United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER & REASONS
M. AFRICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is plaintiff Tracy Riley's
(“Riley”) request for a statement of the reasons
underlying the Court's February 21, 2019 order denying
Riley's motion filed on February 14, 2019. The present
motion is granted, and the reasons for the Court's denial
are set forth herein.
previous motion appeared to request several forms of relief.
Although it only explicitly requested review and
reconsideration of the Court's January 11, 2019
order-which dismissed the majority of the over 100 defendants
in this case- the motion also objected to the substance of
the Court's January 22, 2019 order dismissing the
remaining defendants. The Court, therefore, construed the
February 14th motion as a motion for reconsideration of the
Court's dismissal of all of the defendants in
this matter. Riley's motion also requested that the Court
convene a three-judge panel to hear oral argument on, and
ultimately review, the Court's aforementioned
decisions. Having reviewed the motion and the
applicable law, the Court denied the motion. Riley now
requests that the Court provide the reasons for its denial-a
request the Court obliges.
to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), “[a] district court of
three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by
[an] Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging
the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional
districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative
body.” Riley has not challenged the apportionment of
any congressional district or statewide legislative body.
Moreover, Riley has not cited any authority or act of
Congress in support of her request that a three-judge panel
be convened to review the Court's dismissal of the
defendants in this matter-nor could the Court find any such
authority. As a result, the Court denied that particular
request as foundationless.
respect to Riley's request for reconsideration, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize
motions for reconsideration. Bass v. United States
Dep't of Agric., 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2000).
The question of which procedural rule applies depends on the
timing of such a motion. Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Home
State Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 582 Fed.Appx. 284, 286 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Lavaspere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool
Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990)). A
motion for reconsideration filed within twenty-eight days of
the district court judgment being challenged is characterized
as a motion to alter or amend the judgment and construed
pursuant to Rule 59(e). See Id. A motion for
reconsideration filed more than twenty-eight days after the
judgment is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgment. See id.; see also Morris v. Gulf Coast
Rail Grp., Inc., No. 07-5453, 2010 WL 2990069, at *1
(E.D. La. July 26, 2010) (Africk, J.). Riley filed her motion
for reconsideration on February 14, 2019, within twenty-eight
days of the Court's judgment. Accordingly, a Rule 59(e)
analysis is appropriate.
motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) “calls into question the
correctness of a judgment.” Molina v. Equistar
Chems. LP, 261 Fed.Appx. 729, 733 (5th Cir. 2008)
(citing Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 477
(5th Cir. 2004)). “Rule 59(e) ‘serve[s] the
narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors
of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.'” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479
(quoting Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875
F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.1989)). Thus, “a Rule 59(e)
motion ‘must clearly establish either a manifest error
of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence'
and ‘cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and
should, have been made before the judgment
issued.'” Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp.
Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing
Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.2d 854, 863-64
(5th Cir. 2003)). “Reconsideration of a judgment after
its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used
sparingly.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (citation
motion, Riley exhausts almost thirty pages reciting the
history of this case and lamenting what she characterizes as
this Court's unfairness. Indeed, she makes it a point to
highlight the undersigned's purported “inadequate
comprehension” of, “lack of basic
interpretation” of, and “non compliance”
with both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local
rules. She also criticizes the “fraud,
” “malfeasance, ” “aggressi[on],
” and “generally unhelpful culture” of,
among others, numerous employees, the United States Marshals
Service, and the pro se unit of the United States
District Court's Clerk's Office. However,
regardless of Riley's ugly characterizations and myriad
criticisms of this Court, its staff, and others, Riley has
yet to identify a manifest error of law in any of the
Court's orders dismissing the defendants in this matter;
nor has she presented any new evidence. When, on page thirty,
Riley finally articulates the legal basis for her request,
she reiterates previously made arguments or elaborates on
those arguments using information she could have submitted to
the Court earlier-none of which warrants reconsideration
under Rule 59(e).
IT IS ORDERED that Riley's request for a
statement of reasons underlying the Court's February 21,
2019 order is GRANTED as set forth herein.
 R. Doc. No. 277.
 See R. Doc. No. 270, at
32-36. The Court's January 11, 2019 order dismissed all
of the defendants except those state-actor defendants who had
previously filed motions to dismiss based on an Eleventh
Amendment defense. See R. Doc. No. 263, at 12-13.
Then, on January 22, 2019, the Court ruled on the remaining
motions to dismiss, holding that the state-actor movants were
entitled to sovereign immunity. R. Doc. No. 266, at 7. As a
result, the Court dismissed Riley's claims against those
defendants without prejudice and for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 7-8.
In Riley's February 14th motion, in addition to
raising arguments in response to the Court's dismissal of
the non-state-actor defendants in the January 11th order, she
also argued that the state-actor defendants waived ...