United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana
RULING AND ORDER
A. JACKSON, CHIEF JUDGE
the Court is the Motion to Vacate (Doc. 30)
and the Amended Issue to Petitioner's Motion to
Vacate (sic) (Doc. 40) filed by Petitioner Gregory
Mumphrey. Petitioner requests that the Court vacate his
sentence in light of Johnson v. United States, 576
U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). In Johnson, the
Supreme Court held that the Armed Career Criminal Act's
(“ACCA”) residual clause is unconstitutionally
vague. For the following reasons, the Motion to
Vacate (Doc. 30) and the Amended Issue to
Petitioner's Motion to Vacate (Doc. 40) are
6, 2012, Petitioner pled guilty to possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Docs. 11
and 19). On November 1, 2012, the Court sentenced Petitioner
to a 180 month term of imprisonment. (Doc. 28 at p. 2). On
November 6, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate under
28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he argues that the Court
should vacate his sentence in light of Johnson.
(Doc. 30). Then, on August 4, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion
requesting that the Court enter a judgment on his Motion to
Vacate. (Doc. 33). On August 22, 2017, Petitioner filed an
Amended Issue to his Motion to Vacate (Doc. 40), in which he
argues that the Court should vacate his sentence in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Mathis, 579 U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). On September
11, 2017, the Court ordered the United States to respond to
Petitioner's motions. (Doc. 41). Thereafter, the United
States filed a response. (Doc. 46).
2255 provides that a federal prisoner serving a court-imposed
sentence may move the court to vacate, set aside or correct
his sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Only a narrow set of
claims are cognizable on a Section 2255 motion. The statute
identifies four grounds on which a motion may be made: (1)
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States; (2) the court was without
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds
the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is
“otherwise subject to collateral attack.”
ACCA prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms. 18
U.S.C. § 922(g). This crime ordinarily carries a maximum
sentence of ten years. Id. §924(a)(2).
But if the defendant has three previous convictions for a
“violent felony, ” then the ACCA elevates the
statutory sentencing range to a minimum of fifteen years and
maximum of life. Id. § 924(e)(1).
ACCA defines “violent felony” in three ways:
• The elements clause defines a violent felony as a
crime that “has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
• The enumerated clause provides that a violent felony
includes “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or a crime
that] involves use of explosives[.]” Id.
• The residual clause defines a violent felony as a
crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
2015, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague and therefore “imposing an
increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed
Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution's guarantee
of due process.” Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563.
Johnson, however, did not call into question the
elements clause or the enumerated clause of the ACCA.
Id. at 2563. In Welch v. United States, 576
U.S. __, 165 S.Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016), the Supreme Court also
held that Johnson applies retroactively on
argues that the Court should vacate his sentence because he
was sentenced under the residual clause of the ACCA. (Doc.
30-2 at p. 3-6). The government argues that Johnson
is inapplicable because the Court sentenced Petitioner under
the enumerated clause of the ACCA. (Doc. 46 at p. 4). At
sentencing, the Court indicated that it was sentencing
Petitioner under the ACCA because “he has been
convicted of three serious felonies, that is, simple burglary
of an inhabited dwelling.” (Doc. 27 at p. 4). The
presentence investigation report, to which Petitioner did not
object at ...