United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division
EDWARD C. JACKSON
N. BURL CAIN, et al.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
H.L. PEREZ-MONTES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
case was remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit for consideration of a post-trial affidavit
from the victim, Kenneth Williams (“Williams”),
submitted by Petitioner Edward Jackson
(“Jackson”). Because Williams's post-trial
affidavit does not indicate or show there was prosecutorial
misconduct or that Jackson had ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, Jackson's habeas petition should be
2006, after a bench trial, Jackson was convicted of armed
robbery and being a felon in possession of a firearm,
adjudicated as a fourth felony offender,  and sentenced to
a total of 99 years.
initially presented Williams's 2008
affidavit to the state courts in a Motion for New
Trial (Doc. 22, pp. 39, 44). Jackson's Motion for New
Trial was denied as untimely by the trial court (Doc. 2, p.
41). On direct appeal, both the Louisiana Court of Appeal for
the Third Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed
the denial of the motion for new trial on the ground that it
was untimely. (Doc. 23-2, 24-3). See State v.
Jackson, 09-45 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/7/09), 19 So.3d 631,
reversed, 2009-2406 (La. 1/19/11), 55 So.3d 767. The Supreme
Court noted that Jackson had not sought review of courts'
denial of his motion for new trial on the basis of any
grounds other than its untimeliness. See Jackson, 55
So.3d at 770, n.2.
direct appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the armed robbery
conviction, finding the evidence was unclear as to whether
Jackson took $300 or only $9.00 from Williams. See State
v. Jackson, 09-45 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/7/09), 19 So.3d
631, reversed, 2009-2406 (La. 1/19/11), 55 So.3d 767. The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated the
armed robbery conviction (and habitual offender sentence),
holding that regardless of the amount taken, Jackson admitted
pointing a gun at Williams and demanding payment for the
haircut he had given him. See Jackson, 55 So.3d at
next presented Williams's 2008 affidavit to the state
courts in his application for post-conviction relief
(“PCR”) (Docs. 24-25). The district court
summarily denied PCR. (Doc. 24, p. 96). The Court of Appeal
affirmed the denial of PCR for ineffective assistance of
counsel, stating Jackson had admitted to the police that he
had used a gun to collect money from Williams. (Doc. 25, p.
66). The Louisiana Supreme Court summarily denied PCR. (Doc.
25, p. 86). Those rulings did not mention the victim's
2008 affidavit, although they appear to have considered it.
then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court (Doc. 50). Jackson claims
in part, based on the affidavit, that the prosecutor
“knowingly” presented false testimony at trial,
and that he had ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to interview the victim prior to trial and
“obtain” Williams's affidavit or statement
showing Jackson had not committed armed robbery.
Court denied Jackson's petition. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit remanded the case to this Court for consideration of
how Williams's 2008 affidavit affects Jackson's
claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance
of counsel. The Fifth Circuit stated it was unable to
properly determine Jackson's appeal without that
Law and Analysis.
Jackson has not shown there was prosecutorial
contends the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony
from Williams at trial. Jackson appears to contend that
Williams's 2008 affidavit recanting his trial testimony
proves the prosecutor engaged in misconduct.
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State
from knowingly using perjured testimony. See Beltran v.
Cockrell, 294 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959)). In
order for an allegation of perjured testimony to constitute a
due process violation, a petitioner must show that the
prosecution knowingly presented materially false evidence to
the jury. See Koch v. ...