United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division
HORNSBY MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
MAURICE HICKS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court are three motions filed by Plaintiff Amber Hahmer
Ulrich (“Ulrich”): (1) Motion to Reconsider
Summary Judgment FRCP 59(e) and Rule 60(b) (Record Document
64); (2) Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss Detective Ray
FRCP 59(e) and Rule 60(b) (Record Document 67); and (3)
Motion to Amend Complaint (Record Document 70). Defendants
oppose all three motions. See Record Documents 66,
69, 72, and 73. For the reasons contained in the instant
Memorandum Ruling, Ulrich's motions are
59(e) provides that “a motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry
of the judgment.” F.R.C.P. 59(e). “Generally, a
motion to alter or amend a judgment, filed under Rule 59(e)
may be granted: (1) to correct manifest errors of law or fact
upon which judgment is based; (2) the availability of new
evidence; (3) the need to prevent manifest injustice; or (4)
an intervening change in controlling law.” Hill v.
Kervin, No. CIV A 08-272-P, 2009 WL 2254295, at *1 (W.D.
La. July 28, 2009). Altering or amending a judgment is
considered “an extraordinary measure, which courts
should use sparingly.” In the Matter of Self,
172 F.Supp.2d 813, 816 (W.D. La.2001).
60(b) provides that “the court may relieve a party or
its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any
other reason that justifies relief.” F.R.C.P. 60(b).
“Relief under Rule 60(b) is considered an extraordinary
remedy, ” as the “desire for a judicial process
that is predictable mandates caution in reopening
judgments.” Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000,
1007 (5th Cir.1998) (citation omitted).
Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment FRCP 59(e) and Rule
60(b) (Record Document 64)
labeled as a motion to reconsider a summary judgment ruling,
Ulrich asks the Court to reconsider its ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. On August 16, 2016, this Court
granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by Defendants, Caddo
Parish Assistant District Attorneys Geya Prudhomme
(“Prudhomme”), Jordan Bird (“Bird”)
and Kenya Ellis (“Ellis”). See Record
Documents 60 & 61. All federal and state law claims
against Prudhomme, Bird and Ellis were dismissed. See
id. As to Defendants Bird and Prudhomme, Ulrich contends
the Court's ruling was in error and creates manifest
injustice. See Record Document 64 at
She asks the Court to apply “relevant case law, ”
specifically Loupe v. O'Bannon, 824 F.3d 534
(5th Cir. 2016) and Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752
(5th Cir. 2015), and reconsider the dismissal of all claims
against Defendants Prudhomme and Bird. See id.
Ulrich argues that she has plead actions on the part of
Prudhomme and Bird which form a cause of action not protected
by absolute immunity. See Record Document 64-1 at 7.
Court has reviewed both Loupe and Cole and
finds neither case dictates reconsideration in this instance.
In Loupe, the Fifth Circuit addressed the
applicability of absolute immunity to a claim against a
prosecutor who had ordered a warrantless arrest after a judge
refused to issue a bench warrant. See Loupe, 824
F.3d at 540. In Cole, the Fifth Circuit discussed
absolute immunity in the context of law enforcement officers
and prosecutors who lie or provide false information. See
Cole, 802 F.3d at 774-776. The court noted that a
prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when he
falsifies an affidavit supporting an arrest warrant. See
id. at 775. Here, Defendants Prudhomme and Bird did not
order a warrantless arrest. Moreover, they did not execute an
affidavit or testify under oath as witnesses in order to
secure a bench warrant. Loupe and Cole are
factually distinguishable from the instant matter and neither
case serves as intervening change in controlling law. See
Hill, 2009 WL 2254295, at *1. Ulrich has failed to
demonstrate that the extraordinary remedy of reconsideration,
whether it be under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), is warranted.
Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss Detective Ray FRCP
59(e) and Rule 60(b) (Record Document
August 29, 2016, this Court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
filed by Defendant, Shreveport Police Officer Jimmy N. Ray
(“Officer Ray”). See Record Documents 62
& 63. The Court held that Officer Ray was entitled to
qualified immunity and all of Ulrich's claims against
Officer Ray were dismissed with prejudice. See id.
The Court also granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to the
federal and state law claims against the City of Shreveport
(“the City”), finding no viable Monell
claim and no viable vicarious liability state law claim
because “in the absence of any underlying tortious
conduct of City employees, there can be no vicarious
liability on the part of the City.” Record Document 62
at 13. Ulrich now moves for reconsideration, arguing that the
Court's ruling “was issued in error and creates
manifest injustice as to the dismissal of Detective Jimmy N.
Ray and the City under state law.” Record Document 67
at 2. Ulrich argues that she has plead actions on the part of
Officer Ray that “form a cause of action no protected
by qualified immunity” and that “provide a basis
for state law claims.” Id. Ulrich focuses on
her malicious prosecution and double jeopardy claims.
See Record Document 67-1 at 4-7.
review of the Third Amended Complaint reveals that Ulrich
asserted a Fifth Amendment claim grounded in double jeopardy
protection and a claim for “violation of due process,
malicious prosecution, ” both federal claims.
See Record Document 39 at ¶¶ 39-44, 51-52.
Moreover, Ulrich's state law claims are asserted against
the City and the City Attorney, not Officer Ray. See
id. at ¶¶ 53-58. There is no specific
reference to Officer Ray in the factual allegations relating
to Ulrich's state law claims. See id. Ulrich has
not met her burden of establishing a reason under Rule 59(e)
or Rule 60(b) to warrant reconsideration of this Court's
analysis of qualified immunity as to the federal claims or
the dismissal of the state law claims. At this late stage,
rehashing arguments and/or alleging new factual allegations,
which could have previously been pled, are insufficient bases
Motion to Amend Complaint (Record Document 70)
has also filed a motion to amend her Complaint to further
details the claims against Defendant Prudhomme in her
individual capacity, seeking to avoid absolute immunity.
See Record Document 70 at 2. Ulrich likewise seeks
to amend her ...