United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER AND REASONS
JAY C. ZAINEY, UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc.
8) filed by Defendant Carpenter Health Network, LLC
(“Carpenter Health”). Plaintiff Latunya Magee
(“Magee”) has not filed an opposition. The
motion, set for submission on January 10, 2018, is before the
Court on the briefs without oral argument. This matter is set
as a jury trial beginning on August 13, 2018 at 8:30 a.m.
Having considered the motion and memoranda of counsel, the
record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that
Defendant's motion should be GRANTED for
the reasons set forth below.
Carpenter Health filed the instant motion seeking to dismiss
Plaintiff Latunya Magee's claims against Carpenter Health
for failure to state a claim for relief. On October 11, 2017,
Magee filed a Complaint against Stat Home Health, LLC
(“Stat Home Health”) and Carpenter Health
alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Magee alleges that she was harassed,
forced to work in a hostile work environment, and was
terminated based on her race. Carpenter Health seeks to
dismiss Magee's claims against it on the grounds that (1)
Magee has not and cannot allege Carpenter Health was her
employer under Title VII, (2) Magee has not and cannot allege
Carpenter Health was her employer under § 1981, and (3)
Magee failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to
Carpenter Health. (Rec. Doc. 8).
context of a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.
Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232
(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v.
Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)).
However, the foregoing tenet is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Thread-bare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is
whether, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v.
Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe
v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)). To
avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court
does not accept as true “conclusory allegations,
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”
Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407
F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal conclusions must be
supported by factual allegations. Id. (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
a court should not dismiss an action for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff
“at least one chance to amend.” Hernandez v.
Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 306 Fed.App'x
180, 182 (5th Cir. 2009); accord Great Plains Trust Co.
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305,
329 (5th Cir. 2002).
that general rule does not apply if the proposed amendment
would be futile. Townsend v. BAC Home Loans Servicing,
L.P., 461 Fed.App'x 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2011);
Jaso v. The Coca Cola Co., 435 Fed.App'x 346,
351-52 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Goodman v. Praxair,
Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 2007); Jones v.
Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003); 5B
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1357 at 714-21 (3d ed.
Law and Analysis
to her Complaint, Plaintiff was employed by Carpenter Health
as a licensed practitioner nurse beginning in October of 2014
and ending upon her termination in March of 2017. (Rec. Doc.
1, p. 3, ¶ 4). Plaintiff alleges that she saw
approximately 20-26 patients per week and her duties
included, but were not limited to: assessing patient
conditions during home visits, performing evaluation tasks,
dressing or redressing open wounds, and checking vital signs.
Id. at ¶ 5. The majority of Plaintiff's
allegations center on the actions of Melissa Hinebaugh
(“Hinebaugh”), an office manager at Stat Home
Health. Few of Plaintiff's allegations are directed
towards Carpenter Health-movant in the instant motion.
the Complaint is vague as to the nature of Plaintiff's
employment arrangement, it seems that Plaintiff was
immediately employed by Stat Home Health, which-the Complaint
makes clear-is a subsidiary company of Carpenter Health.
(Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 6). Most of Plaintiff's
allegations seemingly took place in the Stat Home Health
office and are geared towards Hinebaugh, who was undoubtedly
a Stat Home Health employee. Id. at pp. 3-6,
¶¶ 6-21. Therefore, the Court has sufficient reason
to believe that Stat Home Health was Plaintiff's
basis, Carpenter Health brings the instant motion arguing
that it is not Plaintiff's employer within the meaning of
Title VII or § 1981, and as a result, Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for relief. Carpenter Health
additionally argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a