United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division
MAURICE HICKS, JR. JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
H.L. PEREZ-MONTES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 filed by pro se Petitioner Gaston Craig
(“Craig”). Craig is a pretrial detainee at the
Caddo Correctional Center in Shreveport, Louisiana. Craig
claims the charges against him should be dismissed.
Craig's claim is not exhausted, his Petition (Doc. 1)
should be DISMISSED.
alleges that he was arrested on October 23, 2017, but no bill
of information was filed until May 17, 2018. Craig also
states that his motion to quash was wrongfully denied. (Doc.
1, p. 7). Craig seeks the dismissal of the charges pending
against him. (Doc. 1, p. 15).
Law and Analysis
filed this action under § 2254. However, a pretrial
petition challenging ongoing state criminal proceedings is
properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See
Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998)
(construing petition filed to seek release from pending state
criminal proceeding as brought under § 2241 rather than
§ 2254); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220,
224 (5th Cir. 1987); Montes v. Cornyn, 4:02-cv-790,
2002 WL 31495972, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2002). Thus, this
Court construes Craig's Petition as seeking relief under
pretrial detainee is entitled to raise constitutional claims
in a § 2241 proceeding if two requirements are
satisfied. First, the petitioner must be in custody.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); Dickerson,
816 F.2d at 224. Craig, who remains incarcerated at Caddo
Correctional Center on the pending criminal charges, is
“in custody” for purposes of § 2241.
the petitioner must have exhausted his available state
remedies. See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224. State
remedies are ordinarily not considered exhausted if the
petitioner may effectively present his claims to the state
courts by any currently available and adequate procedure.
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S.
484, 489-92 (1973). Typically, in order to exhaust, a
petitioner must fairly apprise the highest state court of the
federal rights that were allegedly violated. See Deters
v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 1993);
Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir.
1985). In Louisiana, this requires that the claims be
presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court in a procedurally
proper manner. See Deters, 985 F.2d at 795;
Procunier, 762 F.2d at 432.
alleges that he filed a habeas petition in the state
court-which was denied-and appealed the denial in the trial
court. (Doc. 1, p. 6). However, a district court's denial
of a habeas petition is only reviewable by the appropriate
court of appeal through a supervisory writ. See
La.C.Cr.P. art. 369; Madison v. Ward, 00- 2842
(La.App. 1st Cir. 7/3/02), 825 So.2d 1245, 1250 (en banc);
Bernard v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and
Corrections, 2000-1912 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/02), 843
So.2d 413. Thereafter, a state habeas petitioner must seek
further review in the Louisiana Supreme Court. Craig did not
seek review in the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal
or the Louisiana Supreme Court. Therefore, his claim is not
petitioner may be excused from the exhaustion requirement
only if he can show “exceptional circumstances of
peculiar urgency.” Deters, 985 F.2d at 795
(citations omitted). “[D]erailment of a pending state
proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses
prematurely in federal court” is not allowed. See
Braden, 410 U.S. at 493.
does not allege-and the jurisprudence does not indicate-that
he fully exhausted his claims through the Louisiana Supreme
Court. Nor has Craig shown that he should be excused from the
exhaustion requirement by demonstrating exceptional
circumstances warranting federal intrusion in his ongoing
state court proceeding. Accordingly, pretrial habeas
interference by this Court is not permitted. See
Braden, 410 U.S. at 493.