United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
DAVID BARLET LOWELL, ET AL.
JASON ARD, LIVINGSTON PARISH SHERIFF, ET AL.
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify Case Management
and Scheduling Order, and to Extend Pretrial Deadlines (R.
Doc. 51) filed on January 25, 2019. Plaintiffs seek
extensions of the Court's discovery and other pre-trial
deadlines for the purpose of naming Livingston Parish as a
defendant and in light of the parties' inability to
before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery
with Request for Expedited Consideration (R. Doc. 53) filed
on February 7, 2019. Defendants seek a stay of the remaining
discovery deadlines in this action in light of their pending
motions for summary judgment (R. Docs. 39, 42), which
Defendants assert will resolve all claims brought by
deadlines for filing oppositions to the foregoing motions
have expired. LR 7(f). Accordingly, both motions are deemed
16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for
the modification of a scheduling order deadline upon a
showing of good cause and with the judge's consent. The
Fifth Circuit has explained that a party is required
“to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met
despite the diligence of the party needing the
extension.” Marathon Fin. Ins. Inc., RRG v. Ford
Motor Co., 591 F.3d 458, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
S&W Enters., LLC v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA,
315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003)). In determining whether
the movant has established “good cause” for an
extension of deadlines, the Court considers four factors: (1)
the party's explanation for the requested extension; (2)
the importance of the requested extension; (3) the potential
prejudice in granting the extension; and (4) the availability
of a continuance to cure such prejudice. See Leza v. City
of Laredo, 496 Fed. App'x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2012)
(citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Land &
Exploration Co., 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1997)).
have not established good cause for an extension of the
deadline to join other parties or to amend the pleadings
based on their representations. The deadline to amend the
pleadings expired on January 31, 2018. (R. Doc.
Plaintiffs assert that it was not until they received
interrogatory responses on March 30, 2018 that “it
could conceivably be gleaned that the Parish of Livingston
needs to be added as a defendant, as the Livingston Parish
government provides medical staff for the Livingston Parish
Detention Center.” (R. Doc. 51 at 4). It is unclear why
the receipt of discovery responses would be required to
identify Livingston Parish as a defendant in this action.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not explain why they waited nearly
10 months after receiving the interrogatory responses to file
a motion seeking to name Livingston Parish as a defendant.
Finally, Plaintiffs did not submit any proposed pleading for
the Court to consider with regard to their late request to
amend the pleadings.
have also failed to establish good cause for an extension of
the deadline to complete non-expert discovery. The instant
motion was filed one week before the close of that deadline.
Plaintiffs do not, as required by the Court's Scheduling
Order (R. Doc. 30 at 2), provide information describing the
discovery already completed, what necessary discovery
remains, the parties' efforts to complete the remaining
discovery by the deadline, or any other information
demonstrating that the parties have diligently pursued
discovery. Plaintiffs state that “discovery could be
completed within six months, once the case is at
issue.” (R. Doc. 51 at 4). If Plaintiffs are suggesting
that additional discovery is required in light of the
proposed addition of Livingston Parish as a defendant, that
issue is moot in light of the Court's denial of the
have separately sought leave to conduct additional discovery
pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to oppose the motion for summary judgment filed by
Jason Ard and Perry Rushing. (R. Doc. 46). That motion is
opposed. (R. Doc. 52). This Order does not control that
issue. The district judge will separately determine whether
any such discovery is merited.
26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the
court to issue a protective order after a showing of good
cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)'s “good
cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a
protective order has the burden “to show the necessity
of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific
demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and
conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l,
Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3
(5th Cir. 1978)). “Trial courts possess broad
discretion to supervise discovery.” Landry v. Air
Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404,
436 n.114 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “A trial
court has broad discretion and inherent power to stay
discovery until preliminary questions that may dispose of the
case are determined.” Petrus v. Bowen, 833
F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987).
reviewed the record, the Court finds good cause pursuant to
Rule 26(c) to stay all expert discovery deadlines in this
action. Resolution of the pending motions for
summary judgment may preclude the need for the parties to
incur significant expenses regarding experts. Plaintiffs do
not oppose this relief.
on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that
Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify Case Management and
Scheduling Order, and to Extend Pretrial Deadlines (R. Doc.
51) is DENIED.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to
Stay Discovery with Request for Expedited Consideration (R.
Doc. 53) is GRANTED. All expert discovery
deadlines are STAYED pending resolution of
Defendants' motions for summary judgment (R. Docs. 39,
42). Counsel shall inform the undersigned's chambers of
any rulings on Defendants' motions for summary judgment
upon receipt of such rulings.