United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
CONSOLIDATED GRAIN & BARGE, INC.
RANDY ANNY, ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
LLC and Anny's, Inc. (“Applicants”) filed a
motion to intervene. Rec. Doc. 507. Plaintiff American River
Transportation Company (ARTCO) timely filed an opposition.
Rec. Doc. 510.
reasons discussed below, IT IS ORDERED that
motion to intervene (Rec. Doc. 507) is
GRANTED. The proposed pleading (Rec. Doc.
507-4) attached to the motion shall be filed into the record.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing to resolve the
competing claims to the garnished funds be held on
Wednesday, May 16, 2018, at 9:00 a.m.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that ARTCO, Randy Anny, and
Applicants shall file memoranda of law on the questions of
sanctions for failures by Applicants and Judgment Debtors to
comply with production orders, and whether Applicants are the
alter egos of Judgment Debtor Randy Anny by May 9,
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
instant motion to intervene arises as part of a garnishment
proceeding. Plaintiff and Judgment Creditor American River
Transportation Company (ARTCO) initiated a garnishment
proceeding in November 2017 as part of its efforts to enforce
the Judgment (Rec. Doc. 397) against, inter alia,
Judgment Debtor Randy Anny. See Rec. Doc. 468.
Garnishee Consolidated Grain & Barge (CGB) first
indicated that it possessed funds owed to Randy Anny in
December 2017. See Rec. Doc. 478. But in January
2018, CGB indicated that Ainey's, LLC and Anny's,
Inc. (“Applicants”) also claimed ownership to the
garnished funds. See Rec. Doc. 499. The funds at
issue derive from a contract between CGB, Randy Anny,
Ainey's, LLC, and Anny's, Inc. that provides for the
lease by CGB of certain land along the Mississippi River.
See Rec. Doc. 502-1. The parties were unable to
resolve the competing claims to the garnished funds, which
were ultimately ordered deposited into the registry of the
court. See Rec. Doc. 506. The funds currently at
issue amount to $102, 482.00. See id.
March 2018, the Court provided Applicants fourteen days to
file a motion to intervene to assert their claims to the
garnished funds within the context of the instant garnishment
proceeding. See Rec. Doc. 506. The Applicants then
filed the instant motion to intervene to assert their
contractual claim to a portion of the garnished funds.
See Rec. Doc. 507. ARTCO filed an opposition.
See Rec. Doc. 510.
Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides two avenues for
intervention. The first is mandatory and applies when a
movant “claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect
its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent
that interest.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). The second is
permissive and applies when a movant has “a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of
law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b). Regardless of which
avenue a movant pursues, a motion to intervene must be
timely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. The instant motion
appears to rely on mandatory intervention under Rule 24(a)
because it focuses on the Applicants' claim to the
garnished funds, which is the “property . . . that is
the subject of the action . . . .” See Rec.
satisfy the requirements for mandatory intervention, an
applicant must establish the following: (1) timeliness; (2)
“an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action;” (3) that the
applicant is “so situated that the disposition of the
action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest;” and (4) that the
applicant's interest is “inadequately represented
by the existing parties to the suit.” Haspel &
Davis Milling & Planting Co. v. Bd. Of Levee
Comm'rs, 493 F.3d 570, 578 (5th Cir. 2007).
determines the timeliness of a motion to intervene by
weighing four factors:
(1) [t]he length of time during which the would-be intervenor
actually knew or reasonably should have known of its interest
in the case before it petitioned for leave to intervene; (2)
the extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the
litigation may suffer as a result of the would-be
intervenor's failure to apply for intervention as soon as
it knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in
the case; (3) the extent of the prejudice that the would-be
intervenor may suffer if intervention is denied; and (4) the
existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or
against a determination that the application is timely.
Sommers v. Bank of America, 835 F.3d 509, 512-13
(5th Cir. 2016). The factors here indicate that the instant