United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division
MAURICE HICKS, JR. CHIEF JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
H.L. Perez-Montes United States Magistrate Judge.
the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C.
§ 2241) filed by pro se Petitioner Morris Edwards
(“Edwards”) (#347765). Edwards is an inmate in
the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections
incarcerated at the Caddo Correctional Center in Shreveport,
Louisiana. Edwards complains he is innocent of a burglary
charge pending against him. Edwards seeks the dismissal of
the state charge and monetary compensation.
petition should be denied and dismissed because Edwards is
not entitled to the dismissal of a pending state criminal
charge, and monetary damages are not available in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding.
has been charged with multiple counts of burglary, including
the burglary of Great Raft Brewing. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Edwards
claims that the charge was fabricated, and he is innocent.
Edwards asks that the charge be dropped, and that he be
awarded one million dollars in damages. (Doc. 5, p. 8).
Law and Analysis A. Edwards has
not exhausted state remedies.
is a pre-trial detainee challenging a pending Louisiana
criminal prosecution. Edwards seeks relief pursuant to §
2241, which applies to persons in custody awaiting trial.
See Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th
Cir. 1998); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220,
224 (5th Cir. 1987).
petitioner seeking federal habeas corpus relief under §
2254 cannot collaterally attack his state court conviction in
federal court until he has exhausted available state
remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). The exhaustion requirement
is a judicial abstention policy developed “to protect
the state courts' opportunity to confront and resolve
initially any constitutional issues arising within their
jurisdictions as well as to limit federal interference in the
state adjudicatory process.” Dickerson, 816
F.2d at 225. In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement,
the petitioner must have provided all state courts that could
review the matter with a fair opportunity to review all of
his habeas corpus claims. See Anderson v. Harless,
459 U.S. 4 (1982).
is no express statutory requirement that a pre-trial detainee
exhaust state court remedies prior to asserting a § 2241
claim in federal court. However, the jurisprudence requires
persons seeking such relief pursuant to § 2241 to first
exhaust state court remedies before seeking federal
intervention. See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-225;
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,
410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973); Robinson v. Wade, 686
F.2d 298, 303 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Although section
2241 contains no statutory requirement of exhaustion like
that found in section 2254(b), exhaustion of state remedies
has been held a necessary prelude to its invocation.”).
Edwards has not exhausted available state court remedies.
Edwards had fully exhausted his available state court
remedies, federal intervention into this pending prosecution
is foreclosed by jurisprudence. A federal court should
abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction if the issue raised
by a pre-trial detainee in a habeas petition may be resolved
either by a trial on the merits in the state court or other
state court proceedings. See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at
225 (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-92). This
jurisprudential requirement has been imposed to preclude
“the derailing of a pending state proceeding by an
attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in
federal court.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 493;
Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225-226.
jurisprudence distinguishes between a petitioner who seeks to
“abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly
functioning of state judicial processes” from one who
seeks only to enforce the state's obligation to bring him
promptly to trial. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225. In
Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir.
1976), the Fifth Circuit articulated the distinction:
[A]n attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a
prosecution is of the first type, while an attempt to force
the state to go to trial is of the second. While the former
objective is normally not attainable through federal habeas
corpus, the latter is, although ...