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Magee v. Concordia Parish Correction

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division

May 16, 2018

KAUNDA L. MAGEE (#331818), Plaintiff
v.
CONCORDIA PARISH CORRECTIONAL, ET AL., Defendants

         SEC. P

          DEE D. DRELL JUDGE.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          JOSEPH H.L. PEREZ-MONTES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         Before the Court is the civil rights complaint (42 U.S.C. § 1983) of pro se Plaintiff Kaunda L. Magee (“Magee”) (#331818). Magee was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 10). Magee is an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. Magee complains that his constitutional rights were violated when he was a pre-trial detainee at the Washington Parish Jail.

         Because Magee's conviction has not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, his § 1983 complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

         I. Background

         Magee was transferred from the Concordia Parish Correctional Facility (“CPCF”) to the Washington Parish Jail (“WPJ”) on February 1, 2016, to be tried on numerous criminal charges. Magee was administered his prescribed medications at CPCF prior to his transfer. (Doc. 7, p. 4). However, Magee alleges that his medication was not sent with him to Washington Parish. (Doc. 7, p. 4). On February 2, 2016, Magee asked the WPJ staff about his medication, and they advised they were “working on getting it” from CPCF. Magee alleges that he did not have his medication for the five days of trial.

         Magee was convicted on all 10 counts of the indictment, and sentenced as a habitual offender to numerous life sentences. See State v. Magee, 2016-1074 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), writ denied, 2017-1003 (La. 2/23/18), 237 So.3d 514. Magee claims that, had he received his medication, he would have been able to defend himself at trial. As relief, Magee asks that the Court bring him justice and treat him fairly. (Doc. 7, p. 5).

         II. Law and Analysis

         A. Magee's complaint is subject to screening under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

         Magee is a prisoner who has been allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 13). As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, Magee's complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Rosborough v. Mgmt. and Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that prison management corporations and their employees are state actors under § 1983). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, Magee's complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

         A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

         B. To the extent Magee seeks relief under § 1983, his complaint is barred by Heck.

         Magee's claim that his conviction is invalid because he was deprived various mental health medications during his trial is barred by Heck. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a claim that, in effect, attacks the constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1995). Magee's conviction has not been expunged, reversed, or otherwise invalidated. See Magee, 237 So.3d 514. Thus, under Heck, Magee's claim must be dismissed. See Reger v. Walker, 312 Fed.Appx. 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2009) (prisoner's claims, whether for damages, declaratory judgment, or injunctive relief, are subject to Heck if they imply the invalidity of conviction); Clarke v. Stadler, 154 F.3d 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that a claim for prospective injunctive relief that would imply the invalidity of a ...


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