United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division
ELIZABETH E. FOOTE, JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
L. HAYES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the
District Court, is a motion for summary judgment filed by
defendants John Lewis and Jerry Ray
(“Defendants”) [doc. # 33]. The motion is
unopposed. For reasons set forth below, it is recommended
that the motion be GRANTED.
Derrick Dukes, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, is an inmate in the custody of Louisiana's
Department of Corrections. On March 29, 2018, he filed the
above-captioned lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against “Sheriffs Office Webster Parish, ” John
Lewis, and Jerry Ray. [doc. # 1]. Dukes alleges that, on or
about February 28, 2018, he was fired from his position at
the auto shop at the Bayou Dorcheat Correctional Center
(“BDCC”) because he is a Muslim and a part of
Islam. He claims that prior to his termination, Defendant
Ray, a lieutenant at BDCC, stated that he did not want Dukes
at the auto shop because he was a Muslim. Further, Dukes
claims that Defendant Lewis, the warden at BDCC, passed down
orders to confine Dukes in a cell twenty-four hours per day
for fifty-eight days in March and April of 2018 and deprive
him of his rights. Dukes alleges that he spent eight of those
days in freezing temperatures with only a steel bed, no
clothes, no lighting, no recreation, and cold food, which
caused back pain, hypothermia, constipation, sleep
deprivation, hallucinations, and “prayer
disruption.” [docs. # 1, 6].
Court conducted a preliminary screening of Dukes'
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A,
1915(e)(2) and dismissed his claims against “Sheriffs
Office Webster Parish.” [docs. # 7, 13].
December 14, 2018, Defendants filed the instant motion for
summary judgment to dismiss Dukes' suit in its entirety.
Defendants claim that Dukes' suit should be dismissed
because Dukes (1) has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); (2)
has no claim against Defendants in their official capacities
as a matter of law; and (3) cannot demonstrate a genuine
dispute of material fact for any individual capacity claim.
[doc. # 33]. Dukes did not file a response to the
motion. Defendants filed a reply on January 14,
2019. [doc. # 41]. This matter is ripe.
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof
of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of
the lawsuit under the applicable law in the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute about a material fact is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that a
reasonable fact-finder could render a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Id.
party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247). The moving party may
meet its burden “by pointing out that the record
contains no support for the non-moving party's
claim.” Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283
F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). If the nonmoving party is then
unable to point to anything in the record to support its
claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Id.
considering the evidence in a motion for summary judgment,
the court will resolve factual disputes in favor of the
nonmoving party, but “only when there is an actual
controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted
evidence of contradictory facts.” Salazar-Limon v.
City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citations omitted). The court will not assume without proof
that the nonmoving party could prove the necessary facts.
Id. In such a situation, there is no genuine dispute
as to a material fact and the moving party is “entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law, ” because “a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at