United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
WILDER-DOOMES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is a “Motion to Strike Both Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment” (the “Motion to
Strike”) filed by Plaintiff Matt Banks
(“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff argues, essentially, that
because similar arguments are made in the Motion for Summary
Judgment as were made in the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings,  which was granted in part and denied in
part by this Court,  that Defendants are precluded from
asserting these arguments in their Motion for Summary
Judgment. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants
“abandoned” the defenses raised in the Motion for
Summary Judgment during the pleading stage and takes
exception with the fact that the Motion for Summary Judgment
was filed by Assistant Attorney General Teresa Phillips, who
is no longer assigned to the case.
Plaintiff's argument that a denial of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings with respect to certain defenses or
arguments forecloses a later summary judgment on those points
is without merit. These two types of motions are different
procedural mechanisms for resolution of claims. Entry of
judgment on the pleadings is proper if the material facts are
not in dispute and the court can render judgment on the
merits by looking to the substance of the pleadings
and any judicially noticed facts. Accordingly, in a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), a court should
only render judgment in favor of the moving party, if based
on the face of the pleadings and judicially noticed facts
alone, the plaintiff has failed to adequately state a claim
showing that he may be entitled to relief. In comparison, a
motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 allows
the court to look at evidence beyond the pleadings to
determine if any genuine dispute as to any material fact
exists. These are two different procedural mechanisms, and
simply because a defendant does not prevail on a Rule 12(c)
motion does not preclude the defendant from later filing a
motion for summary judgment raising the same defenses but
supporting those defenses with evidence.
Plaintiff relies on the arguments made in his Opposition and
Motion to Strike Answer as a basis for striking the Motion
for Summary Judgment. This argument is also without merit.
First, although the Motion to Strike Answer was granted by
the Court,  it was granted because defendants failed
to obtain leave of court to file their most recent Answer,
not because the material in that answer was inappropriate,
immaterial or redundant. Further, to the extent this Motion
to Strike suggests that arguments raised in Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment are inappropriate because they
are based on affirmative defenses that have been waived, the
Court disagrees. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
is largely based upon Plaintiff's lack of ability to
carry Plaintiff's initial burden of proof. Defendants do
raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity,
this defense was pled in Defendants' first, properly
filed Answer to Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint,
Affirmative Defenses and Request for Jury
Trial.Thus, this defense has not been waived.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that
Plaintiff's “Motion to Strike Both Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment” be and is hereby
 R. Doc. 57.
 R. Doc. 36.
 R. Doc. 44.
 R. Doc. 57-1, p. 1. Plaintiff is also
under the impression that two separate motions for summary
judgment were filed by Defendants and takes issue with this.
However, Plaintiff is mistaken. The first document Plaintiff
refers to as a Motion for Summary Judgment is a Motion for
Leave to File Excess Pages, which included the Motion for
Summary Judgment. Because leave of Court was required to file
the Motion for Summary Judgment with excess pages, the Motion
for Summary Judgment was filed into the record as R. Doc. 56
the following day, after leave had been granted.
(See R. Docs. 52, 54, & 56). As to Assistant AG
Phillips, she submitted the Motion for Summary Judgment on
May 23, 2019 and counsel of record was not substituted for
Assistant AG Phillips until May 24, 2019. Thus, Assistant AG
Phillips was properly counsel of record when the Motion for
Summary Judgment was filed.
 Linicomn v. Hill, 902 F.3d
529, 533 (5th Cir. 2018).
 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).
 R. Doc. 67.
See e.g., R. Doc. 56-1, p. 9
(“Here, Plaintiff's allegations against Dr.
Lavespere, Lamartinere, and Dr. Toce do not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation by demonstrating deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need of his. In particular,
Plaintiff has failed to show that any of the named Defendants
‘refused to treat [him], ignored [his] complaints,
intentionally treated [him] incorrectly, or engaged in any
similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard
for any serious medical needs.'”). See
also, R. Doc. 56-1, p 25 (In the alternative, Plaintiff
still fails to show that there is a genuine dispute of
material fact ...