United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report
has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen
(14) days after being served with the attached Report to file
written objections to the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law and recommendations therein. Failure to
file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being
served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which
have been accepted by the District Court.
NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN
OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
the Court is Record Document 5, filed by Plaintiff, Charles
Gaspard (hereinafter, “Plaintiff” or
“Gaspard”) on January 16, 2019. The motion seeks
various forms of relief, some of which have been resolved by
separate order. Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the
District Judge, as well as Plaintiff's failure to correct
certain deficiencies in his filing despite being given an
opportunity to do so, will be addressed in this Report and
Law and Analysis
Motion to Disqualify Chief District Judge Shelly D.
Gaspard requests recusal of Chief District Judge Shelly D.
Dick. In support of this request, Gaspard argues that Judge
Dick should be recused from this instant matter because she
is the district judge assigned to Gaspard's other suit,
Gaspard, et al. v. Bourgeois, et al.,
18-cv-918-SDD-EWD. (R. Doc. 5 at 3). Plaintiff also suggests
that Judge Dick should be recused because she failed to
compel Magistrate Judge Wilder-Doomes to take certain
actions, or to take those actions herself, in that same
litigation. (R. Doc. 5 at 3). Gaspard suggests recusal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1) is warranted
because “she has personal bias or prejudice concerning
Plaintiff Gaspard, as is clearly evidenced by her illegal
actions in” this matter as well as 18-cv-918 by failing
to issue or cause the magistrate judge to issue
“warrant(s) of arrest in some matter” or
“institute[e] prosecution(s).” (R. Doc. 5 at
3-4). At the outset, the Court notes that the other matter to
which Plaintiff refers, Civil Action No. 18-cv-918-SDD-EWD,
has been dismissed.
sections of 28 U.S.C. § 455 under which Plaintiff
Gaspard alleges recusal is required provide as follows:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1). The goal of this statute
“is to promote public confidence in the judicial system
by avoiding even the appearance of partiality.”
Levitt v. University of Texas at ElPaso,
847 F.2d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, § 455
asks whether “the reasonable man, were he to know all
the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's
impartiality.” Potashnick v. Port City Constr.
Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980). The reasonable
man viewpoint means the facts are assessed based on how they
would appear to a “well-informed, thoughtful ...