FROM THE THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF VERNON,
NO. 89, 794 HONORABLE VERNON B. CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE
Watters Jeffery Scot Debarge Counsel for Defendant/Appellant.
Skinner District Attorney, Terry W. Lambright First Assistant
District Attorney State of LouisianaCounsel for Appellee:
composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and
Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.
PHYLLIS M. KEATY JUDGE
Jeffery Scot Debarge, was charged by bill of information with
three counts of video voyeurism, in violation of La.R.S.
14:283, and one count of possession of pornography involving
juveniles, in violation of La.R.S. 14:81.1, to which he
tendered a plea of not guilty to all counts. Prior to that
time, Defendant's counsel had filed an Application for
Appointment of Sanity Commission, which was granted by the
trial court. After a December 2016 hearing, Defendant was
found competent to stand trial.
January 13, 2017, as part of a plea agreement, Defendant
tendered a plea of guilty to three counts of video voyeurism.
According to the factual basis for the charges presented by
the State at his guilty plea hearing, Defendant placed a
video camera inside the bathroom of the home where he lived
with his girlfriend and her nine-year-old daughter, J.I.,
which captured videos of an adult female and J.I. in various
stages of undress and nudity. Defendant also took still
photographs of J.I.'s genital and pubic area from under
the covers of her bed. In accordance with the plea agreement,
the State dismissed the count of possession of pornography
involving juveniles and recommended concurrent sentences. On
March 14, 2017, Defendant was sentenced to four years at hard
labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence for Count 1, under the provisions of La.R.S.
14:283(B)(3); to five years at hard labor without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for Count 2, in
accordance with La.R.S. 14:283(B)(4); and to seven years at
hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence for Count 3, in accordance with
La.R.S. 14:283(B)(4). The sentences were ordered to run
concurrent with each other, and Defendant was given credit
for time served from the date of his arrest.
filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence wherein he alleged his
sentences are excessive under the totality of the
circumstances. The trial court denied the motion ex parte.
Defendant timely appealed his sentence.
sole assignment of error, Defendant alleges the trial court
"imposed excessive sentences on each count that are not
warranted by the offenses or the circumstances of the first
offender,  and contain a restriction on parole that
is not authorized by the statute."
courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding
constitutionally excessive sentence review:
Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be
reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v.
Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v.
Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied,
01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court
discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:
La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, "[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual
punishment." To constitute an excessive sentence, the
reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our
sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore,
nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and
suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the
imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such
sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne,
99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ
denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad