Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Cox Operating, L.L.C. v. Settoon Towing, LLC

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

May 31, 2018

COX OPERATING, L.L.C.
v.
SETTOON TOWING, LLC ET AL.

         SECTION I

          ORDER AND REASONS

          LANCE M. AFRICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         The parties accept the following facts as true for purposes of the present motion.[1]

         In September 2016, plaintiff Cox Operating, L.L.C. (“Cox”) owned a well in Quarantine Bay, Plaquemines Parish. Cox had this well insured. The insurance policy covering the well at that time provided that “a 10% No. Claims Bonus [was] payable at expiry subject to total gross earned premium exceeding USD2, 000, 000 hereon.”[2] Thus, if Cox did not submit any claims under such policy, then the insurer would refund Cox 10% of Cox's total premium amount for the policy period, assuming that total premium amount exceeded $2, 000, 000, which it did. On the other hand, if Cox did submit a claim, then no such refund would issue.

         A vessel owned by defendant Settoon Towing, LLC (“Settoon”) allided with the well on September 13, 2016. As a result of this allision, Cox submitted a claim under the policy and became obligated to repay the “no claims bonus, ” which the insurer had prepaid to Cox.[3] This claim was the only claim that Cox filed during the policy period.

         Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Settoon Towing, LLC (“Settoon”), which plaintiff Cox Operating, L.L.C. (“Cox”) opposes. Settoon's motion raises two legal questions:

1. Is Cox precluded, as a matter of law, from pursuing recovery of the “no claims bonus”?
2. If no, then does the collateral source rule bar Settoon from introducing evidence of a second insurance policy held by Cox that insured it against the loss of the “no claims bonus”?

         After considering the parties' arguments and the applicable law, the Court answers no to the first question, and yes to the second.

         I.

         Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, the court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need not produce evidence negating the existence of material fact, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the other party's case. Id.; Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).

         Once the party seeking summary judgment carries its initial burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue of material fact is not satisfied by creating “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ' by ‘conclusory allegations, ' by ‘unsubstantiated assertions, ' or by only a ‘scintilla' of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Instead, a genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

         The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue. Id. However, the nonmoving party's evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party's] favor.” Id. at 255; see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999).

         Moreover, “[a]lthough the substance or content of the evidence submitted to support or dispute a fact on summary judgment must be admissible . . ., the material may be presented in a form that would not, in itself, be admissible at trial.” Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., LLC, 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting 11 Moore's Federal Practice-Civil ¶ 56.91 (2017)). “This flexibility allows the court to consider the evidence that would likely be admitted at trial . . . without imposing on parties the time and expense it takes to authenticate everything in the record.” Maurer v. Independence Town, No. 16-30673, 2017 WL 3866561, at *3 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 2017).

         II.

...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.