United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lafayette Division
CAROLYN BROWN, ET AL.
v.
ST. LANDRY PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPT, ET AL
CONSENT
OF THE PARTIES
MEMORANDUM RULING
PATRICK J. HANNA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Currently
pending is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants
Sheriff Bobby Guidroz and Assistant Warden Ovide Stelly.
[Rec. Doc. 14]. The motion is opposed. Considering the
evidence, the law, and the arguments of the parties, and for
the reasons fully explained below, the defendants' motion
for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Roland
Brown (“Brown”) died while he was an inmate at
the St. Landry Parish Jail (“SLPJ”) allegedly
because he was denied adequate medical care.[1] As a result,
Brown's wife and children filed a complaint based on 28
U.S.C. §1983 against the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's
Department (“SLPSD”), Sheriff Bobby Guidroz, in
his individual and official capacity, and Assistant Warden
Ovide Stelly (“Stelly”), in his individual and
official capacity.[2] The plaintiffs have also brought various
claims under state law. Although the complaint contains a
number of citations to various provisions of the
Constitution, the Court construes the complaint to allege
violations of the decedent's rights under the Eighth
and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.[3] The state law claims are based on La.C.C.
Art. 2315 and the Louisiana Constitution.
The
defendants contend Brown voluntarily discontinued his blood
pressure medication in writing, and to the extent his death
was caused by complications of hypertension, it was not
caused by anything the defendants did or did not do. The
plaintiffs contend that the defendants failed to provide
Brown with his blood pressure medicine without his permission
because the signatures on the forms which purport to
voluntarily discontinue his blood pressure medication are not
Brown's signature.
The
defendants further contend that the uncontroverted evidence
demonstrates that the medical staff at the SLPJ who allegedly
discontinued Brown's medication and cleared him to return
to his bunk where he subsequently died, were not employees of
the Sheriff. Further, neither the assistant warden or any
other employees of the Sheriff's department were
responsible for the dispensing/administering of medication,
and the medical treatment, or lack thereof, rendered to Brown
when he was brought to the medical staff for attention and/or
medication. Finally, when the decedent did have medical
complaints, he was promptly brought to the medical staff by
the assistant warden. Therefore, the defendants cannot be
liable for their actions or alleged inactions.
The
plaintiffs allege, but provide no evidence, that Stelly was
made aware of Brown's medical problems by his cellmate,
Phil Bryant, but Stelly ignored Bryant's pleas for help
and failed to render aid and assistance. Although they have
provided evidence that SLPSD deputies actually gave
medications to inmates, there is no evidence that non-medical
staff were involved in determining what medications were
given and in what amounts. The plaintiffs do not address the
contention that the medical staff were not employees of the
Sheriff.
LAW
AND ANALYSIS
A.
The Standard for a Motion for Summary
Judgment
Under
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of
its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the
lawsuit under the applicable governing law.[4] A genuine issue
of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could render a
verdict for the nonmoving party.[5]
The
party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility
of informing the court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the
absence of genuine issues of material fact.[6] If the moving
party carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
issue of a material fact.[7] All facts and inferences are construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.[8]
If the
dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will
bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may
satisfy its burden by pointing out that there is insufficient
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim.[9] The motion should be granted if the
nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an
essential element of its claim.[10]
When
both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts,
a court is bound to draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party.[11] The court cannot make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence, and the nonmovant
cannot meet his burden with unsubstantiated assertions,
conclusory allegations, or a scintilla of
evidence.[12] “When all of the summary judgment
evidence presented by both parties could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is
proper.”[13]
Additionally,
when a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the summary
judgment stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise
facts that dispute the defendant's assertion of qualified
immunity.[14] However, the court must still view all
facts and make all reasonable inferences in light most
favorable to the plaintiff.[15] If the plaintiff fails, the
motion for summary judgment should be granted.
B.
The Standard for Evaluating a Section 1983
Claim
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against anyone who
“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State” violates another
person's Constitutional rights. Section 1983 is not
itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a
method for vindicating federal rights conferred
elsewhere.[16] To state a section 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2)
demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.[17] In this case,
the defendants do not contest whether Sheriff Guidroz and
Stelly acted under color of law at any relevant time, but
they do challenge as part of their qualified immunity defense
whether the defendants' alleged actions or omissions are
Constitutional violations.
The
claims against Sheriff Guidroz and Stelly are brought both in
their individual and official capacity. A suit against a
government official in his official capacity is a suit
against the government entity of which he is an
agent.[18]Municipalities are not vicariously liable
for violations committed by their employees, but they are
liable when their official policies cause their employees to
violate another person's constitutional
rights.[19] Therefore, a claim of municipal
liability under § 1983 requires proof of three elements:
a policymaker, an official policy, and a violation of
constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or
custom.[20] The proper analysis of such claims
requires an inquiry into two separate issues: “(1)
whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional
violation, and (2) if so, whether the municipality is
responsible for that violation.”[21]
A
municipality's official policies include any persistent,
widespread practice of officials or employees that is not
authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, but
is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that
fairly represents municipal policy.[22]
In
order to assert a valid claim against an official in his
individual capacity, a §1983 claimant must establish
that the defendant was either personally involved in a
constitutional deprivation or that his wrongful actions were
causally connected to the constitutional
deprivation.[23] “Under section 1983, supervisory
officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on
any theory of vicarious liability.”[24] “A
supervisory official may be held liable . . . only if (1) he
affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the
constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements
unconstitutional policies that causally result in the
constitutional injury.”[25]
To
establish supervisor liability for constitutional violations
committed by subordinate employees, the plaintiffs must show
that the supervisor acted or failed to act with deliberate
indifference to the violation of others' constitutional
rights committed by their subordinates.[26] Deliberate
indifference requires “proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action.”[27]
The
plaintiffs' claims also include allegations of the
defendants' failure to properly train and supervise, as
well as maintain policies to provide required medication and
treatment for medical conditions. A municipality may incur
§1983 liability for its employees' acts when a
municipal policy of hiring or training causes those
acts.[28] When such a claim is asserted, the
plaintiff must show (1) that the training or hiring
procedures of the municipality's policymaker were
inadequate; (2) that the municipality's policymaker was
deliberately indifferent in adopting the hiring or training
policy; and (3) that the inadequate hiring or training policy
directly caused the plaintiff's injury.[29]
A
supervisor may be liable for failure to supervise or train
if: (1) the supervisor failed to supervise or train the
subordinate officer; (2) a causal connection exists between
the failure to supervise or train and the violation of the
plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to supervise or
train amounted to deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.[30]
C.
The Standard for Evaluating Qualified
Immunity
Qualified
immunity, an affirmative defense to a suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, protects government officials in their
individual capacity, while performing discretionary
functions, not only from suit, but from “liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have
known.”[31] Qualified immunity protects “all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.”[32]
Although
qualified immunity is “nominally an affirmative
defense, the plaintiff has the burden to negate the defense
once properly raised.”[33] A defendant's assertion of
qualified immunity is analyzed under a two-prong
test.[34] The first prong asks whether the
plaintiff has shown sufficient facts to “make out a
violation of a constitutional right.”[35] The second
prong requires the court to determine “whether the
right at issue was ‘clearly established' at the
time of defendant's alleged
misconduct.”[36]
The
Supreme Court articulated the analysis as follows:
In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary
judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first
asks whether the facts, [t]aken in the light most favorable
to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the
officer's conduct violated a [federal] right[.]
...
The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks
whether the right in question was “clearly
established” at the time of the violation. Governmental
actors are shielded from liability for civil damages if their
actions did not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. [T]he salient question is whether the state of the law
at the time of an incident provided “fair
warning” to the defendants that their alleged [conduct]
was unconstitutional.
Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to engage
these two prongs. But under either prong, courts may not
resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party
seeking summary judgment. This is not a rule specific to
qualified immunity; it is simply an application of the more
general rule that a “judge's function” at
summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment is appropriate only
if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. In making that determination, a court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing
party.[37]
D.
Deliberate indifference to the medical needs of the
detainee
The
plaintiffs contend that Brown's constitutional rights
were violated when the defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to provide him with his blood pressure medicine
and adequate medical care.“A prison official violates
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment when his conduct demonstrates deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs,
constituting an unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.”[38] Deliberate indifference in the context
of the failure to provide reasonable medical care means that:
(1) the prison officials were aware of facts taken from which
an inference of substantial risk of serious harm could be
drawn; (2) the officials actually drew that inference; and
(3) the officials' response indicated that they
subjectively intended that harm occur.[39]
To meet
the deliberate indifference standard, a plaintiff must show
that the officials “refused to treat him, ignored his
complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged
in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton
disregard for any serious medical needs.[40] Deliberate
indifference may be exhibited by medical personnel in
response to a prisoners' needs, but it may also be shown
when prison officials have denied an inmate prescribed
treatment or have denied him access to medical personnel
capable of evaluating the need for treatment.[41]
Pretrial
detainees also have a constitutional right not to have
confining officials treat their basic needs - including a
need for reasonable medical care - with deliberate
indifference, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.[42] This right was clearly established law
at the time of the incident in question.[43]
“The
State's exercise of its power to hold detainees and
prisoners. . . brings with it a responsibility under the U.S.
Constitution to tend to the essentials of their well-being:
when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him
unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to
provide for his basic human needs . . . it transgresses the
substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.”[44]
A party
alleging that an “episodic act or omission”
resulted in an unconstitutional violation of a pretrial
detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights is required to
show that the official's action constituted
“deliberate indifference.”[45] An episodic
act or omission of a state official does not violate a
pretrial detainee's due process right to medical care
unless the official acted or failed to act with
subjective deliberate indifference to the
detainee's rights, as defined by the United States
Supreme Court. “[D]eliberate indifference entails
something more than mere negligence [and]. . . something less
than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm
or with knowledge that harm will result.”[46] In other
words, “deliberate indifference [lies] somewhere
between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or
knowledge at the other.”[47] “[A]cting or failing to
act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly
disregarding that risk.”[48] The Court also explained that
to act recklessly in this context means to consciously
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.[49]
The
standards applicable to the facts of this case may be stated
as follows:
A prison official acts with subjective deliberate
indifference when he (1) “knew of” and (2)
“disregarded an excessive risk to the [detainee's]
health or safety.” Brumfield v. Hollins, 551
F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Gibbs v.
Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2001)
(alteration in original).[50]
E.
There is a genuine issue of fact whether the
decedentvoluntarily ...