United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
ANTHONY YOUNG JR.
JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL.
RULING AND ORDER
A. JACKSON JUDGE
the Court is Anthony Young, Jr.'s ("Plaintiff')
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3).
James M. Leblanc, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Correction
("DOC"), Malcom Myer, Sheryl Ranatza, Darrel
Vannoy, Nyesha Davis, and Ann Cavalier
("Defendants") filed a Response to
Court's Memorandum Order (Rec. Doc. 4) (Doc. 6).
The Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Oral argument is not required. For the
reasons stated below, Plaintiffs motion is
FACTUAL HISTORY AND ARGUMENTS
is an inmate at Louisiana State Penitentiary currently
serving 134 years at hard labor. (Doc. 6 at p. 1). Plaintiff
was convicted of two separate offenses, attempted armed
robbery committed in 1994 for which he received a sentence of
99 years, and attempted second degree murder committed in
2002 for which he received a sentence of 35 years consecutive
to the attempted armed robbery sentence. (Id. at pp.
1-2). Plaintiffs motion is rambling and difficult to follow,
but the Court gleans that Plaintiff believes he is being
unlawfully denied eligibility for geriatric parole under La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § l5;574.4(A)(2), which requires
Plaintiff to serve 20 years and reach the agree of 45 to
become eligible for parole. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff bases the
entirety of his argument on the applicability of La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § l5;574.4(A)(2) to his armed robbery
sentence, and does not address how the sentence received for
attempted second degree murder applies to the calculation of
parole eligibility dates. Plaintiff requests an injunction
mandating that Defendants recalculate his parole eligibility
date in accordance with what he beheves is mandated by La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § l5;574.4(A)(2) based on his attempted
armed robbery conviction, and to reflect that date in his
master prison record. (Id.). Plaintiff does not
explain why he does not address the attempted second degree
argue that in addition to the attempted robbery conviction,
Plaintiff was also convicted and sentenced to 35 years
imprisonment for attempted second degree murder and is
considered a violent offender who committed a crime on or
after January 1, 1997, therefore requiring him to serve 85%
of the 35 year sentence before being eligible for parole on
June 4, 2032.
"would be inequitable" to hold pro se
litigants to strict procedural standards and thereby punish
such litigants "for lacking the linguistic and
analytical skills of a trained lawyer." Perez,
312 F.3d at 194. Nonetheless, courts "still require
pro se parties to fundamentally 'abide by the
rules that govern the federal courts.'" E.E. O.
C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir.2014)
(citing Frazier v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 541
Fed.Appx. 419, 421 (5th Cir.2013)). Thus, courts have held,
for example, that "[p]ro se litigants must properly
plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state
a plausible claim to relief, ... and brief arguments on
appeal." In re Emergency Room Mobile Servs.,
L.L.C., 529 B.R. 676, 683 (N.D. Tex. 2015).
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy; it is never awarded as of right." Munafv.
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). See also Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc.
v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989)
(preliminary injunctive relief "is an extraordinary
remedy and should be granted only if the movant has clearly
carried the burden of persuasion with respect to all four
factors"); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.
1985) ("[t]he decision to grant a request for
preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception
rather than the rule"). The decision whether to grant or
deny a request for a preliminary injunction is within the
sound discretion of the Court. See Allied Mlttg. Grp.,
Inc., 878 F.2d at 809.
times, the burden of persuasion remains with Plaintiff as to
each of the four elements. Specifically, a
Plaintiff must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) the
threatened injury outweighs any harm that will result to the
non-movant if the injunction is granted; and (4) the
injunction will not disserve the public interest. See
Ridgely u. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 512 F.3d
727, 734 (5th Cir. 2008). If a plaintiff fails to meet his
burden regarding any of the necessary elements, the Court
need not address the other elements necessary for granting a
preliminary injunction. See Roho, Inc. v. Marquis,
902 F.2d 356, 261 (5th Cir. 1990) (declining to address the
remaining elements necessary to obtain a preliminary
injunction after finding that the plaintiff failed to show a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits).
has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of
his claim. Plaintiff has two active convictions, one for
armed robbery, and one for attempted second degree murder.
Plaintiffs motion only references the armed robbery
conviction, and does not address the second degree murder
conviction. The more serious second degree murder conviction,
however, renders Plaintiffs arguments meritless. La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 15:574.4 was amended in 1995 to require any
person convicted of a violent crime after January 1, 1997 to
serve 85% of the sentence imposed before becoming eligible
for parole, "notwithstanding any other provision of law
to the contrary." (Doc. 6-3 at p. 2). Therefore, an
offender found to have committed any violent offense
committed after January 1, 1997 is deemed ineligible for
parole under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:574.4 until 85% of
the sentence has been served.
was sentenced for second degree attempted murder in 2002. The
sentencing court chose to have Plaintiffs 35 year sentence
run consecutively with his previous 99 year sentence (Doc 6-1
at p. 8), thereby rendering Plaintiff unable to take
advantage of "overlapping" sentences pursuant to
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 880(E). Accordingly,
Plaintiff must serve 85% of his 35 year sentence before being
eligible for parole, which is reflected by the parole
eligibility date of June 4, 2032 on Plaintiffs master prison
record. (Doc. 6-1 at p. 1). Because Plaintiff has not
established a likelihood of success on the merits of his
claim, the Court declines to address the remainder of the
Ridgely factors. Plaintiffs motion is
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion
for Preliminary ...