United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ROLAND J. NAQUIN, JR.
JERRY LARPENTER, ET. AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
the Court are pro se plaintiff Roland Naquin
Jr.'s complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Rec. Doc. 1), the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) (Rec. Doc. 4), and
plaintiff's objections (Rec. Doc. 5). For the following
reasons, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's
objections are OVERRULED;
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's
Report is ADOPTED as the opinion of the
IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
is a state inmate currently housed in Terrebonne Parish
Criminal Justice Complex (“TPCJC”). See
Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Defendants are Jerry Larpenter as Sheriff
of Terrebonne Parish; Gordon Dove as Parish President of
Terrebonne; and, Major Bergeron as Warden of TPCJC
(collectively “defendants”). See id.
January 4, 2019, plaintiff filed the instant complaint.
See Rec. Doc. 2. He seeks compensatory damages for
enduring exposure to black mold and hazardous bacteria at
TPCJC. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 9. Plaintiff alleges that
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to TPCJC's
unsanitary conditions. See id.
January 10, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report
recommending dismissal of this matter because plaintiff
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See Rec. Doc. 4 at 3. Specifically, plaintiff's
complaint appears unactionable because he failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies available to him at TPCJC.
See id. On January 17, 2019, plaintiff filed a
timely objection to the Report. See Rec. Doc. 5.
recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States by a person acting under color of state
law. See Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730,
734 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Wong v. Stripling, 881
F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Court must dismiss a § 1983 claim if the complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); §
1915A(b)(1). A plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted when the claim does not contain
“‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). Given a presumption of truth, the
plaintiff's factual allegations must raise a right to
relief above the speculative level. See In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205.
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, a prisoner
filing a § 1983 action must have previously exhausted
his claims through available administrative remedies. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Gonzalez v. Seal,
702 F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2012). This exhaustion is
required regardless of the forms of relief sought or offered
in the administrative process. See Booth v. Churner,
532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). While failure to exhaust is an
affirmative defense, the Court may dismiss a complaint
“if the complaint makes clear that the prisoner failed
to exhaust [administrative remedies].” Carbe v.
Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
Jones v. Bock, 599 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)).
the Fifth Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner
seeks compensatory damages for an alleged constitutional
violation. See Greiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374
(5th Cir. 2005); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191,
193-94 (5th Cir. 1997). The § 1997e(e) physical injury
requirement states that “[n]o federal civil action may
be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury.” Thus, a prisoner's § 1983 action for
an Eighth Amendment violation will not prevail without a
physical injury. See Greiger, 404 F.3d at 374.
prisoner states an Eighth Amendment violation in his §
1983 complaint, he must satisfy two requirements. The first
requirement is that the prison official's act or omission
resulted in denial of “the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman,
425 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); Palmer v. Johnson, 193
F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 1999). The second requirement is that
the prison official's state of mind was “deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)); Palmer,
193 F.3d at 352. This Court need not analyze the ...