United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
H.L. PEREZ-MONTES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is a civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 filed by pro se Plaintiff Carl Johnson
(“Johnson”) (#223075). Johnson is an inmate in
the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections,
incarcerated at the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center
(“RLCC”) in Cottonport, Louisiana. Johnson
complains that he was denied a medical emergency. (Doc. 1, p.
3). He names as Defendants RLCC, Captain Bordelon, Lt.
Lemoine, Sgt. Lemoine, and Sgt. Holden.
Johnson does not state a constitutional claim for the delay
in medical care, his Complaint (Doc. 1) should be DENIED and
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
alleges that, on an unspecified date in May 2018, he asked
Defendants to make a medical emergency because he was not
feeling well, and he thought his blood sugar was low. (Doc.
1-2, p. 2). When Cpt. Bordelon came onto the tier, Johnson
asked Cpt. Bordelon about the medical emergency and
complained of swollen testicles. (Doc. 1-2, p. 2). Cpt.
Bordelon informed Johnson that Lt. Duplechain would be
returning to the dorm. (Doc. 1, p. 3; Doc. 1-2. p. 2).
Johnson complains that Lt. Duplechain did not return to the
dorm until the following day, at which time Johnson signed
and submitted a sick call request. (Doc. 1-2, p. 2).
Law and Analysis
Johnson's Complaint is subject to screening under
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
is an inmate who has been allowed to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. 10). As a prisoner seeking redress from an
officer or employee of a governmental entity, Johnson's
Complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d
578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is
proceeding in forma pauperis, Johnson's Complaint is also
subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) provide for sua
sponte dismissal of a complaint, or any portion thereof, if a
court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an
arguable basis in law when it is “based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at
327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Johnson fails to state a constitutional claim for a delay
in medical care.
complains that he was not able to submit a medical emergency
request and had to submit a regular sick call the following
day. A delay in receiving medical care can only constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation if there has been deliberate
indifference that results in substantial harm. See Easter
v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006). A prison
official acts with deliberate indifference if he knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994);
Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 17677 (5th Cir.
1994). The official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
allegations do not indicate that Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference. Cpt. Bordelon told Johnson that Lt.
Duplechain would be going back to the dorm, but Lt.
Duplechain did not return until the following day, at which
time Johnson was able to sign a sick call form. (Doc. 1, p.
3). There is no allegation or indication that Cpt. Bordelon
or Lt. Duplechain intentionally disregarded a serious risk of
harm. Moreover, when Lt. Duplechain did return the following
day, Johnson did not request emergency treatment, which
indicates Johnson did not face a substantial risk of serious
Johnson states that he had to undergo surgery later that
year, there are not facts indicating that surgery was
necessitated by the one-day delay in submitting a request for
medical treatment. See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d
191, 195 (5th Cir. 2015) (delay in medical care violates the
Eighth Amendment only if it is due to deliberate indifference
and results in substantial harm); Davis v. Michot,
No. 13-30132, 2013 WL 3964234 (5th Cir. August 2, 2013)
(affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim because the
initial misdiagnosis and ...