United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER & REASONS
E. FALLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Defendant LLP Mortgage, Ltd.'s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Alan Jacob's claims against it. R. Doc.
7. The motion is unopposed. The Court has reviewed
Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant's brief, and the
applicable law and now issues this Order and Reasons.
case arises out of foreclosure proceedings and litigation in
Washington Parish, Louisiana. R. Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiff Alan
Jacobs is a resident of Bogalusa, Louisiana. R. Doc. 1 at 1.
Defendant LPP Mortgage, Inc. f/k/a LPP Mortgage Ltd.
(“LPP”) is a national mortgage company with
offices in Plano, Texas. R. Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiff purchased
and owed a single-family home located at 447 Avenue L
Bogalusa, Louisiana 70427 (the “Property”). On
October 13, 2004, Plaintiff executed an original promissory
note in favor of Southern Mortgage Financial group d/b/a/
Southern Mortgage Company on the Property in the amount of
$91, 200 (the “Note”). R. Doc. 7-2. The Note was
secured by an Act of Mortgage importing a confession of
judgement, recorded as Instrument No. 251132 in the mortgage
records of Washington Parish (the “Mortgage”). R.
point between October 13, 2004 and June 1, 2011, the Note and
rights to enforce it were transferred to Defendant. R. Doc.
7-1 at 2. Plaintiff entered into a loan modification
agreement with Defendant and subsequently defaulted on the
Note, Mortgage, and loan modification agreement. R. Doc. 7-1
at 2-3. As a result of these defaults, an executory process
action was initiated by Defendant in the 22nd Judicial
District Court for Washington Parish, Louisiana (“state
court”) on January 24, 2013, and a Writ of Seizure and
Sale was issued by the state court on January 29, 2013. R.
Doc. 7-4, 7-5.
the foreclosure proceedings, Plaintiff sought to stay the
sheriff's sale and raised several complaints pertaining
to issues of standing to enforce the mortgage, lack of
notice, alleged Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act
(“RESPA”) violations, and an alleged nullity of
sale. R. Doc. 7-6. Plaintiff's final motion to stay the
foreclosure proceedings was denied by the state court on May
30, 2018, after which the Property was sold at a
sheriff's sale and adjudicated to Defendant. R. Doc. 7-7.
complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant wrongfully conducted
the foreclosure sale on May 30, 2018. R. Doc. 1 at 2.
Plaintiff claims Defendant did not have authority to
foreclose on the Property or defend the sale in state court
because it is purportedly unclear if Defendant was the title
holder of the mortgage at the time of the sale. R. Doc. 1 at
2. Between March 4, 2018 to May 30, 2018, Plaintiff alleges
the mortgage was transferred at least three times and that
Defendant failed to serve and provide adequate notice of the
transfers, thereby violating various provisions of the RESPA.
R. Doc. 1 at 14, 15. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff
brings claims for wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, and
failure to provide serve/provide notice of sale against
R. Doc. 1 at 4, 8.
moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it pursuant
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. R. Doc. 7-1 at 4.
Defendant submits Plaintiff's claims before this Court
mirror the claims Plaintiff alleged in the state court
proceedings or are otherwise inextricably intertwined with
the state court's judgment against him. Defendant argues
that, because Rooker-Feldman bars both claims that
directly challenge a state court judgment as well as any
claims inextricably intertwined with that judgment,
Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed. R. Doc. 7-1 at 4.
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “bars federal courts
from adjudicating claims where the plaintiff seeks to
overturn a state-court judgment.” Truong v. Bank of
America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923)). The doctrine is limited to “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Put
another way, Rooker-Feldman prevents a party who has
lost his case in state court “from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in
a United States district court.” Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Furthermore,
“[i]f the district court is confronted with issues that
are ‘inextricably intertwined' with a state
judgment, the court is ‘in essence being called upon to
review the state-court decision,' and the originality of
the district court's jurisdiction precludes such a
review.” United States v. Shepard, 23 F.3d
923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 482 n.16); see also Magor v. GMAC Mortgage,
L.L.C., 456 Fed.Appx. 334, 336 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (concluding that Rooker-Feldman bars a claim
that a state foreclosure judgment was procured through fraud
because “reversal of the state court's foreclosure
judgment would be a necessary part of the relief
case, rather than seeking damages or other relief due to
Defendant's alleged wrongful foreclosure, slander of
title, or REPSA violations, Plaintiff seeks relief from the
state court judgment itself. Because his complaint is an
attack on a state court judgment, the Rooker Feldman
doctrine bars his claims, and this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over them. As a result, the Court will grant
Defendant's motion to dismiss.