United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
RULING AND ORDER
A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
the Court is the Motion to Vacate (Doc. 95) filed by
Petitioner Ramon Anderson. Petitioner requests that the Court
vacate his sentence in light of Johnson v.
United States, 576 U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). In
Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the Armed
Career Criminal Act's ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.
For the following reasons, the Motion to Vacate (Doc.
95) is DENIED.
10, 2012, in Case No. 11-cr-96, Petitioner pled guilty to
failure to register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. §
2250(a). (Doc. 40). On June 12, 2012, in Case No. 11-cr-147,
after a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of felon in
possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
(Doc. 63). On March 12, 2013, the Court sentenced Petitioner
to a term of imprisonment of 84 months in Case. No. 11-cr-96
and in Case No. 11-cr-147, to run concurrently. (Doc. 80 at
p. 3). On June 24, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he argued that the
Court should vacate his sentence on the basis of the
Johnson decision. (Doc. 95). On September 11, 2017,
the Court ordered the United States to respond to
Petitioner's motion. (Doc. 98). Thereafter, the United
States filed a response. (Doc. 99).
2255 provides that a federal prisoner serving a court-imposed
sentence may move the court to vacate, set aside or correct
his sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Only a narrow set of
claims are cognizable on a Section 2255 motion. The statute
identifies four grounds on which a motion may be made: (1)
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States; (2) the court was without
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds
the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is
"otherwise subject to collateral attack."
2015, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the
ACCA is unconstitutionally vague and therefore "imposing
an increased sentence under the residual clause . . .
violates the Constitution's guarantee of due
process." Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563. In
Welch v. United States, 576 U.S.___, 165 S.Ct. 1257,
1268 (2016), the Supreme Court also held that
Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review.
Obviously, the ruling in Johnson is only applicable
to those defendants who were sentenced as armed career
argues that the Court should vacate his sentence because he
was sentenced under the residual clause of the ACCA. (Doc. 95
at pp. 1-2). Petitioner avers that he is entitled to relief
from his alleged sentencing enhancement under both
§§ 2k2.1(a)(4)(A) and 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. (Id.). The United
States argues that Johnson is inapplicable because
the Court did not sentence Petitioner as an armed career
criminal. (Doc. 99 at p. 2). The United States further
asserts that at sentencing, both the United States and
counsel for Petitioner agreed that Petitioner did not qualify
as an armed career criminal as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
Court agreed and determined that Petitioner did not meet the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). (Doc. 81 at p. 1).
The Court also found that there was not enough evidence to
support the imposition of the armed criminal enhancement as
suggested in the presentence investigation
report. (Id.). Thus, Petitioner is not
entitled to Johnson relief because Johnson
only applies to offenders sentenced under the ACCA.
Petitioner's motion to vacate is denied. Additionally,
Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 95 at ¶
7) is denied because there is no constitutional right to
counsel in § 2255 proceedings. See United States v.
Vasquez, 7 F.3d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1993).
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to
Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (Doc.
95) is DENIED.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to
Appoint Counsel (Doc. 95 at ¶ 7) is DENIED.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for
Rebecca L. Hudsmith to Withdraw (Doc. ...