United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
ORDER AND REASONS
S. VANCE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
March 3, 2009, defendant Marchello Jones pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to commit a drug trafficking crime in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 851 and discharging a firearm
during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(iii). In the plea agreement, Jones waived his
right to appeal and collaterally challenge his conviction and
sentence. Jones was sentenced to 240 months
imprisonment for conspiracy to commit a drug trafficking
offense and 120 months for discharging a firearm during a
drug trafficking crime, to be served
consecutively. Jones's direct appeal was dismissed as
now asks the Court to vacate his sentence in light of
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551
(2015). The Court in Johnson held that
the “residual clause” of the Armed Career
Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague. 135 S.Ct. at 2557.
This clause defines a “violent felony” as, among
other things, a felony “involv[ing] conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The
Court's opinion in Johnson did not affect, or
even address, the “drug trafficking crime”
definition in Section 924.
claim is meritless. He points out that Section 924(c) contains
a residual clause in the “crime of violence”
definition. Id. § 924(c)(3)(B) (defining
“crime of violence” as, among other things, a
felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense”).
But Jones was convicted of discharging a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, not a crime
of violence. The statute's definition of “drug
trafficking crime” includes no residual clause.
Id. § 924(c)(2) (“For purposes of this
subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking crime' means
any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or
chapter 705 of title 46.”). Because Johnson
has no bearing on Jones's § 924(c) conviction, the
Court DENIES Jones's petition for post-conviction relief.
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provide that
“[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate
of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings,
Rule 11(a). A court may only issue a certificate of
appealability if the petitioner makes “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The “controlling
standard” for a certificate of appealability requires
the petitioner to show “that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented [are] ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.'” Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). With respect to
claims denied on procedural grounds, the petitioner must make
a two-part showing: (1) that “jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling, ” and (2) that “jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.”
Johnson v. Quarterman, 483 F.3d 278, 284 (5th
Cir.2007) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
reasons set forth in this order denying relief, Jones fails
to satisfy this standard, and the Court DENIES a certificate
 See R. Doc. 197; R. Doc. 245;
R. Doc. 54.
 R. Doc. 197 at 3.
 R. Doc. 245 at 2.
 R. Doc. 269.
 R. Docs. 359, 365.