United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
TANESHA O. SCOTT
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S SOCIAL SECURITY
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
O. Scott (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner”) pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) denying Plaintiff's application for
Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act.
(R. Doc. 1). Having found all of the procedural prerequisites
met (Tr. 1-6), the Court has properly reviewed
Plaintiff's appeal. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (“The Appeals Council's
decision, or the decision of the administrative law judge if
the request for review is denied, is binding unless
you… file an action in Federal district
court…”). For the reasons given below, the Court
ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner
is AFFIRMED and Plaintiff's appeal is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
filed her application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income (Tr. 162-169) on April 15, 2014,
alleging that she became disabled on March 1, 2012 because of
a disabling condition, namely hypertension, obesity,
hepatitis c, gastritis, depression, chronic joint pain,
myalgia, pre-diabetes, and blurred vision. (Tr. 184).
Plaintiff's application was initially denied by an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who first held
an administrative hearing (Tr. 35-62) before issuing an
unfavorable decision on September 16, 2015. (Tr. 17-34).
Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision
(Tr. 14-16) was denied by the Appeals Council on December 28,
2016. (Tr. 1-6). The ALJ's decision rested as the
Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's request for review. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.981.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is
limited to an inquiry into whether there is substantial
evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner and
whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971); Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th
Cir. 1994); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021
(5th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence has been defined as
“‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'”
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (defining “substantial
evidence” in the context of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)). The Fifth Circuit
has further held that substantial evidence “must do
more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to
be established, but no substantial evidence will be found
only where there is a conspicuous absence of credible choices
or no contrary medical evidence.” Hames v.
Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983) (quotations
omitted). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner
“and not the courts to resolve.” Selders v.
Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court
may not reweigh the evidence, try the case de novo,
or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner
even if it finds that the evidence preponderates against the
Commissioner's decision. See, e.g., Bowling v.
Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994) (“This
is so because substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance but more than a scintilla.”); Hollis
v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988) (“In
applying the substantial evidence standard, we must carefully
scrutinize the record to determine if, in fact, such evidence
is present; at the same time, however, we may neither reweigh
the evidence in the record nor substitute our judgment for
the Secretary's.”); Harrell v. Bowen, 862
F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence, then it is conclusive and must be upheld.
Estate of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d 744, 745 (5th
Cir. 2000). If, on the other hand, the Commissioner fails to
apply the correct legal standards, or fails to provide a
reviewing court with a sufficient basis to determine that the
correct legal principles were followed, it is grounds for
reversal. Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th
determining disability, the Commissioner (through an ALJ)
works through a five-step sequential evaluation process.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The burden
rests upon the claimant throughout the first four steps of
this five-step process to prove disability. If the claimant
is successful in sustaining his or her burden at each of the
first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
step five. See Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789
(5th Cir. 1991) (explaining the five-step process). First,
the claimant must prove he or she is not currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
Second, the claimant must prove his or her impairment is
“severe” in that it “significantly limits
your physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities…” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). At
step three, the ALJ must conclude the claimant is disabled if
he or she proves that his or her impairments meet or are
medically equivalent to one of the impairments contained in
the Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d) (step three of sequential process); 20 C.F.R. pt.
404, subpt. P, app'x 1 (Listing of Impairments). Fourth,
the claimant bears the burden of proving he or she is
incapable of meeting the physical and mental demands of his
or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
claimant is successful at all four of the preceding steps
then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove,
considering the claimant's residual functional capacity,
age, education and past work experience, that he or she is
capable of performing other work. 20 C.F.R §
404.1520(g)(1). If the Commissioner proves other work exists
which the claimant can perform, the claimant is given the
chance to prove that he or she cannot, in fact, perform that
work. Muse, 925 F.2d at 789.
the ALJ made the following determinations:
1. Plaintiff had met the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through June 30, 2013.
2. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since March 1, 2012.
3. Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, and morbid obesity.
4. Plaintiff did not meet or medically equal a Listing.
5. Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work, except
she can lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for two hours in an
eight hour day; sit for six hours in an eight hour day;
occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds;
occasionally crouch and crawl; and frequently climb ramps and
6. Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.
7. Claimant was a younger individual on the alleged
disability onset date.
8. Plaintiff had at least a high school education and was
able to communicate in English.
9. Transferability of jobs skills was not material to the
determination of disability because the Medical-Vocational
Rules support a finding that Plaintiff is not disabled,
whether or not she has transferable job skills.
10. Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work
experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform.
11. Plaintiff was not disabled.