from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi
REAVLEY, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:
Jauch was indicted by a grand jury, arrested, and put in
jail- where she waited for 96 days to be brought before a
judge and was effectively denied bail. The district court
found this constitutionally permissible. It is not. A
pre-trial detainee denied access to the judicial system for a
prolonged period has been denied basic procedural due
process, and we therefore reverse the district court's
the word of a confidential informant, a grand jury indicted
Jessica Jauch for the sale of a Schedule IV controlled
substance on January 24, 2012.
same day, the Choctaw County Circuit Clerk issued a capias
warrant. The capias reads:
You are hereby commanded to take Jessica Jauch if to
be found in your County, and him/her safely keep, so that you
have his/her body before the Circuit Court of the County
of Choctaw, in said State, at the Courthouse in the town
of Ackerman, MS, on the 31st day of January, 2012,
then and there to answer the State of Mississippi on an
indictment found against him/her on the 24th day of
January, 2012, for:
Ct. 1: Sale of a Schedule IV Controlled Substance
April 26, 2012, Starkville Police Department officers pulled
Jauch over, issued her several traffic tickets, and informed
her of an outstanding misdemeanor warrant in Choctaw County.
Choctaw County deputies took custody of Jauch and transported
her to the Choctaw County Jail where, the next morning, she
was served with the misdemeanor warrant and the capias. Jauch
cleared the misdemeanor warrant within a few days. She
nonetheless remained detained on the capias, and her requests
to be brought before a judge and allowed to post bail were
denied. Jail officials informed Jauch that Sheriff Halford
had confirmed she could not be taken before a judge until
August when the next term of the Circuit Court commenced.
When a friend of Jauch's reached the sheriff on the
telephone, he told her the same thing. Jauch's
protestations of innocence were ineffectual.
days after being taken into custody, Jauch's case moved
forward. She received an appointed attorney, waived formal
arraignment, had bail set, and had a trial date set. Six days
later, on August 6, 2012, she posted bail. Before the end of
the month, the prosecutor reviewed the evidence against Jauch
and promptly moved to dismiss the charge. On January 29,
2013, the Circuit Court of Choctaw County entered the
dismissal. It is undisputed that Jauch was innocent all
along, as she had claimed from behind bars.
April 21, 2015, Jauch sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging Sheriff Halford and Choctaw County caused her
constitutional deprivations. Both parties eventually moved
for summary judgment. The district court observed that Jauch
asserted violations of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments but treated the Fourteenth Amendment claims
(procedural and substantive due process) as an attack on the
original probable cause determination underlying her arrest.
It ruled against her on the basis of procedural due process
because state law renders the probable cause determination of
a grand jury conclusive, meaning Jauch was not entitled to a
hearing (like an initial appearance or preliminary hearing)
where she could challenge that determination. With respect to
substantive due process, the district court found the Fourth
Amendment applied more squarely to such a claim, and then
found the Fourth Amendment was not violated because
the undisputedly valid probable cause determination supported
the arrest. We note that Jauch never alleged a Fourth
Amendment violation nor sought to challenge the probable
cause determination made by the grand jury.
district court also ruled against Jauch with respect to her
Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims. It further ruled that
Choctaw County was not subject to municipal liability under
Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978), and that
Sheriff Halford was entitled to qualified immunity. Based on
these rulings, the district court denied Jauch's motion
for summary judgment and ordered judgment in favor of the
defendants. Jauch timely appealed.
review a district court judgment on cross-motions for summary
judgment de novo." Cedyco Corp. v. PetroQuest
Energy, LLC, 497 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 2007). Each
party's motion is considered "independently, viewing
the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party." Green v. Life Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 754 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2014). "Summary
judgment is appropriate when 'there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting
address only the Fourteenth Amendment and hold that this
excessive detention, depriving Jauch of liberty without legal
or due process, violated that Amendment; for that reason, her
motion for summary judgment should have been granted as to
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim.
Moving Beyond the Fourth Amendment
district court treated Jauch's due process claim as a
Fourth Amendment claim, reasoning that "[b]ecause an
arrest is a seizure, . . . the more particularized Fourth
Amendment analysis [is] appropriate" and concluding that
because probable cause supported Jauch's arrest, there
was no constitutional violation. This analysis dooms
Jauch's claim and seemingly means the Constitution is not
violated by prolonged pretrial detention so long as the
arrest is supported by probable cause.
this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued Manuel
v. City of Joliet, which held that a defendant seized
without probable cause could challenge his pretrial detention
under the Fourth Amendment. 137 S.Ct. 911, 917 (2017).
Manuel does not address the availability of due
process challenges after a legal seizure, and it cannot be
read to mean, as Defendants contend, that only the
Fourth Amendment is available to pre-trial detainees. For
example, even when the detention is legal, a pre-trial
detainee subjected to excessive force properly invokes the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Brothers v.
Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). So, too,
may a legally seized pre-trial ...