United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division
TIREECE COLE-JACKSON REG. # 17579-064
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KATHLEEN KAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by pro se petitioner
Tireece Cole-Jackson. Cole-Jackson is an inmate in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is
currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institution at Oakdale, Louisiana (“FCIO”).
petition has been referred to the undersigned for review,
report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this
court. For the reasons stated below, IT IS
RECOMMENDED that the petition be
DENIED and DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing §
2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
brings this petition seeking expungement of an incident
report and restoration of earned good time credit lost
through disciplinary proceedings relating to that report.
Doc. 1, p. 8. The incident report and disciplinary
proceedings in question occurred at the Federal Correctional
Institution at Englewood, Colorado (“FCIE”).
See doc. 1, att. 2, pp. 11-15. He also complains of
the handling of administrative remedies by the BOP. Doc. 1,
pp. 6-8. Cole-Jackson now brings the instant petition for
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his disciplinary report
should be expunged and good time credit restored because the
incident was investigated by the same officer who wrote the
report, in violation of BOP policy. Id. at 7. He
also alleges that he was denied due process by the denials of
his attempts at administrative remedy as untimely.
Id. at 6-8.
Law & Analysis
Screening of Habeas Corpus Petitions
district court may apply any or all of the rules governing
habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to those
filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
authorizes preliminary review of such petitions, and states
that they must be summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly
appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. at
Rule 4. To avoid summary dismissal under Rule 4, the petition
must contain factual allegations pointing to a “real
possibility of constitutional error.” Id. at
Rule 4, advisory committee note (quoting Aubut v.
Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Accordingly,
we review the pleadings and exhibits before us to determine
whether any right to relief is indicated, or whether the
petition must be dismissed.
§ 2241 petition on behalf of a sentenced prisoner
“attacks the manner in which a sentence is carried out
or the prison authorities' determination of its
duration.” Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451
(5th Cir. 2000). In order to prevail, a § 2241
petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A petition
for habeas relief by a federal prisoner is premature when the
prisoner fails to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
exhaustion is an affirmative defense. See Jones v.
Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007). The PLRA does not apply to
habeas proceedings and nothing in Jones prohibits
the sua sponte dismissal of a § 2241 petition
on exhaustion grounds. See, e.g., Callahan v. Young,
2013 WL 3346842 at *2 n. 2 (W.D. La. Jul. 2, 2013);
accord Wy v. Berkebile, 2008 WL 5262711 at *2 n. 2
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2008) (citing Korobov v. Angeli,
2008 WL 2787874 at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 2008)). Exceptions
to the exhaustion requirement apply only in extraordinary
circumstances. Castano v. Everhart, 235 Fed.Appx.
206, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2007). Exhaustion means “proper
exhaustion, ” including compliance with all
administrative deadlines and procedures. Woodford v.
Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2385 (2006).
claims of a due process violation in the handling of his
administrative remedies are not grounds for habeas relief
because they would not entitle him to accelerated release.
Instead, they are arguments in favor of administrative
exhaustion of the current petition. This petition presents
circumstances that might provide for an exception to the
exhaustion requirement, namely relating to the handling of
his original BP-10 by the North Central Regional Office and
his second BP-10 by the South Central Regional Office.
See doc. 1, pp. 1-4. Accordingly, we decline to
evaluate administrative exhaustion on initial review.
habeas challenge to a disciplinary proceeding, an inmate must
show that the punishment intrudes on a liberty interest
protected by the Constitution or some other law. Orellana
v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)). It is
assumed that federal prisoners have a liberty interest in
their accumulated good-time credit. See, e.g.,
Henson v. Bureau of Prisons, 213 F.3d 897, 898 (5th
Cir. 2000); Watkins v. Lnu, 547 Fed. App'x 409,
410 (5th Cir. 2013). Thus, because a loss of good-time
credits is involved in this proceeding, the Supreme
Court's analysis in Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S.Ct.
2963 (1974), and Superintendent, Massachusetts
Correctional Institution v. Hill, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985),
governs our review.
order for a prison disciplinary proceeding to comport with
the requirements of due process, the following minimal
procedural safeguards must be afforded: (1) adequate notice
of the alleged violation; (2) an opportunity to present
evidence; (3) written findings in support of the ruling; and
(4) the requirement that on review, ...