United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division
JOE W. AGUILLARD
L. HORNSBY Judge.
A. DOUGHTY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is a Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration [Doc. No. 74] filed by Plaintiff Joe W.
Aguillard (“Aguillard”). Aguillard moves the
Court to reconsider its April 4, 2019 Ruling and Judgment
[Doc. Nos. 70 and 71] granting Defendant Louisiana
College's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 48] and
dismissing Aguillard's claims of disability
discrimination, disability-based retaliation, and
disability-based hostile work environment. Louisiana College
has filed an opposition [Doc. No. 78], and Aguillard has
filed a reply to the opposition [Doc. No. 79].
asserts, first, that the Court erred in dismissing his claim
of disability-based retaliation, arguing that he established
all of the elements of a retaliation claim under the ADA. In
his motion, Aguillard argues that he carried his initial
burden of establishing all of the elements of a retaliation
claim under the ADA; however, he does not address the
Court's findings that LC offered sound non-retaliatory
explanations for the adverse employment actions at issue and
that Aguillard presented no evidence of pretext.
Aguillard argues that the Court erred by utilizing the wrong
legal standards or tests to analyze and dismiss
Aguillard's claims that LC failed to furnish or provide
him with the reasonable accommodations he needed to carry out
or perform the duties of his employment by LC.
Aguillard contends that the Court erred in finding that he
failed to adequately allege or establish a hostile work
Aguillard contends that the Court improperly weighed evidence
and decided issues of credibility, motive, or intent in a
motion for summary judgment.
response, Louisiana College asserts that Aguillard is simply
attempting to rehash evidence, legal theories, or arguments
that could have been offered before judgment was entered.
Louisiana College further asserts that Aguillard neither
cites nor provides any admissible evidence raising a genuine
issue of material fact of disability-based discrimination or
that Louisiana College's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the adverse employment actions were pretextual.
regard to the retaliation claim, Louisiana College also
argues that Aguillard fails to show the actions complained of
would not have been taken against him but for his alleged
College additionally contends that the Court correctly
observed that, in his opposition, Aguillard did not oppose or
dispute Louisiana College's argument that it was entitled
to summary judgment dismissing any “hostile work
environment” claim Aguillard may be making. Further,
Aguillard points to no new evidence to refute the unopposed
arguments and evidence that led to dismissal of his
“hostile work environment” claims.
College asserts that Aguillard still has not cited or
explained any specific “accommodation” that was
sought, denied, or granted and then removed.
College further asserts that there was no
“weighing” of evidence or any determination of
“credibility” by the Court, and further,
Aguillard cites no evidence that was supposedly
“weighed” and names no person whose
“credibility” was supposedly determined. Nor was
there any finding of “motive or intent' in the
Court's recognition that Aguillard's conduct was
properly determined by the FAAC to be detrimental to
Louisiana College, thus warranting his termination.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion
for reconsideration per se. Instead, a motion
challenging a judgment or order may be filed under Rules 54,
59, or 60. Rules 59 and 60 apply only to final
judgments. Rule 54(b) provides that any order “that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims... [among] all the
parties... may be revised at any time before the entry of a
[final] judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). “Under
Rule 54[(b)], a district court has the inherent procedural
power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory
order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”
Iturralde v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 512 Fed.Appx. 430, 432
(5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Melancon v. Texaco, Inc.,
659 F2.d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981)) (citations omitted);
see generally Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 n. 14 (1983) (holding that
“virtually all interlocutory orders may be altered or
amended before final judgment if sufficient cause is
shown”). An “order granting partial summary
judgment [is] interlocutory, ” and, therefore, the
Court must “analyze the motion for reconsideration
under Rule 54(b) . . . instead of Rule 59(e), which applies
to final judgments.” Cabral v. Brennan, 853
F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts evaluate motions to
reconsider interlocutory orders under a “less
exacting” standard than Rule 59(e), but, nevertheless,
look to similar considerations for guidance. See HBM
Interests, LLC v. Chesapeake Louisiana, LP, No. 12-1048,
2013 WL 3893989 (W.D. La. July 26, 2013) (quoting
Livingston Downs Racing Ass n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs
Corp., 259 F.Supp.2d 471, 475 (M.D. La. 2002)); Sw.
Louisiana Hosp. Assn v. BASF Const. Chemicals, LLC, No.
2:10-CV-902, 2013 WL 1858610 (W.D. La. Apr. 29, 2013)
(quoting Livingston Downs, 259 F.Supp.2d at 475).
Therefore, in determining whether to grant the motion, the
Court evaluates whether there are “manifest errors of
law or fact upon which judgment is based[, ]" whether
Anew evidence" is available, whether there is a need
“to prevent manifest injustice," or whether there
has been “an intervening change in controlling
law." HBM Interests, 2013 WL 3893989, at *1
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
case, the Court finds no basis to reconsider or rescind its
previous Ruling and Judgment. The Court has already
considered all arguments raised by Aguillard. Aguillard does
not point to any change in the controlling law or new
evidence that was not available to him earlier to support his
motion, but merely rehashes his previous arguments. The Court
understands and appreciates Aguillard's arguments, but
the Court disagrees with his reasoning and finds that his
conclusions are not supported by the case law. Therefore, the
Court finds no reason to ...