United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
RULING AND ORDER
A. JACKSON, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
the Court is Defendant William Ross' ("Ross")
Motion to Dismiss George Jarrett's ("Plaintiff')
claims asserted against him. (Doc. 12). Also before the Court
is Defendant Linda Perkins' a/k/a Evelyn Perkins'
("Perkins," collectively with Ross,
"Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims
asserted against her. (Doc 13). Ross is a supervisor at the
Division of Probation and Parole of the Louisiana Department
of Public Safety and Corrections. At the time of the alleged
incident, Perkins was an Inmate Records Administrative
Assistant. Because both of these motions to dismiss focus on
the same series of events and raise similar arguments as to
why Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed, for the
purposes of judicial economy, the Court shall address both in
this ruling. For the reasons stated below, Defendants'
motions to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against them are
is a parolee currently under the supervision of the Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff asserts that he received a 30-year sentence for
armed robbery after entering into a plea agreement with the
Government. (Doc. 1 at p. 4). Plaintiff contends that on
September 12, 1994, he was offered what he describes as a
"contract" wherein he was to "receive 30 days
for every thirty days in actual custody, pursuant to La. R.
S. 15:571.3 'Diminution of Sentence"'
(Id.). Plaintiff avers that on or about March 29,
2009, he was "put under duress" by Perkins, then an
Inmate Records Administrative Assistant, and coerced into
signing another "contract" releasing Plaintiff
"as if under parole" as opposed to setting a parole
hearing for Plaintiff (Id.). It is unclear from the
record when Plaintiff was released from prison; however,
Plaintiff avers in his complaint that he was required to pay
"Parole Fees" beginning June 1, 2009. Plaintiff
filed the instant suit on December 15, 2017. (Id.,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motion to Dismiss
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule
8, which requires "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. In order to dismiss a
matter, "it should appear from the allegations that a
cause of action does not exist, rather than that a cause of
action has been defectively stated." Twombly,
550 U.S.__, 581.
pro se plaintiffs, it "would be
inequitable" to bold pro se litigants to strict
procedural standards and thereby punish such litigants
"for lacking the linguistic and analytical skills of a
trained lawyer." Perez, 312 F.3d at 194. Nonetheless,
courts "still require pro sp. parties to
fundamentally 'abide by the rules that govern the federal
courts."' E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767
F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir.2014) (citing Frazier v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A, 541 Fed.Appx. 419, 421 (5th Cir.2013)).
Thus, courts have held, for example, that "[p]ro se
litigants must properly plead sufficient facts that, when
liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief, ...
and brief arguments on appeal." In re Emergency Room
Mobile Servs., L.L.C., 529 B.R. 676, 683 (N.D. Tex.
Statute of Limitations
1983 does not prescribe a statute of limitations. Instead,
"[t]he statute of limitations for a suit brought under
§ 1983 is determined by the general statute of
limitations governing personal injuries in the forum
state." Heilman v. City of Beaumont, 638
Fed.Appx. 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2016). The statute of
limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or
has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the
to 28 U.S.C. 1331 "the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
Generally, in any action where a federal court has original
jurisdiction over an issue, the court also has supplemental
jurisdiction over any related issues that form the same
"case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
However, once the claim upon which a court based its original
jurisdiction is extinguished, a court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction for the remaining issues. 28 U.S.C.