United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER AND REASONS
D. ENGELHARDT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Rec.Doc. 45) filed by Defendants Frank Ford
and Frank Ford, LLC d/b/a/ Frank Ford Tennis
(“Defendants”). Plaintiff Thomas D'Aquin
(“D'Aquin”), proceeding pro se, has filed a
response in opposition (Rec. Doc. 49), to which Defendants
have replied. See Rec. Doc. 59. Having carefully
considered the supporting and opposing submissions, the
record, and the applicable law, IT IS
ORDERED that Defendants' motion is
GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.
instant matter arises out of Defendants' alleged breach
of a verbal contract with D'Aquin as well as
Defendants' alleged discrimination against D'Aquin
premised on the race of his wife. On July 21, 2016,
D'Aquin filed a Complaint against Defendants, seeking
relief for the breach of contract and alleged discrimination.
See Rec. Doc. 1. Specifically with regard to his
racial discrimination claim, D'Aquin alleges that,
Upon discussing tennis balls Defendant had to inquire about
spouse[.] Plaintiff informed Defendants that wife was having
immigration problems and was black[.] Defendant states did
not know spouse was not a citizen or black Defendant made
tennis balls an issue and Plaintiff thought he cleared the
matter up[.] Plaintiff arrived in town and informed of the
tennis balls again, which he know as code[.] Defendant then
informed Plaintiffs his services were not needed and contract
was no longer valid. This is a very big point because
Defendant or Representative states either contract or
(Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 2). In connection with such claim,
D'Aquin seeks $2, 000, 000 per defendant because
“having to rebuild ACES Tennis Foundation and the
mental and physically of the discrimination because of the
person he loves is irreplaceable.” Id. In
response to D'Aquin's claims, Defendants filed a
Motion for More Definite Statement (Rec. Doc. 9) on November
10, 2016. Thus, in response to this Court's Order (Rec.
Doc. 10) that granted such motion, D'Aquin filed an
Amended Complaint. See Rec. Doc. 12. In his Amended
Complaint, D'Aquin states that, Plaintiff upon the 3 day
move, Plaintiff contacted Defendants to announce his arrival.
Defendants remarked about the early arrival date and the
Plaintiff covers issues with his wife, When the Defendants
learned his wife was Black. Defendants said he needed to go
back to New Orleans because the contract was voided[.]
Plaintiff is belief contacted Defendants after demonstrating
extreme discrimination and racism called back and said he had
contacted a legal representative said that the real issue was
about the quality of tennis balls he brought in the moving
truck was unprofessional and from that point forward the
Defendants after speaking a lawyer as stated said it was
about the tennis balls. And Plaintiff was addressing
Defendants for exactly the discrimination he showed towards a
Plaintiff is not sure if the discrimination was influenced by
the sites or clubs where Plaintiff would be teaching or that
the Defendants had contracted but from the conversations it
was apparently so.
(Rec. Doc. 12 at p. 2). Thereafter, Defendants filed the
instant motion for summary judgment, arguing that they are
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because there
are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to
D'Aquin's alleged racial discrimination claim.
See Rec. Doc. 45. Specifically, Defendants argue
that: (1) D'Aquin cannot meet his burden with respect to
any discrimination claim under either Title VII or 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, and (2) D'Aquin did not exhaust the required
administrative remedies for asserting a claim for
discrimination under Title VIII. See Rec. Doc. 45-1
at p. 1.
response to the motion, D'Aquin first argues that the
motion is premature because there has not been enough
discovery. See Rec. Doc. 49 at p. 1. D'Aquin
also argues that because Defendants' company is a small
company, Defendants would not be subject to the EEOC
requirements relevant to exhausting administrative remedies
prior to bringing a Title VII claim against an employer.
Id. at p. 2. In addition, D'Aquin states that in
addition to having “[e]qual [p]rotections to hold and
sign contracts, own land, etc., ” he also has
“[e]qual [p]rotections [u]nder 388 [u]nder Loving 1967
[ ] [t]o enjoy the same rights as all white persons.”
Id. at p. 3. Thus, D'Aquin argues that the Court
must deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment and
rule in his favor. Id. at p. 4.
replied, arguing that D'Aquin has failed to offer any
competent summary judgment evidence to support any claim for
discrimination under any applicable federal law. (Rec. Doc.
59 at p. 1). With respect to any purported claim under Title
VII, Defendants argue that: “(i) he has not made a
claim for any form of discrimination under Title VII; (ii) he
did not exhaust the administrative remedies necessary to
bring a Title VII claim had he intended to bring a claim
under Title VII; and (iii) any claim under Title VII is
inappropriate since Defendants do not meet the statutory
definition of ‘employer' under 42 U.S.C. §
2000(b).” Id. at p. 3. With respect to any
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Defendants
argue that to the extent D'Aquin has made a claim for
associational discrimination, he has failed to provide any
evidentiary support for such claim. In addition, Defendants
also assert that D'Aquin's reliance on Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), is misplaced under the
instant circumstances. Thus, Defendants argue that their
motion for partial summary judgment should be granted, and
D'Aquin's claim for discrimination should be
dismissed with prejudice.
RULE 56 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
district court shall grant summary judgment “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The materiality of facts is
determined by the substantive law's identification of
which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S.Ct. ...