United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
RULING AND ORDER
A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE.
the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8)
filed by Defendant, Thorpe Plant Services, Inc.
("Thorpe") and the Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
14) filed by Defendant, Maintenance Enterprises, LLC
("MEI"). Defendants seek a dismissal of the claims
brought by Plaintiff, Avia Lee under Rule 12(h)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a
claim. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
filed by Thorpe. (Doc. 13). Thorpe then filed a Reply. (Doc.
19). In response, Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply. (Doc. 23).
Plaintiff did not oppose MEFs Motion to Dismiss. The Court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Oral argument
is not necessary. For the following reasons, the
Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 8, 14) are
January 5, 2015, Plaintiff began her employment, working in a
"firewatch area," with MEI. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶
5, 12). Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to
menial labor after she complained about a
male employee's conduct for drawing a penis on her
clothes. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 21-23). On May
20, 2015, MEI terminated Plaintiffs employment allegedly
because of her complaints of sexual harassment. (Doc. 13-2 at
p. 4; Doc. L at ¶ 24).
August 24, 2015, Plaintiff began working for Thorpe, which
operates at the same plant as MEL (Doc. 8-1 at p. 3).
However, on September 3, 2015, allegedly at the request of
MEI, Thorpe terminated Plaintiffs employment. (Id.;
Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 14-16).
Plaintiff filed three charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On August 31,
2015, the EEOC received Charge Number 443-2015-00998 filed
against MEI ("MEI-0998") for discrimination based
on race and sex. (Doc. 13-2 at p. 6). On September 25, 2015,
the EEOC received Charge Number 443-2015-01453 also filed
against MEI ("MEI-1453") based on retaliation.
(Doc. 13-2 at p. 4). Likewise on September 25, 2015, the EEOC
received Charge Number 443-2015-01454 filed against Thorpe
("Thorpe-1454") based on retaliation. (Doc. 8-1 at
p. 3). The EEOC closed the file on Thorpe-1454, and mailed
the Notice of Suit Rights on November 13, 2017. (Doc. 8*2).
The EEOC closed the file on MEI-1453 and MEI-0998, and mailed
both of the Notice of Suit Rights on December 20, 2017. (Doc.
13-2 at pp. 2, 8).
March 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed suit against MEI and Thorpe
for discrimination and retaliation. (Doc. 1). In her
complaint, she alleges that she was harassed based on her
sex, that she was treated disparately based on her race, and
that she was terminated for complaining about workplace
harassment. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-38).
Particularly, Plaintiff asserts claims for x-etaliation and
discrimination based on race and sex against MEI under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c
("Title VII") and the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law ("LEDL"), La. Rev. Stat. §
23:301. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts claims for
retaliation against Thorpe under Title VII and the LEDL.
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule
8, which requires "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'" Ashcroft u. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.
plausibility" exists "when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). Hence, the complaint need not set out
"detailed factual allegations," but something
"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is
required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When conducting
its inquiry, the Court "accepts all well-pleaded facts
as true and views those facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff." Bustos v. Martini Club Inc.,
599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
support its motion, MEI argues that Plaintiffs claims under
the LEDL are time-barred because Plaintiff did not fde her
lawsuit within eighteen months, which is the maximum
prescriptive period set forth in Louisiana Revised Statute
§23:303(D), of the last discriminatory conduct. (Doc.
14-1 at pp. 2-3). In its motion, however, MEI does not seek a
dismissal of Plaintiffs Title VII claims. (Doc. 14).
Thorpe argues that Plaintiffs LEDL claim should be dismissed
because she failed to file suit within eighteen months after
her termination. (Doc. 8 at p. 1). Thorpe further argues that
Plaintiffs Title VII claim should be dismissed because she
failed to file suit within 90 days of receipt of the notice
of right-to-sue letter. (Id.).
LEDL Claims ...