FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF
CALCASIEU, NO. 40406-11 HONORABLE DAVID ALEXANDER RITCHIE,
Foster DeRosier Fourteenth Judicial District Court District
Attorney Elizabeth Brooks Hollins Carla Sigler Assistant
District Attorneys FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: State of Louisiana
Christopher Hatch The Hatch Law Firm FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Christopher Shon Mace
composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, John E. Conery, and Candyce
G. Perret, Judges.
ELIZABETH A. PICKETT JUDGE
October 17, 2011, the victim's mother took time off from
work for a doctor's appointment. After seeing the doctor,
she drove home, but when she entered, she heard the teenaged
victim, D.R., "scream that [M]om's
home." She saw the girl run to the bathroom and
realized she was naked from the waist down. The defendant,
Christopher Shon Mace, who was D.R.'s stepfather, was in
his underwear. He stated the situation was not what it
appeared to be, but then suggested that he was teaching D.R.
about sex. He also stated that it was a mistake. D.R. never
discussed the matter in detail with her mother, but the
subsequent investigation revealed that the defendant had
engaged in multiple sex acts with D.R. on multiple dates.
December 1, 2011, a Calcasieu Parish Grand Jury indicted the
defendant Christopher Shon Mace for three counts aggravated
incest, at that time violations of La.R.S.
14:78.1. On July 21, 2015, the parties selected a
jury. On July 22, 2015, proceedings began with opening
statements and sequestration of the witnesses. However, the
state advised that it had learned of a new witness. As will
be discussed in more detail below, the defendant moved for a
mistrial, which the court granted.
January 12, 2016, the parties selected a jury for the second
trial; the next day, said jury began hearing evidence. On
January 15, 2016, it found the defendant guilty as charged.
The district court sentenced the defendant on March 11, 2016,
ordering him to serve three concurrent sixteen-year
sentences. Four years are suspended, and the defendant is to
be placed on supervised probation for five years.
defendant now seeks review by this court, assigning four
1. The evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support
Defendant's multiple convictions for aggravated incest.
2. The trial court erred when it denied Defendant's
motion to quash; double jeopardy prohibited the retrial of
Defendant after the mistrial in Defendant's first trial.
3. This matter should be remanded for resentencing because
Defendant's sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.
4. The trial court erred when it declined to conduct an in
camera inspection of the grand jury proceedings in the case
for exculpatory impeachment evidence.
accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are
reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the
record. After reviewing the record, we find there is one
payment plan was not established for the $2, 500.00 fine,
court costs, and $150.00 presentence investigation report fee
imposed as conditions of probation. In State v.
Arisme, 13-269, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), 123
So.3d 1259, 1262, this issue was addressed by this court:
First, as a condition of probation, the trial court ordered a
$250.00 fee to the Louisiana Crime Lab, for which a payment
plan was not established. In State v. Wagner,
07-127, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1203,
1208, this court held in pertinent part:
When the fines and costs are imposed as a condition of
probation, but the trial court is silent as to the mode of
payment or the trial court attempts to establish a payment
plan, this court has required a specific payment plan be
established. See State v. Theriot, 04-897 (La.App. 3
Cir. 2/9/05), 893 So.2d 1016 (fine, court costs, and cost of
prosecution); State v. Fuslier, 07-572 (La.App. 3
Cir. 10/31/07), 970 So.2d 83 (fine and costs); State v.
Console, 07-1422 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 875
(fine and court costs).
We view this procedure as no different from payment plans for
restitution. See State v. Dean, 99-475
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99), 748 So.2d 57, writ denied,
99-3413 (La.5/26/00), 762 So.2d 1101 (restitution only),
State v. Reynolds, 99-1847 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00),
772 So.2d 128 (restitution, fine, and costs), State v.
Stevens, 06-818 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/07), 949 So.2d 597
(restitution, fine, court costs, and reimbursement to
Indigent Defender Board), and State v. Fontenot,
01-540 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/01), 799 So.2d 1255 (restitution,
court costs and payments to victim's fund, Indigent
Defender Board, and District Attorney).
We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court for
establishment of a payment plan for the fine, noting that the
plan may either be determined by the trial court or by
Probation and Parole, with approval by the trial court.
See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.
Similarly, the trial court's ordering the payment to the
crime lab fund during the period of probation is an
insufficient payment plan. We also remand the case to the
trial court for establishment of a payment plan for these
costs, noting that the plan may either be determined by the
trial court or by Probation and Parole, with approval by the
trial court. See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.
This issue has been similarly resolved in other cases.
See State v. LaCombe, 09-544 (La.App. 3 Cir.
12/9/09), 25 So.3d 1002, and State v. Snelling,
09-1313 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 36 So.3d 1060, writ
denied, 10-1301 (La.12/17/10), 51 So.3d 16. Accordingly,
we remand this case to the trial court for the establishment
of a payment plan for the fee, noting that the plan may
either be determined by the trial court or by the Department
of Probation and Parole with approval by the trial court.
See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.
case is remanded to the trial court for the establishment of
a payment plan for the aforementioned fine, court costs, and
fee imposed as conditions of probation, noting that the plan
may either be determined by the trial court or by the
Department of Probation and Parole with approval by the trial
OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence
adduced at trial was insufficient to support his multiple
convictions. Specifically, he contends that the state failed
to present evidence of the dates when all of the offenses
This court has explained the general analysis:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on
appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing
denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126
(1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d
559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105
(La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981).
It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective
credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate
court should not second guess the credibility determinations
of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations
under the Jackson standard of review. See State
ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v.
Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this
Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must
reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
state cites State v. Foshee, 99-1423, pp. 5-6
(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/00), 756 So.2d 693, 696, which explained:
This court has held that the date of the offense of
aggravated rape of a child is not an essential element of
that crime. State v. Johnson, 95-1002 (La.App. 3
Cir. 3/26/96); 670 So.2d 651. In State v. Dixon, 628
So.2d 1295 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993), this court upheld the
defendant's conviction of aggravated rape of a
seven-year-old victim even though no witnesses mentioned a
specific date the crime was to have occurred. We concluded
that all the testimony was related to the specific time frame
within which the defendant had the continuing sexual
relationship with the victim, and that specific dates were
The date of offense is not a specific element of aggravated
incest; thus, the holdings of Johnson and
present case, the most concrete evidence regarding dates was
set forth through repeated references to the incident on
October 17, 2011, mentioned above. Also, the victim testified
that the sex acts with her stepfather had been going on for
"a couple of months" before then. More
specifically, she stated that she and the defendant had sex
the week before the October 17 offense. She testified that
the sex acts took place over the course of four months. Other
testimony indicated that the improper sexual conduct began in
May 2011. The medical testimony indicated that the victim had
been sexually penetrated on multiple occasions.
facts of this case are analogous to the facts in State v.
Navarre, 15-920, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/16), 188
So.3d 478, 481- 82, writ denied, 16-800 (La.
5/1/17), 220 So.3d 742:
the defendant argues:
An important fact to note is that the indictment states that
Mr. Navarre committed this crime between the dates of
September 9, 2009 and September 9, 2011. The Defendant was in
jail from August 3, 2011, until February 2, 2012. . . . It
would have been impossible for the Defendant to have
committed any act after August 3, 2011, contrary to the
indictment and the allegations of C[.]M.
As noted above, the credibility of a witness goes to the
weight of the evidence. The jury observed and heard C.M.
testify as to what happened to him. While C.M.'s parents
testified that C.M. was known to lie to them on occasions,
they both stated that he would lie to get himself out of
trouble but never lied solely to get someone into trouble.
Casie Barfield, a detective with the Lafayette Parish
Sheriff's Office, was the lead detective in this case.
Detective Barfield worked in the juvenile section and had
extensive training in the physical and sexual abuse of
children. The detective scheduled and observed an interview
with the children's advocacy center for C.M. The
detective testified that C.M.'s trial testimony was
consistent with what he told the police and the
children's advocacy interviewer. The detective noted it
was not unusual for victims of sexual abuse to supply more
details at trial, nor was it unusual for victims to wait for
a few years before speaking out about the abuse. Finally, the
detective stated that in these situations parents of sexual
abuse victims often get the facts confused. The detective had
no reason to believe that C.M. was not telling the truth.
. . . .
The State proved all of the elements of aggravated rape
beyond a reasonable doubt. The sexual acts commenced when the
victim was ten or eleven years old. Defendant had oral and
anal sex with the victim. Based on C.M.'s account, the
indictment alleged that the acts were committed between
September 9, 2009, two days before the victim's tenth
birthday, and September 9, 2011, two days before the
victim's thirteenth birthday. It is of no import that
Defendant was in jail in August 2011. The indictment did not
allege all of the offenses occurred in August 2011. According
to C.M.'s testimony, the first act of rape occurred when
he was ten or eleven. Defendant has failed to show internal
contradictions or irreconcilable conflicts between C.M.'s
testimony and the physical evidence in this case. C.M.'s
testimony was sufficient to establish the elements of the
the victim's testimony and other corroborating evidence
that the abuse occurred over several months, the assignment
of error lacks merit.
OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
second assignment of error, the defendant argues the district
court erred by denying his motion to quash, which was based
on double jeopardy due to the mistrial in the first trial. He
acknowledges that a defendant's motion for mistrial does
not normally bar the state from pursuing a second
prosecution. However, he argues that the state may not retry
him because it provoked the mistrial.
22, 2015, the parties gave opening statements in the first
trial, and the state's first witness testified. After
some other matters were discussed, the following colloquy
MS. KILLINGSWORTH [Prosecutor]:
Your Honor, this morning while we were in court having
openings and our first witness testifying a phone call was
received by my office that was to me, but I couldn't take
the call obviously. I got the message and it was from a man
who said that he had information about this case and his name
was John Duplechain. I asked Ms. Rhodes-May to call him back
to find out what information he had and he stated to me that
he worked __ or to her that he worked with the defendant at
the time that all of this occurred and that he had had a
conversation, including another employee, and Mr. Mace
concerning his wife catching him having sexually
inappropriate conduct with his wife.
Not with his wife.
Not with his wife, with his daughter, his stepdaughter.
Who is the victim in this case. The details that he gave are
very similar to other details that I have with regard to
statements given in this case; that only somebody who knew or
talked to the defendant would know. So I'm led to believe
that this is accurate. Also, there were two other people who
could confirm the conversation. I have talked to one __ or we
have talked to one of them who has confirmed the conversation
between he and Mr. Tybee and Mr. Mace, being Mr. Duplechain
and Mr. Franks was around, not in that exact conversation,
but they all discussed it together and about what the
ramifications were of it. They failed to call. Nobody
notified us. We had no idea that this conversation had
occurred until this morning.
The State is requesting in its supplemental motion to be
allowed to use that information, the statements that the
defendant made to those men.
Okay, Mr. Carter.
MR. CARTER [Defense Counsel]:
Your Honor, the defense has planned and prepared its defense
carefully and has spent a lot of hours on it and sent
discovery to the State on many occasions, supplemental
discovery, so we're very concerned about what the
evidence might be in this case so we can defend. We have
anticipated everything that has happened in this case until
this and everything was going as we expected it to go and as
we expected it to tie into our defense. We come up ...