Appealed from the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for
the Parish of Webster, Louisiana Trial Court No. 75, 093
Honorable R. Lane Pittard, Judge
SHARUNDA PREVO In Proper Person
WALLACE WINGERTER, JR. Counsel for Appellee By: Edward F.
MOORE, McCALLUM, and THOMPSON, JJ.
Prevo, in proper person, appeals a summary judgment that
ordered her to pay the balance due on a car loan after
default, repossession and sheriff's sale. We affirm.
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prevo bought a 2012 Ford Focus from Orr Nissan in August
2014. She financed the $18, 640 purchase price by retail
installment contract calling for 60 monthly payments of
$536.14, at 23.99% interest and a 25% attorney fees in case
of default. She made exactly one payment and, in June 2015,
the holder of the note, Credit Acceptance Corp.
("CAC"), repossessed the Focus and had it sold at
sheriff's sale. The deficiency after the sale was $11,
552.66. CAC filed this suit in January 2016 to recover the
deficiency, costs, interest and attorney fees.
Prevo filed a pro se answer urging various deficiencies in
the petition, such as lack of proof that CAC had purchased
the debt. She also applied for pauper status, which was
granted. Later, in March 2016, she filed an "affidavit
of truth" asserting, inter alia, that she had
"reserved" all her rights under the Uniform
Commercial Code, and that the petition lacked a
"Mini-Miranda Warning" and
"verifiable proof" of the plaintiff's loss.
filed this motion for summary judgment in June 2018. In
support, it filed the affidavit of its legal assistant,
Kimberly Cavazos, attesting to all the facts alleged and
stating the balance due was $11, 552.66, plus interest, costs
and attorney fees. Attached to the affidavit was a copy of
the customer payment history, notice of plan to sell property
and notice of disposition of repossessed vehicle. A memo in
support contended that all Ms. Prevo's alleged
deficiencies were "frivolous at best" and bore the
hallmarks of Sovereign Citizen Theory, making them
"frivolous as a matter of law," Mack v.
Sweet, 2017 WL 6756667 (N.D. Tex. 12/4/17).
before the hearing on motion for summary judgment, on July
17, Ms. Prevo filed an "affidavit of fact" which
bore the heading of the "Moorish National Republic"
and identified herself as "Ashanti Imani Bey, authorized
representative / Natural Person, In Propria Persona: Ex
Relatione ShaRunda Lynette Prevo." This document
(apparently copied from a website) quoted various
constitutional passages, some pertaining to criminal law, but
did not mention one fact about the case.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
hearing, Ms. Prevo's conduct was bizarre. She identified
herself as Ashanti Imani Bey, "an authorized
representative" and "in reference to" Ms.
Prevo. The court advised her that if she was not a lawyer,
she could not represent anyone in court; she responded that
her "ex-relationship" or "prior name" was
Prevo. CAC's counsel conceded that Ms. Ashanti and Ms.
Prevo were one and the same, and the person being sued on the
court then asked CAC's counsel to present his case for
summary judgment, but Ms. Prevo kept interrupting, demanding
to "see the jurisdiction of this court," insisting
she was there only "under threat, duress and
coercion," and it was only a "special
appearance." The court warned her that if she
interrupted again, she would be removed. Almost immediately,
she interrupted again; the court held her in contempt and
ordered her to jail for 24 hours.
counsel then presented its case, after which the court
granted judgment as prayed for, actually reflecting an extra
credit, for a principal of $11, 012.93, with legal interest
from date of judicial demand, 25% attorney fees and all
costs. The court fixed August 8 for form and content, and
ordered Ms. Prevo released from jail at 4:00 pm the day of
August 3, Ms. Prevo fax-filed another sheaf of documents,
"Affidavit of Fact / Answer," "Answer / For
the record, to be read into the record," and another
"Affidavit of Truth." These maintained her status
as a citizen of the Moorish National Republic. She attached a
copy of the proposed judgment, which she refused to sign, and
instead wrote on the bottom, "I dispute this debt and
all claims to contract in accordance with 15 USC 1692G. I do
not consent to these proceedings. The Clearfield Doctrine.
Inducement of Fraud."
filed a Rule 9.5 certificate attesting that it had received
no opposition to the proposed judgment. The court filed the
signed judgment on August 20. On October 8, after receiving
notice of judgment, Ms. Prevo filed a motion for findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and a motion for a return date
for a devolutive appeal. The court rendered a written opinion
and granted Ms. Prevo's appeal on October 26.
Ms. Prevo filed a request for 10-days' notice of setting
and notice of judgment, with a motion to traverse Ms.
Cavazos's affidavit. The court granted a hearing on these
motions, but that hearing, on November 13, was very short:
the court peremptorily advised Ms. Prevo that the motion to
traverse was untimely, as judgment was already rendered.
Ms. Prevo filed several more motions in the district court,
which were all denied as repetitive or untimely.
Prevo has filed a pro se brief advancing 22 assignments of
error and six "issues presented for review."
interest of justice, this court will read pro se filings
indulgently and try to discern the thrust of the
appellant's position and the relief she seeks. Magee
v. Williams, 50, 726 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So.3d
265. However, even with the latitude extended to a pro se
litigant in the form of liberally construed pleadings, the
appellant is required to meet her burden of proof.
Id.; Greenwood Comty. Ctr. v. Calep, 48,
737 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 132 So.3d 470. Ms. Prevo's
assignments are mostly assertions of fact and conclusions,
without citations to the record or legal authority. However,
we have grouped them by topic and addressed the issues she
was attempting to assert.