United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division
G. JAMES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is the petitioner39;s, Keith Crossan
(“Crossan”), Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Scheduling of Expedited Preliminary Injunction
Hearing. [Doc. No. 3]. Crossan brings this action under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (the “Hague Convention”) and the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 9001, et
seq, seeking, inter alia, the return of his
minor child to Ireland. [Doc. No. 1, p. 10]. Crossan
claims that the respondent, Louise Clohessy
(“Clohessy”), removed their minor child from
Ireland to the United States without his authorization, in
violation of his custody rights under Irish law. Id.
at p. 8. Pursuant to his motion, Crossan seeks a temporary
restraining order “prohibiting the removal of his son
from the jurisdiction of this Court pending a hearing on the
merits of [his] Verified Petition.” [Doc. No. 3-1, p.
10]. Crossan also requests an expedited preliminary
injunction hearing on the merits of his Verified Petition and
an order that the trial of this action on the merits be
consolidated with the hearing for preliminary injunction,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Id.
After considering the motion and the relevant law, the Court
finds that Crossan39;s motion should be
Court may only issue a temporary restraining order without
notice to the adverse party if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can
be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant39;s attorney certifies in writing any
efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
case, the Court finds that Crossan39;s verified petition
clearly shows that he will suffer immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage if a temporary restraining order is
not entered before Clohessy can be heard in opposition.
Moreover, ICARA permits courts to “take or cause to be
taken measures under Federal or State law, as appropriate, to
protect the well-being of the child involved or to prevent
the child39;s further removal or concealment before the
final disposition of the petition.” 22 U.S.C. §
has set forth facts demonstrating that Clohessy removed the
parties39; minor child from Ireland to the United States
without permission from, or notice to, Crossan. [Doc. No. 1,
pp. 4-5]. Crossan further states he learned that Clohessy and
his son were in Atlanta, Georgia through the aid of the
police. Id. at p. 5. Crossan also states that after
attempting to serve Clohessy with a summons and a similar
complaint filed in the Northern District of Georgia, he
learned that Clohessy had moved from Georgia to Louisiana.
Id. Therefore, the Court finds there is a strong
likelihood that if Clohessy receives notice of the instant
action, she will flee the jurisdiction with the minor child,
causing Crossan immediate and irreparable injury through his
difficulty or inability to find his minor child. A temporary
restraining order will also prevent further removal or
concealment of the child pending disposition of the verified
attorney has submitted a certificate stating that she has
provided actual notice of the time of making the application,
and copies of all pleadings and other papers filed in the
action to Clohessy and her attorney. [Doc. No. 3, p. 3].
Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Crossan39;s motion for a
temporary restraining order.
Court further finds that the expedited adjudication of
Crossan's petition is warranted pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65(b)(3) and conforms with Article 11 of
the Hague Convention. Further, finding that the evidence to
be submitted at the preliminary injunction hearing will bear
on the merits of the petition, the Court finds that
consolidation of the hearing with a trial on the merits is
appropriate. This Order does not prevent Clohessy from moving
for a continuance of the trial in this matter pursuant to any
rights she may have. However, the Court notes that
“evidence that is received on the motion and that would
be admissible at trial becomes part of the trial record and
need not be repeated at trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2).
Accordingly, the Court will grant Crossan ...