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United States v. Williams

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

May 31, 2019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GROSS WILLIAMS

         SECTION I

          ORDER & REASONS

          LANCE M. AFRICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Before the Court is petitioner Gross Williams's (“Williams”) motion[1] to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The government opposes the motion, [2] and Williams filed a reply.[3] For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

         I.

         On January 22, 2015, Williams was charged with counts one through four of a five-count indictment.[4] On May 18, 2016, before then U.S. District Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt, Williams pled guilty to count one, which charged Williams with conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin and five kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine.[5] Williams also pled guilty to count three, which charged Williams with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.[6]

         Pursuant to Williams's plea agreement, Williams also pled guilty to a bill of information, filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1), which increased Williams's mandatory minimum sentence to twenty years.[7] If Williams complied with the terms of the plea agreement, the government agreed not to file a second bill of information, which would mandate a life sentence upon conviction.[8] Williams waived his right to appeal or contest his guilty plea, conviction, and sentence as well as his right to bring any collateral challenges, including challenges pursuant to § 2255, except claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in “an appropriate proceeding.”[9] However, Williams entered a conditional plea that specifically reserved his right to appeal Judge Engelhardt's adverse ruling with respect to Williams's motion to suppress.[10]

         On March 15, 2017, Judge Engelhardt sentenced Williams to a term of imprisonment of 276 months as to count one and 120 months as to count three, with the terms of imprisonment to run concurrently.[11] Williams timely appealed his sentence and conviction.[12] On February 15, 2018, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Engelhardt's ruling on the motion to suppress.[13] On May 29, 2018, the United States Supreme Court denied Williams's petition for a writ of certiorari.[14] Williams timely filed the present motion.[15]

         II.

         Section 2255 allows a prisoner in federal custody to bring a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence in the court that imposed the sentence, when that prisoner claims a

right to be released upon a ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without the jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). When a defendant challenges his conviction and sentence collaterally under § 2255, the defendant can only bring “issues of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude.” United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); see also United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Section 2255 motions may raise only constitutional errors and other injuries that could not have been addressed on direct appeal that will result in a miscarriage of justice if left unaddressed.”).

         Williams asserts sixteen grounds for relief.[16] Specifically, he asserts sixteen claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against three attorneys: Eddie Jordan, Jr. (“Jordan”) (grounds 1-10 and 15-16); Jerrod Thompson-Hicks (“Thompson-Hicks”) (grounds 11-12); and Ada Phleger (“Phleger”) (grounds 13-14). Jordan represented Williams from his initial appearance through the plea proceedings.[17] Thompson-Hicks was thereafter appointed to represent Williams, and he represented Williams in connection with sentencing proceedings.[18] Phleger represented Williams in connection with his appeal to the Fifth Circuit.[19] The Court will address each of Williams's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in turn.[20]

         III.

         Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires a petitioner to prove both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. The petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to be successful in an ineffective assistance claim. See id. A court is not required to address these prongs in any particular order. Id. at 697. If it is possible to dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim without addressing both prongs, “that course should be followed.” Id.

         Deficient performance is established by “show[ing] that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In applying this standard, a “court must indulge a ‘strong presumption' that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). In other words, “judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

         A showing of prejudice requires “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. With respect to guilty pleas, the prejudice requirement “focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Thus, in challenging a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” King v. Davis, 898 F.3d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). The defendant must also show “that going to trial would have given him a reasonable chance of obtaining a more favorable result.” King, 898 F.3d at 605 (citing United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 2018)).

         At the outset, the government argues that Williams cannot succeed as to any of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he cannot demonstrate prejudice.[21] Specifically, the government argues that Williams cannot show that going to trial would have given him a reasonable chance of obtaining a more favorable result.

         As previously stated, in exchange for Williams's guilty plea, the government agreed not to file a second bill of information, which would have resulted in Williams receiving a mandatory life sentence.[22] The government also agreed to dismiss counts two and four; count two charged Williams with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, which the government contends would have carried a mandatory consecutive term of 60 months of imprisonment up to life imprisonment, [23]and count four charged Williams with conspiring to launder the proceeds of unlawful activity, namely narcotics distribution.[24]

         At Williams's rearraignment, the Court explained to Williams that he was facing a mandatory minimum sentence by pleading guilty and it explained the maximum sentences that he faced:

THE COURT: Mr. Williams, if you're convicted of the crime charged in Count 1, either upon a plea of guilty or after a trial, the statutory sentence that could be imposed on you is a maximum term of imprisonment of life and a minimum term of imprisonment, pursuant to the statute, of 20 years.
. . .
If you're convicted of the crime charged in Count 3, either upon a plea of guilty or after trial, then the statutory sentence that could be imposed on you is a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years.
. . .
Mr. Williams, do you understand the maximum sentences that can be imposed on you relative to Counts 1 and 3?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand the minimum sentence that must be imposed on you relative to Count 1?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.[25]

         Based on the foregoing, the government argues that Williams knew he was going to receive a sentence of at least 240 months in prison.[26] Williams was then sentenced to a term of 276 months, which is 36 months above the mandatory minimum sentence as to count one.[27]

         The government argues that the “modest difference” between the minimum possible sentence that Williams knew he would receive and the sentence that he actually received, as well as the fact that he did not face a mandatory life sentence, makes Williams's contentions that he would not have pled guilty but for his counsel's alleged errors “unconvincing.”[28]

         A.

         In his first ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Williams asserts that his counsel failed to object to the Court's failure to advise him of the nature of the offense to which he was pleading guilty as required by Rule 11(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.[29] Specifically, Williams argues that the Court should have advised him-and that he would not have pled guilty if he knew-that he would be held accountable for 150 grams of cocaine base and 2.49 kilograms of marijuana as described in his presentence investigation report (“PSR”), [30] in addition to the quantities of heroin and cocaine described in the indictment.[31]

         As explained above, Williams must show that Jordan's performance was deficient and that such performance caused Williams prejudice. With respect to the first Strickland prong, the Court complied with Rule 11 at Williams's rearraignment and, therefore, Williams's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the Court's alleged failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(1).

         Rule 11(b)(1) provides:

Before the Court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following:
. . .
(G) the nature of the offense to which the defendant is pleading.

         The Court explained the elements of each offense for which Williams was charged in the indictment:

THE COURT: . . . I am going to go through the counts that are pertinent to today.
Mr. Williams, I've been advised that, subject to your reservation of your right to appeal the Court's determination of the previously filed motion to suppress . . . pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, you're here today with that reservation, to plead guilty to Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment which charged, in Count 1, that you, from a time unknown and continuing until on or about September 22 of 2014, did knowingly and intentionally conspire with persons known and unknown to the grand jury to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 1 kilogram or more of heroin and to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 of the United States Code; and, in Count 3, that you, on or about September 22 of 2014, having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, specifically a December 20, 2012[ ] conviction in . . . the 18th District Court for the Parish of Iberville, State of Louisiana, No. 672-11D . . . for possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute Title 14, Section 966(a), did knowingly possess in and affecting commerce a firearm, specifically a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber semiautomatic pistol bearing serial number DSS6399, all in violation of Title 19, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1).
Mr. Williams, I previously mentioned that you intend to plead guilty here subject to your reservation of your right to appeal this Court's determination of your previously filed motion to suppress, and to withdraw your guilty plea if you prevail on the appeal, pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Mr. Williams, am I correct that you are here today to plead guilty on these two charges subject to the reservation I just mentioned?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Williams, I also understand that you wish to plead guilty, pursuant to Section 851 of Title 21, to Count 1 of the May 11, 2016, bill of information that serves to establish a prior felony drug conviction, specifically a September 27, 1993[ ] conviction for your possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, that is cocaine, on August 31, 1992, in the 15th District Court for the Parish of Lafayette, State of Louisiana, in No. 64126 in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute Title 40, Section 967, after having previously been convicted on April 28th of 1992 of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine in that same court under No. 61689. Am I correct in this regard?
JORDAN: That's correct.
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That's the bill to establish the prior conviction. We're going to make reference to that as we go through today and what the significance of that is. And I know you and your attorney have already discussed it, and you may have already discussed it with the government as well, but I am going to cover that here today.[32]
. . .
THE COURT: Have [ ] you discussed with your attorney the particular charges in the five-count indictment to which you intend to plead guilty?
. . .
Mr. Williams, have you discussed with Mr. Jordan Counts 1 and 3 --
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- prior to today. All right.
. . .
As I previously stated, Mr. Williams, Count 1 of the indictment - I am going to go through each of these counts and give you the elements of each count and some definitions.
Count 1, Mr. Williams, states that you, from a time unknown and continuing until on or about September 22 of 2014, did knowingly and intentionally conspire with persons known and unknown to the grand jury to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 1 kilogram or more of heroin and to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 of the United States Code, and all in violation of Section 846 of Title 21.
For you to be found guilty of the crime charged in Count 1, the government, in the absence of a guilty plea, would have to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt as to the conspiracy offense: First, that two or more persons directly or indirectly reached an agreement to violate the narcotics laws by knowingly and intentionally distributing controlled substances and by knowingly and intentionally possessing with the intent to distribute controlled substances, which in this case are heroin and cocaine, all as charged in Count 1 of the indictment. Second, that you knew of the unlawful purpose of the agreement. Third, that you joined in the agreement willfully. That is, with the intent to further its unlawful purpose. And, four, that the overall scope of the conspiracy involved at least 1 kilogram or more of heroin and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine.
Mr. Williams, you're advised that a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of partnership in crime in which each member becomes the agent of every other member. One may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all the details of the unlawful scheme or the identities of all the other alleged conspirators. If a defendant understands the unlawful nature of a plan or scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that plan or scheme on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him or her of conspiracy even though the defendant had not participated before and even though the defendant played only a minor part. The government need not prove that the alleged conspirators entered into any formal agreement, nor that they directly stated between themselves all the details of the scheme.
Similarly, the government need not prove that all of the details of the scheme alleged in the indictment were actually agreed upon or carried out; nor must it prove that all of the persons alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were, in fact, such, or that the alleged conspirators actually succeeded in accomplishing their unlawful objectives. Mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime is being committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy but who happens to act in a way which advanced some purpose of a conspiracy does not thereby become a conspirator.
Now, Mr. Williams, the underlying crimes of the charged conspiracy, specifically distribution and possession with the intent to distribute 1 kilogram or more of heroin and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, have the following essential elements which the government, in the absence of a guilty plea, also would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the offense of possession with the intent to distribute 1 kilogram or more of heroin or 5 or more kilograms of cocaine, the elements the government would have to prove are: One, knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance. Second, that the substances were, in fact, heroin and cocaine. Third, possession of the substances with the intent to distribute them. And, fourth, that the quantity of the substances was at least 1 kilogram of heroin and at least 5 kilograms of cocaine. The terms "knowing" or "knowingly" mean that the act was done voluntarily an intentionally, not because of some mistake or accident.
"Possession with the intent to distribute" simply means to possess with the intent to deliver or transfer possession of a controlled substance to another person with or without any financial interest in the transaction. "Possession," as that term is used here, may be of two kinds, actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is then in actual possession of it. A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it. Possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint. The element of possession is present if the defendant had actual or constructive possession, either alone or jointly with others.
Mr. Williams, with respect to the offense of distribution of 1 kilogram or more of heroin and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, the elements the government would be required to prove are: First, knowing and intentional distribution of a controlled substance. Second, that the substances were, in fact, heroin and cocaine. Third, that at the time of the distribution, the defendant knew the substances were controlled substances. And, fourth, that the quantity of the substances distributed were at least 1 kilogram of heroin and 5 or more kilograms of cocaine. To distribute a controlled substance means to deliver or transfer possession of a controlled substance to another person with or without any financial interest in the transaction. The terms "knowing" or "knowingly" have the same meanings that I have just described in connection with explaining the elements of the crime of possession with the intent to distribute.
With respect to the crime with which you are charged in Count 3, that you, on or about September 22, 2014, having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, specifically a December 20, 2012, conviction in the criminal district court of the 18th District Court for the Parish of Iberville, State of Louisiana, No. 672-11D for possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance in violation of 966(a) of Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, did knowingly possess in and affecting commerce a firearm, specifically a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber semiautomatic pistol bearing serial number DSS6399, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1).
The government, in the absence of a guilty plea, would have to prove the following elements of Count 3 beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that you knowingly possessed a firearm as charged. Here, that firearm is identified as being a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber semiautomatic pistol bearing serial number DSS6399. Second, that prior to the time that you possessed the firearm, you had been convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year. In other words, a felony offense. And, third, that the possession of the firearm was in or affecting commerce. That is, prior to the time that you possessed the firearm, it had traveled at some time from one state to another. The term "firearm" means any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. The term "firearm" also includes the frame or receiver of any such weapon or any firearm muffler or firearm silencer or destructive device. The terms "knowingly" and "possession" have the same meanings that I explained in connection with Count 1.
. . .
All right. Mr. Williams, do you understand the offenses with which you have been charged in Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment?
WILLIAMS: I don't understand one thing, Your Honor. With the gun, the interstate commerce, are they saying I brandished the gun from state to state?
THE COURT: No. The element that you're referring to is that the gun itself had traveled from one state to another, not that you brought it from one state to another.
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. Okay.
THE COURT: And I think -- and Mr. Haller can correct me on this --
[ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY] HALLER: Yes. In the factual basis --
THE COURT: -- firearms actually are not manufactured in Louisiana.
HALLER: Yes, Your Honor. And on that point, in the factual basis it states that a government expert would testify that Smith & Wesson has never manufactured .40 caliber semiautomatic pistols in Louisiana, and that the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol seized from Williams'[s] bedroom had to have traveled in interstate commerce. It's not an allegation that he personally took it across state lines.
THE COURT: Correct. Nor does it have to be. You understand that, the gun itself had traveled across state lines into Louisiana even prior to your ownership or possession of it?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Any other questions that you have, Mr. Williams, about Counts 1 and 3?
WILLIAMS: No, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. You understand the elements and the definitions I gave you?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
. . .
THE COURT: Mr. Williams, did you, in fact, again subject to the reservation, do the acts charged in Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.[33]

         As to the inclusion of additional drug quantities for sentencing purposes, the Court informed Williams at the rearraignment that additional facts would be included in the PSR that the Court could not know at the time:

THE COURT: [ ] Mr. Williams, have you and Mr. Jordan discussed the sentencing guidelines?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do [ ] you understand that those guidelines are advisory and that the Court can determine that you - that your sentence will be greater or less than the guidelines if the Court determines that the guidelines don't take into account certain facts about you or about these particular offenses?
. . .
Mr. Williams, do you understand that?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do [ ] you understand that in determining what your sentence will be in this case, the Court is not limited to considering only the facts set forth in the factual basis that you may have signed in connection with your decision to enter a plea of guilty here today? The Court, for instance, may also consider factual information set forth in the presentence investigation report that the probation office will prepare between now and the date of sentencing.
. . .
Mr. Williams, do you understand that?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.[34]

         Williams was held responsible for additional drug quantities, as described in the factual basis, [35] as part of the conspiracy for which he was charged in the indictment. Furthermore, the inclusion of the additional drug quantities in the PSR was proper pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5 (“Type and quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction may be considered in determining the offense level.”) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (relevant conduct)).

         In sum, the Court informed Williams of the nature of the offenses for which he was charged, the Court described the elements of the crimes by using the language provided in the Fifth Circuit pattern jury instructions, and the Court informed Williams that additional facts may arise in the presentence investigation that could affect sentencing.

         Finding that the Court complied with Rule 11(b)(1), Jordan did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the Court's plea colloquy as insufficient. “Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection.” United States v. Lutcher, No. 03-338, 2009 WL 666767, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 10, 2009) (Africk, J.) (citing Wood v. Quarterman, 503 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2007)). Williams's first ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails under the first prong of Strickland.

         B.

         Williams's second ineffective assistance of counsel claim also asserts that Jordan failed to object to the Court's alleged non-compliance with Rule 11. Specifically, Williams argues that the Court did not ensure that Williams understood he had the right to be represented by “new” counsel at trial and at any other type of proceeding, pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1)(D).[36] For substantially the same reasons as outlined in Section A, supra, Williams's claim fails.

         The Court specifically informed Williams that he had the right to an attorney and, if necessary, appointed counsel at the rearraignment and every stage of the proceedings:

THE COURT: . . . You are [ ] represented at this time by able counsel. . . . [Y]ou have a right to have an attorney at every stage of the proceedings. If it later appears that you are unrepresented and cannot afford it, an attorney will be appointed to represent you.[37]

         In his motion and declaration, Williams argues that his relationship with Jordan was “beyond repair” and that, had Jordan or the Court informed him of his right to counsel, he “would have taken full advantage of the opportunity” and would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial.[38]

         Such conclusory statements are contrary to what Williams told the Court at the rearraignment proceeding. Williams was advised of his right to counsel.

         Williams would have this Court mandate that a defendant be advised of his right to change counsel, which is not required by Rule 11. Furthermore, after Williams was sworn, the Court questioned him about his attorney's representation:

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Williams . . ., have . . . you had [ ] ample opportunity to discuss this case with your attorney?
. . .
Mr. Williams, you [ ], I know, have had a chance to talk to Mr. Jordan.
WILLIAMS: Yes.
THE COURT: You're satisfied with his services as your attorney in this case?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.[39]

         Williams's second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails because he cannot meet either prong of the Strickland test.

         C.

         In his third ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Williams again argues that Jordan should have objected to the Court's alleged non-compliance with Rule 11. This time, however, he argues that the Court failed to inform him “that all of the properties charged in the indictment and bill of particulars would be forfeited, ” and he alleges that he would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial if he knew that all of his properties would be forfeited.[40] Specifically, Williams argues that the plea agreement was “ambiguous” and did not provide Williams with notice that the government filed a bill of particulars.[41] He further argues that he would have instructed Jordan to contest forfeiture had Jordan or the Court properly instructed Williams regarding forfeiture.[42]

         Williams's assertion that he did not have notice of the forfeiture is without merit. First, the Court complied with Rule 11(b)(1)(J) by informing Williams, and making sure that Williams understood, that his property was subject to forfeiture:

THE COURT: Finally, any and all property constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of these violations, and any and all property used or intended to be used in any manner or part to commit or facilitate the commission of these violations, shall be subject to forfeiture pursuant to the applicable provisions of the United States Code.[43]
. . .
Mr. Williams, you understand what rights you are relinquishing or giving up by entering a plea of guilty here today?
WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. And all of the ones that I have covered with the exception of the motion to suppress issue, ...

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