United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division
CORTNEY M. WARD, Petitioner
DEE D. DRELL
H.L. PEREZ-MONTES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C.
§ 2241) filed by pro se Petitioner Cortney M. Ward
(“Ward”) (#42352-044). Ward is an inmate in the
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”),
incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Pollock,
Louisiana. Ward challenges the calculation of his sentence by
pled guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2). See United States v. Ward, 4:15-cr-38
(E.D. Mo.). The Court sentenced Ward to a prison term of 70
months. Ward's federal sentence was ordered to run
consecutively to any sentences imposed in the Circuit Court
for St. Louis under Docket Nos. 1422-CR00112-01 and 1522-
CR01777-01. Ward did not appeal his federal conviction or
sentence. Ward v. United States, 4:17-CV-2331, 2018
WL 513797 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2018).
filed a habeas petition under § 2241 in the Eastern
District of Missouri, asking that the court direct the BOP to
recalculate his federal sentence to credit him with
additional time. Ward v. Bureau of Prisons,
4:17-CV-1673 (E.D. Mo.). The claim was dismissed as
then filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Ward's motion was
dismissed in part as time-barred and in part as
non-cognizable under § 2255. Ward v. U.S.A.,
4:17-CV-2331 (E.D. Mo.). Ward claimed that the federal
sentence was not supposed to run consecutively to his
“non-imposed” state sentences. Id. Ward
asked that all sentences be concurrent, and that his federal
jail time be credited accordingly. Id. The court
found that the sentencing claim was not properly raised under
§ 2255, but noted:
Additionally, because the State of Missouri had primary
jurisdiction over movant when he was transferred to the
Federal Court in his Federal criminal action in United
States v. Ward, No. 4:15CR38 AGF (E.D. Mo), it matters
not that this Court was the first to sentence movant. See
United States v. Hayes, 535 F.3d 907, 909-10 (8th Cir.
2008); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (“A
sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to,
or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at,
the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served.”) (emphasis added);
Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1256 (10th
Cir. 2006) (sentence begins when received into custody for
purpose of serving sentence, not when received into custody
at an earlier time on a writ for the purpose of adjudicating
federal claims). Thus, because movant began his time in
Missouri state custody to begin with, he had to start serving
his Missouri state sentence of five (5) years'
imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections
(“MDOC”) on his conviction for revocation of
probation prior to the time he could start serving his
federal sentence in 4:15-CR-38 (E.D. Mo.). This Court is
unable to designate the BOP as the place at which movant
serves his sentence, as it did not have primary jurisdiction
at the time of movant's initial arrest.
then filed the § 2241 petition now before this Court,
seeking credit for an eight-month period that Ward claims was
not credited toward his federal or state sentences.
Instructions to Amend
has been advised by the Eastern District of Missouri, a
petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 must first
exhaust his administrative remedies through the BOP. See
Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n. 2
(5th Cir. 1990)); United States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d
83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a prerequisite to § 2241
relief). An exception to this requirement may be made if the
petitioner demonstrates “extraordinary
circumstances” such as the unavailability of
administrative remedies, the inappropriateness of the
remedies, or the futility of pursuing such remedies.
Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994).
Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply only in
“extraordinary circumstances.” See Castano v.
Everhart, 235 Fed.Appx. 206, 207 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating the inappropriateness or futility of
administrative review. See Fuller 11 F.3d at 62.
does not indicate that he exhausted his sentence computation
claim through the BOP's administrative remedy process.
Ward should amend his petition to state whether he sought
administrative relief, and whether he exhausted through the
regional and national levels. Ward should provide documents
that establish exhaustion, including the responses received
at each level. If Ward did not exhaust, he must explain what,
if any, extraordinary circumstances prevented him from
properly exhausting. See Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62.