United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division
RAY D. BRISTER D.O.C. # 383050
POLICE JURY OF JEFFERSON DAVIS PARISH, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KATHLEEN KAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the court are Motions for Summary Judgment [docs. 40, 44]
filed by the Police Jury of Jefferson Davis Parish
(“Police Jury”) and the individual defendants
named in this matter, respectively. Both motions relate to
the pro se complaint and amendments thereto filed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 by Ray D. Brister. Brister has not
responded to either motion and his time for doing so has
passed. Accordingly, both motions are regarded as unopposed.
They have been referred to the undersigned for review,
report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 636.
alleges that he received inadequate medical care while on
pretrial detention at the Jefferson Davis Parish Jail
(“JDPJ”) in Jennings, Louisiana, resulting in a
violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Doc. 5. Specifically, he asserts that he began
complaining of testicular pain and swelling in January 2017,
while housed at Concordia Parish Correctional Facility
(“CPCF”). Doc. 5, p. 3. He was seen by doctors
and placed on different medications, which did not work.
Id. Eventually, the doctor at CPCF said that he
needed surgery and sent him to a hospital in Shreveport,
Louisiana. Id. at 3, 5. Brister underwent an
ultrasound there and was told by two physicians that he
needed surgery. Id. at 5. He returned to the
hospital on May 5, 2017, to see a urologist, who also
recommended surgery and scheduled him for another appointment
in November 2017. Id.
27, Brister was transferred back to JDPJ because of safety
concerns at CPCF. Id. The next day he saw the
facility nurse at JDPJ and was then sent to a physician, who
also said that he needed to surgery to address his testicular
issues. Id. The physician prescribed medication,
which Brister again claims did not work. Id. When
Brister returned to the jail, he told the warden that he
needed surgery but was told that the parish would not pay for
the operation. Id. After Brister filed a grievance
in August 2017, the warden sent him to a local hospital,
where an ultrasound revealed a new cyst on his testicle and
fluid in the sac. Id. The doctor prescribed
medication for swelling and infection, but Brister complains
that the medication only resulted in some alleviation and
that his symptoms returned once it was discontinued a few
days later. Id. at 5-6. Still, he asserts, the
warden refused to approve the surgery and asserted that the
Police Jury would not cover the expense because it cost too
much and related to a preexisting condition. Id.;
doc. 12, p. 1. He also asserts that he was returned to CPCJ
in September 2017, after filing grievances relating to his
health care, even though defendants knew his life was in
danger there. Doc. 5, p. 6.
filed suit in this court on September 6, 2017, asserting that
the above allegations amount to constitutional violations and
that he is entitled to monetary damages. Docs. 1, 5, 12. As
defendants he names the Police Jury, Deputy Sheriff Chris
Ivy, Sheriff Ivy Woods, and Warden Locke, as well as other
parties subsequently dismissed from the suit. Specifically,
he alleges that the Police Jury/Warden Locke are liable for
refusing him medical attention and that the Police Jury is
well aware “that this is not a pre-existing
condition[;] that this happened on their
watch.” Doc. 5; doc. 14, atts. 2-3. He also
asserts that Warden Locke is liable for “going against
his word and shipping me back to [CPCF]” despite
knowing that Brister's life was in danger there. Doc. 14,
att. 2. Finally, he asserts that Sheriff Ivy Woods is liable
for returning him to CPCF and that Deputy Sheriff Chris Ivy
is liable for refusing him appropriate medical attention.
Doc. 14; doc. 14, att. 1.
Police Jury and individual defendants have now filed motions
for summary judgment, asserting that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on all of Brister's claims.
Docs. 40, 44. Brister was granted an extension of time to
respond to both motions but has failed to do so. See
doc. 52. Accordingly, the motions are regarded as unopposed.
should grant a motion for summary judgment when the movant
shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The party moving for
summary judgment is initially responsible for identifying
portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V
Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). The court must
deny the motion for summary judgment if the movant fails to
meet this burden. Id.
movant makes this showing, however, the burden then shifts to
the non-moving party to “set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505,
2511 (1986) (quotations omitted). This requires more than
mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's
pleadings. Instead, the nonmovant must submit
“significant probative evidence” in support of
his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman,
896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Neither conclusory
allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the
movant's burden. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994 (en banc). “If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).
may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110
(2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Clift v.
Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this
standard, a genuine issue of material fact exists if a
reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322,
326 (5th Cir. 2008).