United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
NOTICE
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Please
take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report
has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District
Court.
In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen
(14) days after being served with the attached Report to file
written objections to the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law and recommendations therein. Failure to
file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being
served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which
have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY
NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN
OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
MAGISTRATE
JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This
matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed on
behalf of defendants Warden Darrel Vannoy, Asst. Warden Tracy
Falgout, and Capt. Michael Simpson (R. Doc. 13). The motion
is not opposed.
The
pro se plaintiff, an inmate confined at the
Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), Angola,
Louisiana, filed this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against numerous defendants alleging that his
constitutional rights have been violated due the use of
excessive force, failure to protect the plaintiff from the
use of excessive force, false disciplinary charges, and
deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs.[1] He prays for injunctive, declaratory and
monetary relief.
The
moving defendants first seek dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, of the plaintiff's claim against them in
their official capacities. In this regard, the defendants are
correct that § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for
a litigant who seeks monetary damages against either a state
or its officials acting in their official capacities,
specifically because these officials are not seen to be
“persons” within the meaning of § 1983.
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, in Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed
the distinction between official capacity and individual
capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a state
official in an official capacity for monetary damages is
treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 25.
Accordingly,
the plaintiff's claims asserted against the defendants in
their official capacities, for monetary damages, are subject
to dismissal. In contrast, the plaintiff's claims for
monetary damages asserted against the defendants in their
individual capacities remain viable because a claim against a
state official in an individual capacity, seeking to impose
personal liability for actions taken under color of state
law, is not treated as a suit against the state. Id.
at 29. The plaintiff's claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief also remain viable. Of course, the
plaintiff must prove a deprivation of a constitutional right
to obtain any relief.
Turning
to the plaintiff's claims that are not subject to
dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the
defendants next assert, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the
Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a
plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, supra, at 555. “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.' ”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678,
quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
supra. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. It follows
that, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to
relief.' ” Id. at 679. “Where a
Complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent
with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.' ” Id. at 678
(internal quotation marks omitted).
On a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the Complaint.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Further,
“[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be
liberally construed' ... and ‘a pro se
Complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.' ” Id. (citation omitted).
Notwithstanding, the court need not accept “a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation, ”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or
“naked assertions [of unlawful conduct] devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In his
Complaint as amended, the plaintiff alleges that on September
22, 2017 he was placed in restraints by Sgt. Wesley Spillman
and taken to the upstairs lobby to make a phone call
regarding a death in his family. The plaintiff was unable to
make his call due to restrictions on the phone line, and he
requested to speak with the shift major. The plaintiff was
then taken back to the downstairs lobby and instructed to
stand to the right side of the lobby while the field line was
brought in from work.
While
standing in the downstairs lobby, the plaintiff was
approached by defendant Simpson and the plaintiff explained
his need to access an outside line and requested to speak
with a shift major. Defendant Simpson denied the
plaintiff's request and the plaintiff then declared
himself a mental health emergency and asked to speak to his
social workers. Defendant Simpson refused the plaintiff's
request and ordered the plaintiff to return to his cell. The
plaintiff refused and again requested to speak to his social
worker.
Defendant
Simpson then reached into his pocket, retrieved a can of
mace, and sprayed the plaintiff. The plaintiff was then
thrown to the floor, was stomped and kicked, and again
sprayed with mace by defendant Simpson. Sgt. Spillman was
present during these events but did not intervene. Defendant
Vannoy had prior notice of complaints against defendant
Simpson for use of excessive force, but ...