United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division
A. DOUGHTY, JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
L. HAYES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Skipper, a prisoner in the custody of Louisiana's
Department of Corrections proceeding pro se, filed the
instant “Motion for Relief from a Final Judgment Under
F.R.C.P. Rule 60” on approximately January 3,
2019.[1" name="FN1" id=
"FN1">1] [doc. # 1]. Skipper seeks to reinstate a
proceeding previously before the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
For reasons that follow, the motion should be
moves to “re-open” a proceeding in which a court
entered final judgment on December 5, 2017. [doc. # 1, p. 1].
Skipper does not, however, explicitly identify the proceeding
he seeks to reinstate. That said, the only case, federal or
state, in which he was involved and in which a court entered
final judgment against him on December 5, 2017, is a Supreme
Court of Louisiana post-conviction relief proceeding. On
December 5, 2017, the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied
Skipper's application for supervisory and/or remedial
The application was not timely filed in the district court,
and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an
exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel.
Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 1189');">660 So.2d 1189.
The application is also repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4. We
attach hereto and make a part hereof the district court's
written reasons denying relief.
Relator has now fully litigated several applications for
post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal
habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana
post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a
successive application only under the narrow circumstances
provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations
period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the
legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make
the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory.
Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord
with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final.
Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow
exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application
applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral
State ex rel. Skipper v. State, 2016-1666 (La.
12/5/17), 1 So.3d 25');">231 So.3d 25, 26.
suggests that he was convicted of murder in 1973 and
sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. [doc. # 1-2,
pp. 2, 5]. He alleges that he initiated the Supreme Court of
Louisiana proceeding described above to redress “equal
protection and due process violations” in connection
with his indictment. [doc. # 1, p. 1]. He claims that the
indictment “failed to provide the necessary substance
required for a prosecutor to provide jurisdiction to a grand
jury” because it failed to state “with
particularity each and every element of the crime charged . .
. .” [doc. # 1-2, pp. 2-3]. According to Skipper,
“the indictment ‘only' states[, ]
‘murdered J.T. Crockett' . . . .”
Id. at 4. Skipper also claims, impliedly, that the
State did not meet its burden of proving that he committed
the charged crime. Id. at 5.
“prays that after due and proper consideration of the
merits herein, [he] be granted relief and that his case be
re-opened to challenge the facts herein contested.”
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack
jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on a state court
judgment, “even if it is alleged that the state
court's actions were unconstitutional.”
Hultberg v. Louisiana, 163 F.3d 1356');">163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir.
1998); see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 486 (1983). “Reduced to its essence, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal
courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court
judgments except when authorized by Congress.”
Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 871
F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and
quoted sources omitted). “[A] federal district court,
as a court of original jurisdiction, lacks appellate
jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify a final order of a
state court.” Kimball v. The Fla. Bar, 632
F.2d 1283, 1284 (5th Cir. 1980). The United States Supreme
Court is the only federal court permitted to review state
court decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when four factors
are satisfied: “‘(1) a state-court loser; (2)
alleging harm caused by a state-court judgment; (3) that was
rendered before the district court proceedings began; and (4)
the federal suit requests review and reversal of the
state-court judgment.'” Burciaga, 871 F.3d
at 384 (quoting Houston v. Venneta Queen, 606 Fed.
App'x. 725, 730 (5th Cir. 2015)). “The doctrine
applies only to ‘final judgment[s] rendered by a
state's court of last resort.” Id.
(quoting Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Guy, 1');">682 F.3d 381,
390 (5th Cir. 2012)). “In addition to the precise
claims presented to the state court, Rooker-Feldman
prohibits federal court review of claims that are
‘inextricably intertwined' with a state court
decision.” Id. (quoting Feldman, 460
U.S. at 486-87). “[C]laims presented to a federal
district court are inextricably intertwined with a state