were entitled to
summary judgment on Seals's excessive force claims
because Seals had produced no evidence showing that he
suffered an injury even though an injury is a required
element of an excessive force claim. Seals now argues that this
Court's decision was untimely because Defendants did not
specifically move for summary judgment on this ground, and
thus Plaintiff Seals lacked sufficient notice to defend
dismissal on this ground.
is no doubt Seals has had notice since June 12, 2019 of his
failure to produce any evidence that he suffered an injury
based on Defendants' alleged excessive force. Still, he
has not done so. In fact, the only evidence cited to by Seals
is a Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office incident report
noting that Seals refused medical treatment after being
arrested. Certainly refusing medical treatment
cannot be sufficient to establish an injury for excessive
Seals apparently argues that that evidence of being pepper
sprayed constitutes a per se injury for excessive
force purposes. On the contrary, “[n]umerous courts
have found that being tased and/or pepper sprayed, without
some long-term effect, is no more than a de minimus
injury.”As such, the Court need not reconsider its
grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff
Seals's excessive force claims.
Seals's malicious prosecution claim
Court granted summary judgment on Seals's malicious
prosecution claims because Defendants had shown that they had
probable cause to arrest him, which is a defense to a
malicious prosecution claim. Seals now argues that the Court
conflated probable cause for some of the charges against
Seals as probable cause for all of them. The Court did no
such thing. Seals faced charges of simple assault, resisting
an officer, public intimidation, and aggravated assault. A
Louisiana district court judge determined that Defendants had
probable cause to arrest him ...