United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
CEH ENERGY, LLC ET AL.
KEAN MILLER LLP ET AL.
ORDER & REASONS
the Court are Plaintiffs' second Motion for
Reconsideration, R. Doc. 61, Motion to Amend Complaint, R.
Doc. 60, and Motion to Amend/Correct their Motion for
Reconsideration, R. Doc. 62. Defendants oppose the motions.
R. Docs. 63, 64. Having considered the parties'
submissions and the applicable law, the Court now issues this
Order & Reasons.
lawsuit arose from the representation by Defendants of
Plaintiffs who are investors in Louisiana oil prospects.
Plaintiff CEH Energy, LLC (“CEH Energy”) is a
Delaware corporation, wholly owned and created by Plaintiff
Shenzhen Careall Investment Holdings Group Co., Ltd.
(“Careall”), for the purpose of investing in
Louisiana oil prospects. R. Doc. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiffs
invested a total of $2.1 million in two oil prospects. R.
Doc. 1 at 5. The oil prospects were owned by Intrepid
Drilling, LLC (“Intrepid”), which is owned by
Bill Simmons. R. Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiffs allege that the
investments were fraudulent. R. Doc. 1 at 25-26. Plaintiffs
filed a lawsuit in federal court in Mississippi against
Intrepid and Bill Simmons claiming that these defendants
failed to disclose material omissions, including a $205
million outstanding RICO judgment, and defrauded Plaintiffs.
R. Doc. 1 at 5, 10-11.
in this action are Kean Miller LLP (“Kean
Miller”) and Stephen Hanemann. R. Doc. 1. Stephen
Hanemann is a partner at Kean Miller. R. Doc. 1 at 3. Stephen
Hanemann was engaged by Plaintiffs, at the suggestion of Bill
Simmons, to represent them regarding their investments in
Louisiana oil prospects. R. Doc. 1 at 2-3. Plaintiffs alleged
that Kean Miller and Stephen Hanemann already were, and had
been, representing Intrepid and Bill Simmons. R. Doc. 1 at 4.
Plaintiffs alleged that Kean Miller and Stephen Hanemann had
a conflict of interest, failed to disclose material omissions
regarding the investment, and breached their fiduciary
duties. R. Doc. 1 at 5-6, 30.
November 20, 2017, the Court granted Defendants' motions
to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. R. Doc. 45.
The Court held that all of Plaintiffs' claims were
perempted under La. R.S. 9:5605 or if they fell under the
statute's fraud exception were prescribed under Article
3492. R. Doc. 45. Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims
with prejudice was entered for Defendants on November 21,
2017. R. Doc. 46.
February 7, 2018, the Court denied Plaintiffs' first
motion to reconsider. R. Doc. 58. Plaintiffs now bring a
second motion to reconsider and a motion to amend their
complaint. R. Docs. 60, 61.
Second Motion for Reconsideration (R. Doc. 61)
asking a court to reconsider an order are generally analyzed
under the standards for a motion to alter or amend a judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief from a judgment
or order pursuant to Rule 60(b). See Hamilton Plaintiffs
v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d 367, 371 n. 10 (5th
Cir. 1998). “[S]uccessive motion[s] for reconsideration
[are] condemned by well-established authority in [the Fifth]
and other circuits.” Charles L.M. v. Ne. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 884 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1989).
Additional motions for reconsideration are only considered if
the Court, in ruling on the first motion, amended its
previous judgment by changing what that judgment did.
Id. at 870. Here, the Court did not change what the
judgment did in ruling on Plaintiffs' first motion.
Rather, the Court simply stated that its original ruling was
correct and supported by an alternative justification. The
Court could have simply denied Plaintiffs' first motion
with no additional explanation. Therefore, Plaintiffs'
second motion to reconsider is deemed successive and will not
Motion to Amend Complaint (R. Doc. 60)
Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides, “[a] party may
amend its pleading once as a matter or course within . . . 21
days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule (12)(b).” Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(a)(1)(B). “In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent
or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave
when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
However, “[w]hile [Rule 15(a)] endows a district court
with ‘virtually unlimited discretion' to allow
amendments before entry of judgment, that discretion narrows
considerably after entry of judgment. . . . Post-judgment
amendment to a complaint can only occur once the judgment
itself is vacated.” Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218
F.3d 458, 468 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Dussouy v. Gulf
Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981);
6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1489 (2d ed. 1990 &
Supp. 1999)). Here, the judgment has not been vacated.
Therefore, this Court is without discretion or authority to
permit Plaintiffs' to amend their complaint.
foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that
Plaintiffs' second Motion for ...