United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER AND REASONS
ZAINEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
following motion is before the Court: Motion for
Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 17) filed by Defendant,
Rouses Enterprises, LLC. Plaintiff, Allen Lee, opposes the
motion. The motion, submitted for consideration on July 12,
2018, is before the Court on the briefs without oral
September 22, 2017, Plaintiff Allen Lee initiated this action
pro se in state court against his former employer, Defendant
Rouses Enterprises, LLC. Lee alleged that he was terminated
one year earlier on September 22, 2016, when he was falsely
accused of stealing. (Rec. Doc. 1-1, Petition ¶ 4). Lee
had been employed with Rouses for 38 years. (Id.).
According to the Petition, Lee filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC on September 19, 2017, which was
nearly one year after the termination occurred and only three
days before he filed suit. Lee claimed recovery under Title
VII/§ 1981 and Louisiana's Employment Discrimination
Law (LEDL), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), and state tort law (intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, defamation,
misrepresentation of material facts).
now moves for summary judgment on all claims.
trial was scheduled to commence on July 23, 2018, but the
Court continued it in order to allow Plaintiff sufficient
time to oppose Rouses' motion for summary judgment (Rec.
Doc. 39, Minute Entry). Plaintiff filed his opposition on
June 18, 2018 (Rec. Doc. 40), and Rouses filed its reply on
June 19, 2018 (Rec. Doc. 41). A bench trial is scheduled for
November 28, 2018.
judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."
TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). A dispute about a
material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248). The court must draw all justifiable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Once the moving party has
initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party's cause," Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the
non-movant must come forward with "specific facts"
showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id.
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable
inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing
SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)).
faced with a well-supported motion for summary judgment, Rule
56 places the burden on the non-movant to designate the
specific facts in the record that create genuine issues
precluding summary judgment. Jones .v Sheehan, Young,
& Culp, P.C., 82 F.3d 1334, 1338 (5th
Cir. 1996). The district court has no duty to survey the
entire record in search of evidence to support a
non-movant's position. Id. (citing Forsyth
v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1992);
Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307
(5th Cir. 1988)).
references in his pro se pleading to claims under the FLSA,
NLRA, and ADA are easily dismissed. As Rouses points out,
Plaintiff alleges no facts in support of a claim under any of
these federal labor laws. Neither the Petition nor the
evidence of record even hints at a potential disability or an
issue with overtime pay.
that Plaintiff could overcome the problems surrounding the
filing of an EEOC charge, see note 1 supra, his
discrimination claims under both federal and state law fail
as a matter of law.
VII makes it unlawful for a covered employer “to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” Moghalu v. Bd. of Supervisors, Univ. of
La. Sys., No. 15-30559, 2016 WL 943619, at *3
(5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2016) (unpublished) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Liability on a claim that an
employer intentionally discharged an employee because of race
or national origin, i.e., a “disparate
treatment” claim, ...