United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER AND REASONS
L. C. FELDMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Michael Duke's motion for clarification of
sentence, which the Court construes as a motion requesting
credit for jail time he has served. For the reasons that follow,
the motion is DENIED.
Duke appeared before the Court for sentencing on January 23,
2019, after having pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute
and possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine.
This Court sentenced Duke to 57 months of imprisonment, to be
served concurrent to a state sentence imposed on March 2,
2016 in the 24th Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Jefferson. Neither the Court's oral
pronouncement, nor written judgment of Duke's sentence,
includes any reference to credit for previous time served.
Duke (and his counsel) now ask the Court to clarify its
judgment and/or the record to reflect all detention dates
that are to be credited against Duke's sentence.
3585(b) of Title 18 of the United States Code governs the
calculation of a term of imprisonment and, in particular,
credit for prior custody; it provides:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences -
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant
was arrested after the commission of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
a district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney
General, through the BOP, has the responsibility for
administering the sentence.” United States v.
Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). “Although the
statute does not explicitly say who is responsible for
calculating the [§ 3585(b)] credit, controlling
precedent indicates that it is the Attorney General acting
through the Bureau of Prisons.” United States v.
Wynder, 659 Fed.Appx. 761, 762-63 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334-335);
see also Falcetta v. United States, 734 Fed.Appx.
286, 287 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“[D]ismissal for
lack of jurisdiction was appropriate because Falcetta failed
to show that he exhausted his sentencing credit claim fully
through the multi-step BOP exhaustion procedure.”);
United States v. Binion, 981 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.